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ABSTRACT
TYPES OF POWER ASSERTION AND THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF POWER IN MARRIAGE
by
JOYCE E. FOSS
This research explores the types of power assertions, 
or "power modes," used by married couples. The combined 
observation and self-report study includes seventy-eight 
couples, some of whom were receiving marital counseling. The 
interaction stimulus was the Inventory of Marital Conflict 
(IMC) task developed by Olson and Ryder. This is a highly- 
involving, realistic conflict resolution task which induces 
disagreement between the participants.
Previous theoretical and empirical work has focused 
almost exclusively on explaining variations in the distri­
bution of power in marriage. In this research, new data 
are provided concerning relationships between such variables 
as personal resources, authority, reported power, and decision­
making outcomes. A contribution in this area is the still 
uncommon multi-method (observation ans self-report) and 
multi-subject (husbands and wives) approach.
The overriding issue in the project is how marital 
partners go about "powering," or the types of power assertions
xiv
they use. Attention to this issue means going beyond analysis 
of the fairly stable distribution of power toward a poten­
tially more dynamic, process-oriented approach to confronta­
tion and change in families.
Toward this end, the Marital Power Assertion Coding 
System (MPACS) was developed to code laboratory interaction 
stimulated by the IMC task. The system contains three broad 
divisions, each with several sub-types: (1) unqualified, direct
power assertions; (2) qualified, indirect power assertion (in­
cludes persuasion, attempts at situation definition, and 
consequence identification); and (3) bilateral power assertions 
(explicit attempts to bargain or negotiate). In presenting
i
the findings based on this system, emphasis is placed on 
basic descriptive information, husband-wife differences in types 
of power assertions, verbal aggression as a type of power 
assertion, and implications of the research for analogies 
between families and zero-sum or mixed motive games. In 
addition, relationships between power modes and the power dis­
tribution and outcomes variables are explored.
xv
CHAPTER I
POWER MODES: A NEGLECTED AREA OF FAMILY STUDY
The voluminous literature on power relations in 
families has been characterized by a great deal of contro­
versy over concepts, methodology, and theory. The most 
basic issue is how power ought to be defined. In particular 
is power an ability or potential to influence, or does it 
refer to actual attempts to influence or control outcomes, 
or even only to successful attempts at influence? Further, 
is power a single, unidimensional concept, or is it multi­
dimensional— i.e., an umbrella term for all the dimensions 
just mentioned? (These issues are addressed in some detail 
in Chapter III, and for recent discussions and critiques 
see Olson and Cromwell, 1975; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970; 
Sprey, 1972; Straus, 1976; and Turk, 1975).
Some major methodological issues include the rela­
tive usefulness of observation and self-report methods 
(Olson, 1969; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972) 
the use of "win scores" as a measure of power in observation 
studies (Turk, 1974); and the use of a single family member 
(the wife) to report on marital power (Safilios-Rothschild, 
1970).
1
2The almost exclusive theoretical concern with the 
distribution of power, or the relative amounts of power of 
family members, has also been questioned (Foss and Straus, 
1975; Sprey, 1972, 1975). It is this last issue which is 
of paramount importance here.
The resource theory of power, a variant of exchange 
theory (Cromwell and Olson, 1975:24; Smith, 1970), has domi­
nated the recent study of marital power relations. This 
approach, at a most basic level, suggests that the marital 
partner with the greater personal resources relative to the 
other will have a greater ability to influence the other 
(Blood and Wolfe, 1960:11-12). The development of this 
theory within family sociology has taken the form of tying 
it more closely to exchange theory (Heer, 1963; Smith, 1970), 
as well as specifying it cross-culturally in terms of cul­
tural norms about who should have more power (Burr, 1973; 
Rodman, 1972). In addition, the notion of resources has 
figured prominently in models of power developed outside 
the family sociology arena. Examples of recent general 
developments include Rogers' (1974) typology of resources 
as bases of power, and Buckley and Burns (1975) work on 
meta-power.
Until recently, the study of power relations spec­
ifically in marriage, based heavily on resource theory, has 
been almost solely concerned with one aspect of power 
structure: The relatively stable distribution of power.
Little attention has been paid to processual aspects of
3power. In an analysis of measures of family power available 
through 1965, Foss and Straus found that almost all measures 
referring to the husband-wife relationship focus on the 
relative amounts of power (power distribution). There is a 
corresponding lack of measures of how husbands and wives go 
about influencing each other (1975:15).^
Others have noted the lack of theoretical attention 
to power processes in marriage. Olson and Cromwell observe 
that "very little systematic work has been done on the family 
power processes" (1975:6), and Sprey has called for a shift 
in analytical focus to the study of "powering" or the 
"ongoing confrontation in which the power inputs of all 
participants are reciprocally put to the test" (1972:236).
It is not suggested here that the distribution of 
power is unimportant, nor that it has already received 
enough attention. The recent critiques and assessments of 
the state of the art of measuring power distribution them­
selves indicate that a great deal still needs to be done 
in this area (see Bahr, 1972; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972;
Olson and Cromwell, 1975; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970; Turk 
and Bell, 1972). Rather, it is suggested that preoccupation 
with the relative amounts of power of husbands and wives
•^ The situation is completely reversed with reference 
to parent-child measures. Apparently there is an assumption 
that children have little or no power, and thus these 
measures focus not on the power distribution, but on the 
"powering techniques" used by parents on their children (but 
not those used by children on parents) (Foss and Straus, 1975).
4(power distribution) may blind us to the importance of 
also investigating the techniques by which marital partners 
attempt to exercise power. We need to develop measures 
and models for the study of types of power assertion (power 
modes).
Such an addition to a model of marital power 
relations could make at least three basic contributions. 
First, asking how decisions or resolutions are reached, 
rather than who wins, encourages a shift away from an ex­
clusively win-lose view of marital power (Sprey, 1971). 
Second, the question "who wins" tends to discourage moving 
beyond the individual level of analysis, especially in 
studying dyadic relationships like marriage. In contrast, 
examining power modes may encourage less individualistic 
analysis. Third, if structure is defined as a pattern 
characteristic of a relationship at a given point in time, 
and if the power distribution is an aspect of power struc­
ture, then an exclusive focus on the distribution of power 
means an exclusive focus on a fairly static aspect of power 
relations. To the extent that types of power assertions 
(power modes) develop a characteristic pattern in a marriage, 
they too are an aspect of power structure and can be 
treated as static. However, analysis of power modes 
seems more likely to contribute to the eventual study of 
process and dynamics in power relations. Thus, a third 
potential advantage of extending current models of marital
5power to include power inodes lies in the development of 
an ultimately more dynamic, process-oriented approach.
Based on laboratory observations and self-reports 
of seventy-eight married couples, the research described 
here has as its overriding goal the exploration of types of 
power assertion and their relationships to other important 
dimensions of power. Figure 1 serves as a guide to the 
research, by identifying the variables included and offering 
a preliminary model of how power modes may be incorporated 
into current approaches to marital power relations.
Briefly, power modes are treated as equal in impor­
tance to "attributed p o w e r i n  providing a bridge between 
the personal resources of group members and the outcomes 
of group decision-making or conflict resolution. In the 
figure, "power modes," or types of power assertion, is 
heavily outlined to indicate that this is the central variable 
in the research. The heavy solid lines indicate the main 
relationships to be explored— those between power modes 
and personal resources, power distribution norms, attributed 
power, and "outcome variables." Light solid lines indicate 
sub-relationships which might be explored in future research, 
and/or indicate where mutual causal influence is expected.
9
Attributed power refers to the power distribution, 
usually assessed through self-report methods. See Chapter 


















Figure 1. Partial Model of Power Relations
OBJECTIVES AND REVIEW OF CHAPTERS
Chapter II presents the method of data gathering 
and sample description for the research. The remaining 
chapters are reviewed here in the context of their contri­
butions to the objectives of the project.
1. To Clarify Important Dimensions of Power
This is actually a sub-goal of the project, necessi­
tated by the present state of controversy and confusion con­
cerning power concepts. Any current study of power relations 
in the family must somehow come to grips with basic conceptual 
issues. In Chapters III and V, variables included in this 
study, such as resources, power norms, and power modes, are 
discussed in considerable detail. At the very least, the 
rather lengthy discussions of key concepts should make 
explicit how power terms are being used in this particular 
research. However, it is also hoped that others will find 
the approach offered here useful, and a more general con­
tribution toward conceptual clarification in this area will 
be made.
2. To Provide Further Data Concerning Resources and the 
Distribution of Power in Marriages
The research includes several variables which 
refer to personal resources and to the distribution of power.
A second sub-goal of the project is to examine relationships 
among these variables, and thus to provide further data 
relevant to an aspect of power relations which, while already
8heavily researched, is by no means sufficiently understood. 
Chapter IV is devoted to this issue.
3. To Develop a Typology of, and System of Coding, Power 
Assertions Made By Husbands and Wives in the Context of 
Laboratory Interaction
The types of power assertions made by marital part­
ners are the central concern of this study. As indicated 
above, the focus of research and theory in this area has been 
on the distribution of power. The question of how spouses 
go about "powering" has largely been neglected. Thus, the 
development of a coding system for power modes should make 
a major contribution toward measurement in this field.
Further, relationships among types of power assertions may 
be explored. In addition, devising a typology of power 
assertions in marital interaction should help in ascertaining 
the parameters of power modes which can be observed in a 
laboratory setting, as well as in providing a baseline which 
might ultimately be extended toward examining the broader 
range of power assertions which are available in a natural 
setting. The concept of power modes is discussed in detail 
in Chapter V, while Chapter VI presents the coding system 
devised for the study, basic descriptive findings, and analysis 
of inter-code relationships.
4. To Explore Relationships between Power Modes and Variables 
Which Represent the Distribution of Power and Personal Re­
sources
In particular, possible relationships between power 
modes and personal resources, power distribution norms,
9and self-reports about the power structure (attributed 
power) are examined in Chapter VII. The development of a 
typology of power assertions is viewed here as a first step 
toward a more dynamic, processual approach to marital power 
relations. The objective of this aspect of the research is 
to provide some initial inquiry into relationships between 
aspects of the power structure and power processes in 
marriage.
5. To Explore Relationships between Power Modes and the. 
Outcomes of Conflict Resolution
Beyond the major objective of devising a typology 
and coding scheme for powering techniques or power modes, 
one thrust of this research is toward examining the extent 
to which aspects of the distribution of power may affect or 
explain the use of different types of power assertions (see 
4 above). However, it has also been suggested that power 
modes act as a bridge between such aspects of the power 
structure and the outcomes of decision-making or conflict 
resolution events. Therefore, the types of power assertions 
made by marital partners may have important implications for 
the kinds of solutions they arrive at. In order to explore 
such implications, the relationships between power modes 
and outcome variables are examined in Chapter VII. Finally, 




The present exploration of power modes and their 
relationships to other dimensions of power is based on a 
combined self-report and observation study of seventy- 
eight married couples, carried out at the University of 
New Hampshire during the summer of 19 75. This Chapter 
describes the sample selection, basic sample characteristics, 
and data-gathering procedures for the overall project. In 
addition, features of the larger project which have special 
importance for this particular research on power modes are 
discussed.
SAMPLE SELECTION
A total of seventy-eight couples participated in 
the overall project. Couples were chosen through three 
selection procedures. An initial attempt to obtain a 
random sample from the Dover City Directory provided only 
eight couples.'*' As a result of this poor response, a
■*-For the Dover sample, letters describing the project 
were mailed, followed by telephone calls by personnel from a 
professional research agency. Even before all seventy-five 
households initially in the sample had been contacted, it 
was clear the response was very low.
second procedure was developed for the town of Durham. 
Potential subjects were randomly selected from the town 
voting lists. A personal visit was made to the home of 
each potential subject couple to determine if the couples 
met the criteria for inclusion in the study, and to explain 
the nature of the project. One hundred twenty potential 
couples were selected based on the criteria that they be 
married and living together in Durham at the time of the 
sample selection. Couples who were divorced, separated, no 
longer living in Durham, etc., were not considered part of 
the universe from which the sample was drawn. For the 
eligible couples, the personal visit was followed after a 
day or two with a phone call to arrange an appointment.
The response rate in Durham was 45 percent, or fifty-four 
of the one hundred twenty eligible couples.
Finally, sixteen of the couples were referred to the 
project by private marriage counselors and agencies which 
provide marriage counseling services in the Seacoast area 
(within which the non-agency couples were also located).
2
An attempt was made to contact all of the agencies 
and private counselors in the area. Only one private coun­
selor could not be contacted after repeated attempts. Of 
the remaining five private counselors and three agencies, 
all expressed considerable interest and the intention of 
referring clients. Only one of the private counselors did 
not, in fact, refer at least one couple.
With the exception of one agency, all of these sources 
followed a procedure of describing the project to client 
couples and suggesting that they call the project for an 
appointment. For the other agency, a project staff member 
was given names of interested clients and telephoned them
12
Differences Among Sub-Samples
The above differences in selection procedures 
and response rates suggest possible differences among the 
three sub-samples in reasons for participating and 
characteristics of the subjects.
Several reasons may be offered as to why the response 
in Dover was so much lower than in Durham. First, the letter 
mailed to Dover residents was, in retrospect, too lengthy 
and elaborate. A much briefer and simpler description of 
the project was given to Durham residents during the initial 
contact at home. Second, the personal visit in Durham pro­
vided an opportunity to clarify the project and allay mis­
givings (not to mention the greater difficulty of saying no 
in a face-to-face encounter). Third, the association of 
the project with the University of New Hampshire was probably 
a more positive factor for residents of Durham (where the 
University of New Hampshire is located) than for those in 
Dover. Last but not necessarily least, it was much easier 
for Durham residents to get to the research site.
In terms of assessing the 45 percent response rate 
in Durham alone, the length of time required to participate 
(about two hours), the fact that videotaping was part of the 
procedure, and the necessity of obtaining the participation
for an appointment. This agency also preferred to have 
sessions conducted at its own facilities, so three of the 
sixteen sessions with agency couples were not conducted at 
the main research site.
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of both spouses, all suggest that a relatively low response 
should be expected. On the other hand, the ten dollar 
stipend paid to each non-agency couple, and the number of 
people in the community who are involved with the University, 
may have produced a higher response than would otherwise 
be expected.
The motivation for participating in the project was 
probably somewhat different for the couples referred by area 
counselors. The project was presented to these couples 
partly as an opportunity for an experience which might be 
helpful for them and/or their counselors in dealing with 
their problems. These couples did not receive a stipend, as 
it was decided in concert with the counselors that it would 
seem strange to receive payment for a counseling-related 
experience. Finally, whether and on what basis agency 
couples were selected for referral was left to the discretion 
of the counselors. In addition, some couples who were re­
ferred may not actually have contacted the project. Thus, 
the couples included in the sample are not necessarily repre­
sentative of couples in marriage counseling in this area.
Given the response rate in the Durham and especially 
the Dover sub-samples, and the inclusion of couples referred 
by marriage counselors, the generalizability of findings from 
the sample as a whole is limited. Despite this, the com­
bined sample has the advantage of being moderately large in 
comparison with those used in other observational studies of 
marital interaction.
The specific research on power modes includes all 
of the seventy-eight couples who participated in the project. 
While the larger project required the inclusion of both agency 
and non-agency couples, general comparisons of these two 
groups are not an objective of this particular study. How­
ever, beyond augmenting the size of the sample, the agency 
couples are important to this research in that they may use 
a range of power modes which is somewhat different from the 
range used by couples who are not in counseling. The inclusion 
of these couples, then, may provide an opportunity to observe 
a broader range of power assertions than would be possible 
if only non-clinical couples were included. This is important 
for developing the system of coding power modes. At best, 
including agency couples in the study ensures the broadest 
possible typology of power modes. At worst, in this 
respect, there are no differences between the two groups 
of couples.
BASIC SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Table 2.1 presents basic characteristics of the 
wives in the sample, and Table 2.2 presents the same character­
istics for the husbands. Each table also breaks down the 
sample information separately for clinical and non-clinical 
couples.^
•%ote that the clinical/non-clinical breakdown here 
is based on whether the couple was referred to the project 
by an area counselor. Some of the so-called "non-clinical"
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Table 2.1. Sample Characteristics of Wives, for Clinical, 









Protestant 75.8 69.4 70.5
Catholic 18.8 21.0 20.5
Other/None 6.3 9.7 9.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (62) (78)
Children
None 37.5 8.1 14.1
At least one under
6 years of age 25.0 17.7 19.2
All 6 years of age
or older 37.5 74.2 66.7
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (62) (78)
Personal Income
Under $1000 26.7 50.0 45.3
$1000-$5999 53.3 26.7 32.0
$6000-$9999 6.7 11.7 10.7
$10000-$14999 6.7 10.0 9.3
$15000-$19999 - 1.7 1.3
$20000-$24999 - - -
$25000 and over 6.7 - 1.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (15) (60) (75)
Total Family Income
Under $6000 6.7 1.7 2.7
$6000-$9999 26.7 8.3 12.0
$10000-$14999 40.0 18.3 22.7
$15000-$19999 20.0 25.0 24.0
$20000-$24999 - 18.3 14.7
$25000 and over 6.7 28.3 24.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0











High school or less 50.0 16.1 23.1
Partial college 50.0 35.5 38.5
College grad - 35.5 28.2
Graduate work - 12.9 10.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (62) (78)
Work Status 
Full time 43.8 36.8 38.4
Part time 25.0 22.8 23.3
Other 31.3 40.4 38.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0





sional 9.1 32.4 26.7
Administrative/minor 
professional 17.6 13.3
Clerical/sales 27.3 38.2 35.6
Blue collar 63.6 8.8 22.2
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0














Mean 32.1 42.0 40.0
Median 31.5 43.2 38.5
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Table 2.2. Sample Characteristics of Husbands, for Clinical, 









Protestant 62.5 71.0 69.2
Catholic 37.5 19.4 23.1
Other/None - 9.7 7.7
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (62) (78)
Children
None 37.5 8.1 14.1
At least one under
6 years of age 31.3 19.4 21.8
All 6 years of age
or older 31.3 72.6 64.1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (62) (78)
Personal Income
Under $1000 - 1.7 1.3
$1000-$5999 6.3 8.3 7.9
$6000-$9999 43.8 6.7 14.5
$10000-$14999 43.8 16.7 22.4
$15000-$19999 - 30.0 23.7
$20000-$24999 - 20.0 15.8
$25000 and over 6.3 16.7 14.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (60) (76)
Total Family Income
Under $6000 - 1.7 1.3
$6000-$9999 25.0 6.7 10.5
$10000-$14999 50.0 13.3 21.1
$15000-$19999 18.8 25.0 23.7
$20000-$24999 - 20.0 15.8
$25000 and over 6.3 33.3 27.6
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.6











High school or less 43.8 11.3 17.9
Partial college 37.5 12.9 17.9
College grad 18.8 33.9 30.8
Graduate work - 41.9 33.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (62) (78)
Work Status 
Full time 81.3 89.8 88.0
Part time 6.3 3.4 4.0
Other 12.5 6.8 8.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0





sional _ 19.0 15.3
Admini s trative/minor 
professional 14.3 24.1 22.2
Clerical/sales 35.7 5.2 11.1
Blue collar 50.0 5.2 13.9
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0














Mean 33.8 43.9 41.8
Median 32.0 44.0 41.5
Taking the information for the sample as a whole 
(total N = 78 couples), first it is clear that the breakdown 
on religious affiliation is about the same for wives and 
husbands. Roughly 70 percent are Protestant, 20 percent 
are Catholic, and the rest report other affiliations or 
no religious preference. (While the husbands and wives as 
groups each report about the same breakdown on religion, this 
is not to say that for all or almost all the couples both 
spouses have the same religious preference.)
One of the more fascinating bits of sample informa­
tion is the number and ages of children. This is one of 
only two variables being discussed here for which both 
spouses are presumably reporting on "the same thing." While 
for religion, for example, the wife is giving her religion 
and the husband his, and the two can quite legitimately 
differ, for information on the children the wife and husband 
reports should simply be redundant. Interestingly, this is 
not the case. Among the wives, 14.1 percent reported 
having no children, 19.2 percent having at least one child 
under six years of age, and 66.7 percent having at least one 
child but none under six years old. The husbands do report 
having no children at the same rate as the wives, but two 
more husbands than wives report having children who are
couples may, in fact, have been in counseling at the time 
of the research (or received counseling in the past), but 
were not selected for the research on that basis.
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all at least six years old. I think that the wife's 
report on this variable is more likely to be accurate (and 
should be used in analyses) since the age shift of a child 
from five to six (pre-school to in-school) is tyoically 
of more importance in the wife's life career than the 
husband's. Thus, the wife has more reason to know which 
age group the child falls into. Further information in­
cluded in the tables is that the mean number of children 
for the sample as a whole is 2.31 (N=77), and for those 
couples who have any children the mean is 2.7 (N=67).
Reports by the wives and husbands as to personal 
income follow the typical pattern of the wives' income 
being skewed heavily toward the no/low income level. In 
addition, the husbands' incomes appear to be somewhat higher 
than one would expect if the sample were representative.
The educational and occupational data discussed below con­
firm the sample's skewness toward the upper middle class.
The total family income data even more strongly confirm the 
upper middle class nature of the sample. Beyond this, while 
only a few discrepancies exist in the wife and husband 
reports (as groups) on family income, it is interesting that 
all are in the direction of the husband's reporting higher
^As for the other variables there may be a larger 
number of couple discrepancies than is indicated by the 
group differences. Such discrepancy information is always 
interesting in its own right, but will only be pursued in 
this work when specifically needed for substantive analysis.
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income. It could be that husbands are more subject to a 
need to appear successful on this item than tvives, or it 
could be that there is a difference in knowledge of family 
finances and when this exists the husband is more likely 
to be knowledgeable (in some cases, a husband may even be 
hiding income from his wife). I will opt for the latter 
explanation, and assume that the higher family income 
reports of the husbands are the more accurate (and should 
be used in any subsequent analysis).
The educational level of the project participants 
is again consistent with the tendency toward an upper middle 
class sample, as well as with the location of the project 
in a "university town." Approximately one-third of the 
husbands have at least some graduate level education, and 
another 30 percent are college graduates. Thus, almost two- 
thirds of the men hold at least college degrees. Only two 
men and two women have less than a high school education.
As expected, the educational attainments of the wives are 
lower than for the husbands. About two-fifths of the women 
have some college work, 30 percent are college graduates, and 
10 percent have at least some graduate work.
Among the men, the professional occupations are 
very heavily represented, reflecting the number of college 
professors included in the sample.^ For the wives who gave
5The occupational data are based on Hollingshead's 
seven-point Occupational Scale. For this presentation, the
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occupational data (N-45), there is also a significant repre­
sentation of at least the middle and lower level professional 
occupations, although as expected there is also a larger 
proportion in the lower level occupations than for the men.
In terms of work status, almost 90 percent of the men work 
full time. A large percentage of the wives report working 
outside the home, almost two-fifths full time and another 
one-fourth part time.
The ages of the participats suggest that the sample 
is somewhat older than would be expected if representative.
The husbands' mean age is 41.8, and the wives' 39.9; the 
age distribution for both groups appears centered in middle- 
age and normally distributed.
The age variable provides a most interesting trans­
ition point for making a brief summary comparison between 
the clinical and non-clinical couples. The clinical couples 
are clearly much younger than the non-clinical couples, 
and this age difference probably goes very far in explaining 
other differences between the groups. The clinical couples 
are more likely to have no children or children under six, 
report lower personal and family incomes and occupational 
levels, are less well educated, and are more likely to include 
a full time working wife. Clearly, a good part of each of 
these could be due to the clinical couples' relative
three lowest levels (skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled 
manual labor) are collapsed due to the small number of 
cases in those categories.
youngness, although some differences (such as in education) 
may also substantially relate to the broader population base 
from which the clinical couples are drawn (as opposed to 
the university population base of the non-clinical couples).
Finally, it is interesting to speculate on one addi­
tional issue. If there is an actual relationship between 
the use of an agency and the ages of couples (and this is 
not really established by the data presented here), we may 
suggest two different explanations. One, it may be that 
couples in the early stages of the family life cycle face 
stresses that older couples have already been through. Thus, 
couples in counseling are young because young couples actually 
face great stress. Or it may be that there is little dif­
ference in the degree of stress (although probably in the type) 
faced by younger and older couples, but this generation of 
younger couples are more willing to seek help for whatever 
difficulties they might have. These two explanations are 
not mutually exclusive and are offered as possibilities for 
consideration.
To summarize, the overall project sample is heavily 
skewed toward the upper middle class, with relatively high 
income, educational, and occupational levels. The sample 
would be further skewed in this direction were it not for the 
inclusion of the clinical couples. Thus, in many respects 
the clinical couples help make the sample more representative.
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PROCEDURES
The sessions were conducted in two laboratory 
settings at the University of New Hampshire.6 Each labora­
tory "package" included a room for videotaping and four 
additional rooms where each member of a couple (two couples 
at a time) could individually complete questionnaire mater­
ials. Most of the sessions took place in the evening.
Each videotaping room contained a small table where 
the spouses were asked to sit close together to facilitate 
conversation and to allow for videotaping. Each also 
included a portable video camera on a tripod, the control 
console for the camera, and a separate audio casette tape 
recorder. While the equipment was fairly extensive, the 
units were quite compact. Couples did not seem especially 
concerned about the equipment, except sometimes at the 
beginning of the taping. The seating arrangements and the 
couple's preoccupation with completing a joint answer form 
during taping may have helped focus the marital partners on 
each other and on the task rather than on the equipment.
Session Format
Each couple was guided through the procedure by a 
session administrator. The couple was brought to a room
®The exceptions were the three couples at one of 
the agencies, whose sessions took place at the agency. The 
physical setting was similar to the setting at University of 
New Hampshire, and the procedures the same.
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where the procedure was briefly described and instructions 
were given for filling out questionnaires (identical except 
for husband/wife wording) on background, marital history, 
esteem scales, and so forth. The administrator made it 
clear that responses for this part of the session would 
not be shown to one1s spouse and would not be used again in 
the session. Spouses completed the questionnaires in 
separate rooms, and then were brought together again to 
receive instructions for the Inventory of Marital Conflicts 
(IMC) task (see Appendix B).
The IMC was developed at the University of Minnesota 
as a stimulus for marital interaction (Olson and Ryder, 1970) 
Each member of a couple reads eighteen brief descriptions of 
couples having various kinds of marital conflicts and answers 
questions about each case. In twelve of these stories, two 
different perspectives on the situation are presented: the 
husband's form provides one perspective and the wife's form 
another. For the other six items, both spouses receive 
exactly the same perspective. This design sets the stage 
for disagreement on twelve of the items, and does not induce 
disagreement on the other six.
Both spouses received the IMC instructions together. 
Then they read the eighteen vignettes and filled out indivi­
dual answer forms in separate rooms. When both were finished 
they returned the case descriptions to the session admini­
strator and kept their own answer forms for personal 
reference. The couple was brought to the taping room where
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they discussed each vignette, resolved disagreements, and 
completed a joint answer form. The discussion was video­
taped and tape recorded. The couple was told that they had 
thirty minutes to discuss all the items and they were 
reminded after twenty minutes. However, couples were allowed 
to continue for as long as they needed to finish. The session 
administrator was not in the room during the discussion.
After the IMC discussion, the spouses independently com­
pleted the IMC Post Discussion Form concerning their reac­
tions to the procedure, as well as a brief set of questions 
concerning power relations (Blood and Wolfe Decision Power 
Index). Finally, the session administrator answered any 
questions and debriefed the couple. The entire session was 
generally about two hours long.
Special Features of the IMC Task
As a stimulus for marital interaction in the labora­
tory, the IMC has several important features. First, the 
procedure is designed to induce disagreement and thus to 
negate the tendency for family members to present a united, 
mutually supportive front to observers. Second, the task 
appears to be highly involving. One indication of involve­
ment is that while participants are told in advance that 
they will receive different perspectives on the vignettes 
(see the IMC instructions in Appendix B), couples generally 
complete the discussion task as if they were ignorant 
of this aspect of the procedure. Third, the vignettes have
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an unusual degree of realism and relevance, in that they 
describe couples having common marital difficulties. Fourth, 
providing different perspectives to the participants on 
the same situation adds another element of realism, in that 
if the participants were actually dealing with a disagreement 
of their own, they would undoubtedly bring different points 
of view to the issue.
The IMC has one additional feature which is of 
special interest in this particular research. Most disagree­
ment-inducing tasks, such as variants of Strodtbeck's 
"revealed differences technique" (Strodtbeck, 1951), ask 
group members to make a single judgment or devise a single 
solution to a disagreement. However, in the IMC procedure, 
participants make two judgments about each vignette— one 
concerning who is responsible for the problem and the other 
concerning how the problem should be solved (see items a 
and d on the individual forms and parts A and B on the joint 
discussion form in Appendix B). This aspect of the IMC 
task is superior to the one-judgment procedures in that two 
kinds of joint solution are possible— one in which the resolu­
tion represents a unilateral "win" for one member of the 
couple, and the other in which the resolution is a compromise 
between the initial choices of the two participants.
IMC Items. The interaction coding for this research 
was done for only the twelve conflict or disagreement-inducing 
vignettes. Thus, the six vignettes for which both spouses
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receive the same information were not coded. This decision 
was based on the assumption that the six non-conflict vig­
nettes would not usually produce rich material with respect 
to the power modes coding system. To include these six 
vignettes would have required a greater use of resources 
than seemed justified by their potential contribution to 
the study.
Use of Audio Tapes. This research did not make use 
of the videotapes. Coding was done using the audio tapes 
and the transcripts of these tapes simultaneously. Of 
interest here is a study by Murphy and Mendelson (1973) 
designed to compare inter-coder reliabilities using video­
tapes or transcripts alone. There was 81.5 percent agreement 
when videotapes were used, but only 60.34 percent with trans­
cripts alone, using Leary's Interpersonal Checklist (ICL) 
coding system. However, Terrill and Terrill (1965), also 
using the ICL, apparently obtained 78 percent agreement using 
audio tapes. Thus, it appears that tapes offer significant 
improvement over transcripts alone, but videotape does not 
produce much higher agreement than audio tape. Aside from 
the question of inter-rater reliability, use of videotapes 
would provide an opportunity to examine non-verbal behavior 
relevant to the question of power modes. At some point it 
would be worthwhile to expand a system of coding power modes 
to include such behavior; however, this is beyond the scope 




In this Chapter current approaches to the conceptuali­
zation and measurement of several familiar concepts in the 
marital power field are reviewed and the approach used in 
the present study is presented. For each of the concepts a 
number of issues are addressed. First, the concept is 
defined as it is used in this research, and the relation­
ship of this definition to other common definitions is 
examined. Such specification is crucial to the study of 
marital power relations since there is so much variability 
and confusion in the use of terms in the literature. As 
mentioned earlier, this effort at conceptual clarification is 
one objective of the project, and will hopefully make a con­
tribution in its own right. Second, the concept is related 
to, and distinguished from, other power concepts where 
necessary. These aspects of the analysis take their lead 
from a preliminary systematization of power terms developed 
by Straus (1976). Third, previous approaches to measuring 
the concept are examined, and, the measurement of the variable 
specifically in this research is presented. Combining the 
discussion of conceptualization and measurement in this way 
has the advantage of clarifying the rationale for each measure 
as it is considered.
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Before dealing with the specific power variables 
included in the research, some discussion of the term "power" 
itself is in order. A great deal of debate has taken place 
over the definition and measurement of power. Turk (1975) 
has argued that the confusion is so great as to warrant 
eliminating the concept altogether. However, Olson and 
Cromwell take the less drastic stand that power is multi­
dimensional and the term "should be employed as a generic 
construct, consisting of several different, but related, 
concepts and dimensions" (1975:5). While Straus is in basic 
agreement with this approach, he further suggests that 
"'power' should never be used unmodified, except when one 
wishes to refer to all the . . . dimensions as a single 
package" (1976:2).
The approach taken here is similar to that of Straus. 
All of the power variables have specific modifiers. No 
attempt is made to measure "power" itself, since it is seen 
as an umbrella concept for a number of specific dimensions. 
However, a global definition of power is offered, as 
follows: Power is the set of variables involved in the
alteration or maintenance of group outcomes by group members. 
The main purpose of presenting such a definition is to pro­
vide a sensitizer for discussing the specific power variables. 
One advantage of this lies in initiating a consistent ter­
minology to be used with all the power variables. In addition, 
this initial definition provides the opportunity to consider 
at the outset two issues basic to all the power variables.
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These issues are reflected in the phrase "group out­
comes." This phrase suggests, first, an orientation in 
which power and power relations are seen as relative to 
specific social systems (Rogers, 1974). Thus, an indivi­
dual's "power" in one social system, such as marriage, may 
be quite different from his/her power in another. Moreover, 
if power is viewed this way, then it cannot be said that it 
is merely a " . . . fixed or stable individual disposition. 
Rather, it is a social phenomenon susceptible to the ebb 
and flow of the social life in which it is embedded" (Rogers 
1974:1432).
A second implication of defining power in terms of 
group outcomes is that this represents a more general defini 
tion than is commonly found. Family researchers have tended 
to focus on dyads, and so have often defined power as the 
ability to influence the other's behavior. Turk points out 
that defining power in terms of group outcomes and defining 
it in terms of the other's behavior both amount to the same 
thing when one is dealing with dyads (1975:83). Since this 
research will focus on the marital dyad, either version of 
the definition would be appropriate here. However, aware­
ness of the more general definition is important if the 
ultimate goal is a theory of power relations which applies 
not just to dyads but to larger units as well.
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PERSONAL RESOURCES
Definition. Any capabilities, characteristics, 
or goods possessed by an individual which may 
be used to facilitate or hinder satisfaction of 
needs or provision of benefits (for self or 
others).
Other Definitions of Personal Resources
Roger's definition of resources is typical of many 
current definitions: "A resource is any attribute, circum­
stance, or possession that increases the ability of its 
holder to influence a person or group" (1974:1425). Simi­
larly, Olson and Cromwell speak of the "resources an indivi­
dual possesses which may increase their ability to exercise 
control in a given situation" (1975:5-6). Common synonyms 
for resources include "bases of power" (originated by French 
and Raven, 1959), "power resources" and "types of power."
The definition used here differs from the above in 
that power terms are not embedded in it, and it thus avoids 
problems of tautology. To use terms like "power resources," 
and to define resources in terms of their effect on power, 
as does Rogers, seems improper in that the assumption of a 
causal relationship is built right into the term and its 
definition. It is important to define resources independently 
of their relationship to power dimensions, both to avoid the 
relatively formal problem of tautology and for more substan­
tive reasons. Combining resources and power in one's defini­
tion implies that power dimensions only depend on resources, 
although this is clearly not intended by family power
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theorists. Rather, resource/exchange theorists generally 
would agree that "levels of power are determined by the 
interaction of resources, dependencies, and alternatives" 
(Smith, 1970:862). Discussions of resources also are 
usually qualified by stating that resources provide only a 
potential for power, or that possession of resources does not 
guarantee that an individual will actually attempt to exer­
cise power or be successful in that attempt (Safilios- 
Rothschild, 1970:80; Sprey, 1975:64). However, even with 
such cautions and qualifications, it is inappropriate and 
confusing to use as synonyms for personal resources phrases 
like "types of power."
Another important definition of resources is 
" . . . anything that one partner may make available to the 
other, helping the latter satisfy his needs or attain his 
goals" (Blood and Wolfe, 1960:12). This is similar to the 
present approach in not entangling resources and power. 
However, the Blood and Wolfe definition differs from ours 
in its focus on attributes which make a positive contribu­
tion to a person's welfare, and its neglect of the possibility 
of using resources to prevent the other from attaining goals. 
As Foa and Foa point out (1975:4), the notion of resources 
covers both "positive and negative encounters," "mutual 
deprivation" as well as "mutual provision," and aggression 
as well as supportive behavior. Further, the Blood and 
Wolfe definition includes only those attributes which may 
be made available to the other. It thus fails to recognize
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that resources which are not made available to the other 
may still have implications for power in allowing one indi­
vidual to remain independent of the demands of the other (see 
Blau, 1964).
To summarize, the central features of the present 
definition of personal resources are its independence from 
power terms, the inclusion of attributes which have implica­
tions not only for the other but also for oneself, and the 
recognition that resources can be used both to provide 
benefits and to prevent them.
Relationship to Power Variables
The purpose of including personal resources in this 
study is not to attempt another test of the resource theory 
of power. A full-blown test of the more sophisticated ver­
sions of resource/exchange theory would require measures of 
dependencies and alternatives (as in Smith, 1970), and 
these are not available here. Rather, the intent is to 
explore relationships between resources and the central 
variable in the study, power modes. Both the general levels 
of resources and the kinds of resources held by marital 
partners are expected to have some relationship to the types 
of power assertions they make.
Previous Measures of Resources
There are two approaches to the measurement of 
resources. The first derives from the "bases of power" 
model originated by French and Raven (1959). For reasons
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outlined below, this approach is the less satisfactory of 
the two. In delineating five potential bases of power, 
French and Raven focus on the subjective orientation of a 
person (P) toward the relationship with the other (0) . ■*"
The five bases of power are then used to outline five types 
of power:
(a) reward power, based on P's perception that 
0 has the ability to mediate rewards for him;
(b) coercive power, based on P's perception 
that 0 has the ability to mediate punishments 
for him; (c) legitimate power, based on the 
perception by P that 0 has a legitimate right
to prescribe behavior for him; (d) referent power, 
based on P's identification with 0; (e) expert
power, based on the perception that 0 has some 
special knowledge or expertness (French and 
Raven, 1959:263).
One major difficulty with this approach is the ten­
dency for resources and several dimensions of power to 
become entangled, as in the alternative definitions of 
resources discussed earlier. Straus notes a problem with 
the terminology growing out of the bases of power model, 
as evidenced by terms like "referent power," and indicates 
that such terms confuse power assertions, power modes, and 
personal resources. He suggests that rather than "informa­
tional power," for example, terms such as "knowledge" should 
be used (Straus, 1976:2).
-^-Apparently the only study in the family power litera­
ture which actually approached the measurement of resources 
from this subjective orientation model is Smith's (1970) study 
of parental influence on adolescents. Raven et al. (1975) 
do use the "bases of power" model in a study of husband-wife 
power relations, but they shift the focus to responses of 
the other to different kinds of power assertions. This 
research is thus more relevant to power modes than personal 
resources.
This solution not only eliminates a great deal of 
conceptual confusion, but it also opens the door to assessing 
resources on a more "objective" basis than the subjective 
orientation measures demanded by the original French and 
Raven model. In fact, a second difficulty of the bases of 
power model as originally formulated is the neglect of 
resources which an individual may possess independently of 
the other's orientation toward him/her. As the definition 
used here suggests, resources are not just important in 
their availability to the other, but also in their facilita­
tion of the holder's independence. The "objective" resources 
possessed by an individual may be just as important as the 
other's subjective orientation toward those resources. Thus, 
the actual "expertise" of A is as significant as B's belief 
that A has a certain amount of expertise. It is suggested 
here that the objective and the subjective aspects of 
resources are distinct, that the two do not always coincide 
with one another in a particular relationship, and that 
their relationship is an interesting subject of study in 
its own right.
Finally, the particular categories of resources 
originally outlined by French and Raven also present diffi­
culties. First, in this model authority ("legitimate power") 
is included as a resource. It may not be inherently in­
appropriate to view authority in this way. However, authority 
represents a quite different dimension (the normative) from 
the structural dimension which the other resources usually
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enumerated represent. Further, recent work within resource
theory has consistently treated authority as a separate
variable which mediates the influence of resources on power
dimensions (as in Rodman's (1972) "theory of resources in
cultural context") , and indeed as a variable which is itself
influenced by resources (Allen and Straus, 1975:3). For
these reasons, authority will be treated here as a separate
variable, even though some would give it the conceptual status
of a resource. Second, the reward and coercive categories
outlined by French and Raven are certainly very broad. It
seems preferable to concentrate on the more specific resources
which may make it possible for one to reward or punish another,
2rather than to combine these into such broad categories.
Far more common in the measurement of resources than 
the bases of power model is the approach taken by Blood and 
Wolfe (1960) . This alternative does focus on specific 
resources as suggested just above, and it is also consistent 
with the disentangling definition of resources presented 
here. The actual resources considered by Blood and Wolfe 
and by many subsequent investigators (such as Fox, 1973; 
Scanzoni, 1972) consist of characteristics like income, 
education, and occupation. Allen and Straus note that these 
types of resources refer to "economic and prestige conferring
This is not to say that French and Raven's categories 
are not useful in other respects. This model is probably 
most helpful in examining types of power assertions. In 
fact, French and Raven (1959) offer a very insightful dis­
cussion of the implications of using different types of power 
assertions for the other's response.
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characteristics" of the spouses, which correspond to "what 
Blau (1964:20-22) would call 'extrinsic resources'" (1975:7).
In addition, resources of a more personal and interpersonal 
nature have been considered, and these may be seen as equiva­
lent to what Blau calls "intrinsic" resources (Allen and 
Straus, 1975:7). For example, Heer (1963) suggested that 
personal attributes like attractiveness and role competence 
should be considered as resources. In a study of resources 
and husband-wife violence, Allen and Straus included items 
on self-esteem, achievement orientation, sociability, and 
anxiety in a measure of resources (1975:7). This research 
includes measures of both the "extrinsic" and the "intrinsic" 
types of resources, and these are discussed in detail in 
the following chapter.
ATTRIBUTED POWER
Definition. The attribution to an individual 
of the ability to alter group outcomes. More 
specifically, reports as to the distribution 
of power in a group.
Previous Measurement and Relationship to Other Power 
Variables
The concept of attributed power is derived from current 
self-report measures which purport to assess the power struc­
ture or the relative power of members of a group. Such 
measures seek to find out "who has the power," and thus focus 
on the relative amounts of power of husbands and wives, or 
the distribution of power (Foss and Straus, 1975:14-17).
These self-report measures range from single-item questions
like "who is the real boss in your family?" (Turk and Bell, 
1975); to the extensively used Blood and Wolfe Decision 
Power Index, which asks respondents to indicate who usually 
has the final say in a series of family-related decisions; 
to predictions of which partner would make a particular 
decision during a laboratory task, and retrospective reports 
of which partner actually did make the decision (Olson and 
Rabunsky, 1972).
It is suggested here that self-report measures of 
the marital power distribution are appropriately viewed as 
attributional statements. Attribution may be defined as 
the process of imputing or assigning certain properties, 
abilities, motivations, etc. to entities (including self 
and others) in the environment (after Kelley, 1967) . In 
terms of self-report measures of "power structure" in 
marriage we may say that imputations are being made about 
the relative abilities of oneself and one's spouse to alter 
group outcomes.
Applying some of the insights of attribution theory 
to these measures has certain advantages. For example,
Kelley suggests that it is possible to "identify systematic 
discrepancies between the attributions different persons or 
different types of persons make" and these differences may be 
a function of "differences between actor and observer in 
their respective information about possible causes and co- 
variances" (1973:125). It is certainly the case that
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differences have been found between attributions about the 
power distribution made by husbands and wives. Turk and 
Bell (1972) found that husbands and wives tend to attribute 
greater power to their partners than the partner attributes 
to him/herself, and this is consistent with findings by 
Heer (1962, 1963) and others. (In contrast, Olson (1969) 
found that husbands tend to overestimate, and wives tend 
to underestimate, their own power.) Attribution theory 
suggests, at the very least, that systematic differences 
between respondents should be expected and viewed as 
theoretically important, rather than merely as irritating 
methodological obstacles.
Viewing self-reports of the marital power distri­
bution as attributions may also help to clarify other 
findings which have often been considered troublesome. In 
particular, a number of researchers have been dismayed 
at the extent to which authority is related to self-reports 
of the power structure. For example, in review of a number 
of methodological studies, Olson and Cromwell conclude at 
one point that "those studies using retrospective self- 
report measures of power, of which there are many, are actually 
tapping who is perceived as the authority" (1975:136). Such 
comments imply that correlations between normative and struc­
tural measures indicate that the structural measures are 
invalid. We would suggest that self-report measures repre­
sent attributions about the distribution of power, and as
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such they are a function not only of the perceived outcomes 
of previous power confrontations, but also such other 
dimensions as norms about who should "have more power" 
(authority) and the personal resources possessed by group 
members, as well as differential information available to 
the persons making the attributions (as in Kelley, 1973).
POWER DISTRIBUTION NORM
Definition. Expectations/beliefs about the way 
power should be distributed in a group. In a 
dyad, the right of A to alter B's behavior.
Authority.
Other Definitions
This is a fairly standard, non-controversial concept. 
It may be seen as the normative companion to attributed 
power, in that both concepts focus on the distribution of 
power among group members. Whereas the concept of attributed 
power refers to attributions about the actual power distri­
bution, power distribution norms focus on the question of who 
should have more power, or how power should be distributed 
in a group (i.e., one variable is ostensibly descriptive 
and the other prescriptive).
Norms about the distribution of power are usually 
referred to as "power norms" or "norms about power." The 
more specific "power distribution norm" is considered 
preferable here in that it makes explicit the notion that 
norms about the distribution of power are only one specific
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type of power norm. There are other dimensions of power 
which are subject to normative definition. In particular, 
different types of power assertions may also be studied 
on a normative level. That is, we may examine not only what 
kinds of power assertions are made, but also which types 
are considered legitimate or illegitimate. (Foss and Straus, 
1975:16-17). The latter issue refers to what may be called 
"power mode norms.
Relationship to Other Power Variables
A considerable body of research indicates that norms 
about the distribution of power in marriage have important 
implications for other dimensions of power. In a re­
examination of research findings from eleven cultures,
Rodman (1972) found not only that power distribution norms 
directly affect what we term "attributed power," but also 
that the relationship between personal resources and attri­
buted power depends upon norms about the power distribution. 
Burr (1973) further specified this relationship when he con­
cluded that personal resources are related to power attri­
butions only when the prescribed or normative distribution 
of power is equalitarian. The present study will be able 
to provide additional evidence concerning such relationships.
•^While recent research specifically on norms about 
physical aggression between husbands and wives suggests the 
importance of this variable (Straus, 1975), data on "power 
mode norms" are not available for the present study.
The main reason for including power distribution 
norms here, however, is their possible relationship with 
power modes or types of power assertions. Safilios- 
Rothschild (1970:80) has suggested that a spouse who lacks 
authority (usually the wife) will not make power assertions 
which are direct, but will use indirect, "manipulative" 
approaches in attempting to influence the other. On the 
other hand, the spouse with the greater authority (the one 
whom the power distribution norms favor) may need to make 
only mild power assertions unless directly challenged 
(1970:80). Even in the context of a laboratory interaction 
task, where the range of available power modes is limited 
compared to those in a natural setting, it may be possible 
to shed light on such alternative hypotheses.
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
The final aspect of power to be considered here 
concerns the outcomes of the conflict resolution process, 
or the actual choices or decisions made by the participants 
in the laboratory situation. These task outcomes or decisions 
have typically been used by researchers as measures of 
"achieved power"— the actual success of an actor in altering 
group outcomes (Straus, 1976). Thus, if the final decision 
reached by a couple is the same as the husband's initial 
choice, then the husband is given a "win." Sprey (1972), 
among others, has argued that this is a poor measure of 
achieved, or successful, power. This is partly a problem
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due to the time distance between particular acts of power 
assertion and the final decision actually made by a couple. 
Probably the best way of measuring achieved power would be 
through an act-by-act counting of instances of immediate 
compliance to a command— similar to the "effective power" 
score in SIMFAM (Straus and Tallman, 1971). Sprey (1972, 1975) 
offers a further, and perhaps more important argument against 
the use of "win scores" as measures of achieved power, or 
success in making power assertions. Such scores assume that 
family relationships represent an "I win-you lose" situation, 
or indeed a zero-sum game, and according to Sprey, this 
assumption about families is unwarranted.
It may be suggested, however, that whether or not 
families are analogous to zero-sum game situations is an 
empirical question. Some families may indeed treat situa­
tions as zero-sum games even though there is no structural 
reason for doing so, while others may not. In line with 
this, one of the possible uses of the IMC task outcomes is 
as an indicator of the extent to which the couple is treating 
the task as a unilateral "win" situation or as a situation 
offering bilateral solution possibilities. As mentioned 
earlier, the IMC task is uniquely suited to shedding light 
on this issue, since two choices must be made by the couple 
for each vignette. Thus, one outcome measure is the couple's 
tendency toward unilateral or bilateral solutions. When 
both choices made by a couple favor one member of the couple, 
this outcome is unilateral. Bilateral outcomes are those in
T
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which of the two choices made by the couple, one choice 
favors one spouse and the other choice favors the other 
spouse. The unilateral-bilateral solution measure in 
particular allows an opportunity to explore relationships 
between types of outcomes and resources, power distribution 
variables, and (most importantly) power modes.
Chapter IV presents the specific measures, basic 
descriptive findings, and analyses of interrelationships 
for the concepts discussed in this Chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
RESOURCES, THE POWER DISTRIBUTION, AND OUTCOMES
The concepts analyzed in the last chapter, and 
the findings presented in this chapter, refer to two of 
the three power domains identified by Olson and Cromwell 
(1975:5-7). Personal resources and power distribution 
norms represent the "bases of power" domain, and the out­
comes or "achieved" power variables are part of the "power 
outcomes domain." While Olson and Cromwell include attri­
buted power in the outcomes domain, I think it can also
be counted— particularly as it is conceptualized here— as 
a bases of power (or "potential" power) concept. The one 
domain which is left out so far is "power processes," and 
this will be addressed in the later chapters on power 
modes or types of power assertion.
Before we get to the study of power processes, we
are confined in this chapter to the fairly static analyses 
of relationships between power base variables and outcomes 
which have dominated previous research. The obvious ques­
tion, then, is "Why still another analysis of these structural 
variables— why not move directly to power process concepts?" 
There are a number of reasons for pursuing one more
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examination of relationships between personal resources, 
power distribution variables, and outcomes.
First of all, it is useful in terms of assessing 
the generalizability of the ground-breaking power modes 
data, to see how the present findings for the more heavily 
researched variables fit those of previous research. Second, 
presenting these relationships is necessary background for 
fitting the power modes analysis into the model of marital 
power relations in Chapter I.
In their own right, the findings offered in this 
chapter are worthwhile. For one thing, it is only recently 
that studies have been done using both self-report and 
observational methods (Cromwell, Klein, and Wieting, 1975; 
Olson, 1969; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972).
A side effect of such studies is that they are generally 
the only ones which obtain data from both husbands and 
wives. In this chapter, then, we can bring a still rare 
multi-method approach, and the perspectives of both marital 
partners, to the study of power structure.
In addition, the outcomes variable in this research 
provides an opportunity to examine both win-oriented and com­
promise behavior by the spouses, and thus a chance to test 
some important notions derived from conflict and game theories.
Finally, the need for a processual approach to 
marital power does not diminish the importance of under­
standing power structure, or the relatively stable distri­
bution of power and power-related attributes in a relation­
ship.
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CONSTRUCTION OF INDEXES: PERSONAL RESOURCES
In the last chapter, personal resources were defined 
as "any capabilities, characteristics, or goods possessed 
by an individual which may be used to facilitate or hinder 
satisfaction of needs or provision of benefits (for self or 
others)." Further, two kinds of resources were identified 
as important in conjugal power relations. Extrinsic 
resources are the "economic and prestige-conferring charac­
teristics" of the spouses, while intrinsic resources are the 
interpersonal skills and personal qualities which the part­
ners bring to the relationship (Allen and Straus, 1979).
By far most of the research on marital power has focused 
only on extrinsic resources. However, much of the theo­
retical work has suggested that non-economic resources are 
also relevant to marital power (Heer, 1963; Safilios- 
Rothschild, 1970), and in recent empirical work these 
variables are important (Safilios-Rothschild, 1976; Straus,
1977).
In this section, the methodology for constructing 
indexes of intrinsic and extrinsic resources is described. 
The personal resources indexes are the most complex in the 
research, so this discussion is rather lengthy. However, 
several of the issues raised are common to the construction 
of other indexes, so this presentation does double duty.
In most of the research on personal resources and 
marital power, particular resources have been correlated
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one by one with some index of power. This is useful in 
assessing the impact of each resource separately, but is 
rather cumbersome. Further, the single-variable analyses 
do not give us a full sense of the extent to which all of 
the resource variables, taken together, may help to explain 
power relations. Finally, since the main focus of the 
present research is not to test resource theory, a one-by- 
one analysis of resources would take up an inordinate 
amount of attention. Thus, overall indexes of extrinsic 
and intrinsic resources are desirable here as concise 
summaries.
Method of Standardizing Measures
Most of the variables treated in this chapter consist 
of indexes each made up of a number of items or dimensions. 
Some method of standardizing both the items and the indexes 
was desirable. The personal resources indexes, for example, 
include very disparate items— from a tricotomous classifi­
cation of work status, to a seven-point occupational rating 
scale, etc. Since such measures differ markedly in range 
and variance, it is necessary to standardize the items to 
equalize^ their respective contributions to the composite 
index.
•*-It is also possible to differentially weigh items 
for an index; however, there were no theoretical reasons 
for doing so in the indexes constructed for this research.
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The indexes for "power distribution norms" and 
"attributed power" are based on items from the Decision 
Power Index (Blood and Wolfe, 1960). While these items 
"were pre-designed to have equal score ranges, . . . the 
mean, variance, and skewness of the items . . . often 
differ markedly from each other, again indicating the need 
for item standardization" (Straus and Kumagai, 1978). Thus, 
both the indexes of personal resources and indexes related 
to the distribution of power require standardization for the 
purpose of ensuring that each item contributes equally to 
the total index.
At another level, it is often important to also 
standardize the indexes themselves, so as to "express scores 
in units that have a known meaning" (Straus and Kumagai, 
1978). For example, the sum of the raw scores on the 
attributed power items (Blood and Wolfe Decision Power 
Index) ranges from 5 to 40. Given this unusual range, the 
meaning of a reported score of 20 is not readily apparent.
In situations like this it is helpful to the reader to 
express index scores in some standard unit.
A second advantage of standardizing index scores is 
that scores for different variables are expressed in the 
same units, making for a more ready understanding of dif­
ferences and similarities in how the variables in the 
research "work." For the most part, indexes used in this 
chapter were constructed by standardizing first the items 
and then the index.
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The PZ Score. The method of standardization chosen 
for this research is the PZ score, developed by Straus 
(1978; Straus and Kumagai, 1978). Like the Z score, PZ 
scores have the advantages of meeting the assumptions of 
necessary statistical procedures. However, the PZ score 
is preferable in being more readily understood than the Z 
score. The PZ score combines the notion of scores being 
expressed as "a percentage of the maximum raw score" (as 
in class tests), "with the measurement characteristics of 
Z scores and is therefore called a 'PZ' scale" (Straus,
1978) .
"PZ scores have a range of 0 (Z score of <_ -2.5) 
to 100 (Z score of _> 2.5), with a mean of 50, which is
50 percent of the maximum possible score, and a standard
2
deviation of 20" (Straus, 1978). Roughly speaking, the 
meaning of a PZ score of 70 on the index of attributed power, 
would be that relative to the rest of the sample, the res-
3
pondent received 70 percent of the total possible score.
Relationship to Other Methods of Standardization.
The PZ score is a new method of expressing item and index
_ ^For computing from raw scores, PZ = 50 + (20 +
((X - X)/SD)). From Z scores, PZ = 50 + 20Z. For additional 
details on the characteristics of PZ scores and their rela­
tionship to Z and other standard scores, see Straus (1978).
A rather neat feature of the PZ score can be illus­
trated here. Twenty PZ points equal 1 SD. Thus, since the 
mean of a PZ distribution is 50, a PZ score of 70 is 1 
standard deviation above the mean.
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scores in terms of a standard unit. Evidence for the 
relative adequacy of this method is found in a comparison 
of eleven methods of index construction (Straus and Kumagai,
1978) . In this research, PZ scores on four variables 
were almost perfectly correlated with other standard 
scores for the same variables (such as the Z score), and 
correlations between eight variables and an external 
criterion variable were essentially the same whether Z 
or PZ scores were used. These findings are of special 
relevance here, since two of the four primary variables 
studied (SES and decision power of husband) are highly 
similar to the personal resources and power distribution 
variables in the present research. Given these findings, 
the choice of PZ scores as a method of standardization which 
combines the advantages of a Z score with considerably 
greater ease of understanding, seems well justified.
EXTRINSIC RESOURCES
Five items relating to economic performance were 
used to form an index of extrinsic resources for each 
partner. The individual's education, occupation, and 
personal income are three commonly used indicators.^
^Education was measured on a seven-point scale 
ranging from less than eighth grade through some work on a 
graduate degree. Income was based on a seven-point scale 
ranging from less than $1,000/year to over $25,000/year. 
Occupation also was measured on a seven-point scale, based 
on Hollingshead1s occupational classification, and ranging 
from unskilled workers to "higher executives and major 
professionals."
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In addition, the work status of the individual 
(working full time outside the home, part time or not 
working outside) was included. This particular variable 
was seen as especially important for the women, and a 
number of studies have shown the work status of the wife 
to be related to the distribution of power (Brown, 1977;
Heer, 1958; Scanzoni, 1970:160). Although few of the men 
in this sample were not employed full time, it seems worth­
while to also include work status among the husbands' 
resources. This is because less than full time employment 
is a significant deficit in the husband's "arsenal" of 
resources.
Finally, the fifth extrinsic resources item was a 
self-rating as to one's economic contribution to the marriage. 
Each partner rated his/her own economic contribution on a
C
five-point scale. This item is a desirable addition to
5
The economic contributions item is one of four 
experimental items on contributions to the couple's marriage 
which posed a special problem in terms of scoring responses. 
Each partner rated his own contribution in the economic, 
emotional, social, and sexual areas as "much more than it 
ought to be," "more than it ought to be," "just about right," 
"less than it ought to be," or "much less than it ought to 
be."
Given the wording of the responses, it could be 
argued that the "just about right" category should receive 
the highest numerical score (3), the two adjacent categories 
a middle score, regardless of direction (2), and the end 
points both receive the lowest score (1). This is because 
feeling that one's contribution was much too large could 
be seen as equally distressing as feeling that it was much 
too small.
On the other hand, it is possible that despite the 
wording, respondents were basically ranking themselves on
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the overall index, since it is anchored in the partners' 
personal views of appropriate economic contributions. This 
is qualitatively different from the four other extrinsic 
resources, where the "absolute" value of the individual's 
resources is what counts.
A multidimensional Extrinsic Resources Index (ERI) 
was constructed in three steps. First, each of the five 
extrinsic items was standardized. Next the sum of the 
resulting scores was computed, and finally, this sum of 
the items was itself standardized so as to be in PZ score 
form. Thus, the resulting PZ'd index has a range of 0 to
/ r
100, a mean of 50, and a standard deviation of 20.
an ordinary five-point scale, from making a very small 
contribution to making a very large one.
In order to determine which scoring procedure to 
use, a "trace-line analysis" was conducted as follows.
There are sound theoretical reasons for believing 
that the contributions items are positively correlated with 
attributed power. Therefore, the attributed power index 
can be used as an external criterion variable for deter­
mining the scoring direction for the contributions ques­
tions. The mean attributed power scores for each response 
category on the contributions questions were computed.
Since the attributed power scores tended to peak at the 
"much more than it ought to be" category, rather than at 
the "just about right" category, the contributions items 
were scored on a five-point scale (from 1 = much less, to 
5 = much more) (the detailed information for the trace-line 
analysis can be made available upon request).
®Both the specific items and the index were stan­
dardized separately for women and men. Thus, the wives' 
scores were standardized in terms of wives only, not in 
terms of the entire sample of one hundred fifty-six indivi­
duals, and similarly for the husbands. This means that the 
same PZ value does not necessarily mean the same thing for 
a man and a woman.
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Internal Consistency of the Extrinsic Resources Index
Table 4.1 gives the product-moment correlation 
matrix for each of the five extrinsic resource items and 
the multidimensional indexes. This analysis gives infor­
mation as to the internal consistency of the external 
resources indexes. In other words, this indicates whether 
the five items "hang together" or are all tapping some aspect 
of the same underlying dimension. As Straus (1977:5) 
points out, very high intercorrelations among the items 
are not necessarily desirable here. This is because if the 
correlations approach perfection, there is no point in con­
structing an index at all since any one item would do as 
well.
As the table indicates, not every item is signifi­
cantly related to every other item, for either the women 
or the men. However, each item is "tied into" at least one 
other item, and thus it seems justifiable to retain all of 
the items for the overall indexes.
Patterns for Husbands and Wives. The three classic 
economic variables— income, education, and occupation— are 
clearly interrelated for both men and women, and the 
pattern does not seem to differ between the groups. How­
ever, there are some interesting differences in how the work 
status and self-rating of economic contributions items 
operate. For both husbands and wives, work status is 
strongly related to income. However, only for the wives
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Table 4.1. Correlation Matrix for Five Extrinsic Personal 
Resources Measures, and a Multidimensional Index Combining 
Them, for Husbands and Wives
Extrinsic
Personal
Resources EDUC INC WKST OCC ECON
Husbands
Education (EDUC) -
Personal Income (INC) .29 -
Work Status (WKST) .06 .53 -
Occupation (OCC) .73 .40 .01 -
Economic Contribution 
to Marriage (ECON) -.03 .19 .07 .01 -
Extrinsic Resources 
Index (ERI) .66 .77 .55 .71 .37
Wives
Education -
Personal Income .22 -
Work Status -.02 .62 -
Occupation .60 .30 .00 -
Economic Contribution 
to Marriage -.11 .31 .36 -.09 -
Extrinsic Resources 
Index .52 .82 .67 .54 .51
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does work status correlate with any other extrinsic 
resource item— notably the self-rating of economic con­
tribution to the marriage.
For the economic contribution item, the only sig­
nificant relationship for the men is with personal income. 
Thus, the husbands' self-rating was positively related to 
income but not to any of the other economic items. The 
wives' self-ratings were positively related to both income 
and work status. The small negative correlations between 
self rating of economic contribution and education and 
occupational level for the women are particularly interest­
ing. It may be that women with relatively high educational 
achievement and occupational positions have higher expecta­
tions for their own economic contributions to the marriage 
and thus rate themselves more harshly than other women.
This may especially be the case if one notes the possibility 
that women are structurally barred from actually achieving 
the level of occupational functioning which a high level 
of educational attainment, as well as personal standards, 
may lead them to expect for themselves.
To summarize in terms of the criterion of internal 
consistency, the five extrinsic resources items appear 
sufficiently interrelated to warrant combining them into 
a single index. This is especially the case for the three 
standard items— income, occupation, and education. The 
work status and self-rating of economic contribution items 
appear more important for the wives than for the husbands.
58
External Criterion Item Analysis
Another way of assessing the adequacy of the
extrinsic resources index is to do an "external criterion
item analysis" (Straus, 1964:354). This analysis has to
do with the validity of the indexes, while the internal
consistency analysis above relates to reliability.
The criterion variable is the attributed power index.
Both the "resource theory" of conjugal power and previous
research predict certain relationships between it (as the
Blood and Wolfe Decision Power Index), and most of the
7items m  the extrinsic resources index.
Ordinarily, an external criterion analysis would be 
used with a large pool of items as an empirical "weeding 
out" device in index construction. However, here there are 
a small number of items and good theoretical reasons for 
including each of them. Thus, the external criterion analysis 
becomes not so much a selection process, as a means of 
finding out if the items are "working" in this research in 
expected ways.
Table 4.2 gives the product-moment correlations 
between the five extrinsic resources items as well as the
^Using the attributed power index as the external 
criterion does not rule out later discussing the correla­
tions of the resulting extrinsic indexes with attributed 
power. This is because the latter discussion is not intended 
as a "test" of the resource theory, but as an overall 
summary of the resources and attributed power relationship.
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indexes, and attributed power, for both husbands and wives. 
Roughly speaking, the items operate as expected, with 
some exceptions. For the husbands, with the exception of 
education, each item shows at least a moderate correlation 
with attributed power. The correlation between the index 
as a whole and attributed power is fairly strong, and higher 
than for any single item. These findings are generally 
consistent with previous findings of relationships between 
husband's absolute resources and attributed power (Allen 
and Straus, 1979, presently in press; Blood and Wolfe, 1960).
The picture for the wives is quite different: 
there are no relationships between the wives' personal ex­
trinsic resources and attributed power. However, this is 
not inconsistent with previous findings. For example, Allen 
and Straus (1979) found hardly any relationship between
O
wife's resources and power (see also Price-Bonham, 1976).
The one relationship for the wives is a moderate 
one between the self-rating of economic contribution and 
attributed power, and is not in the expected direction.
In other words, the higher the wife's rating of her own 
economic contribution to the marriage the higher the relative 
power she attributes to her husband. One possible explanation
O
In that research, the expected negative relationship 
between wives extrinsic resources and level of husband's 
power was found only for working class wives. Since the 
present sample includes only ten working class couples, this 
is an important finding. More on this when the relation­
ships between resources and power distribution variables are 
examined in their own right.
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relates to the fact that the self rating item could be 
scored highly by women with very low levels of the other 
extrinsic resources. Thus, I could rate my contribution 
as very high even if I were not working, bringing in income, 
etc., if I have a traditional view of the division of labor 
in the family. Further, if I believe that as a wife I am 
not expected to bring in economic goods and my husband is,
I may also subscribe to a traditional husband-oriented 
distribution of power.
In summary, based on the internal consistency 
analysis, and the fact that the external criterion analysis 
"worked" at least moderately well for the husbands, the com­
bination of the five extrinsic resource items into overall 
indexes is considered appropriate here.
INTRINSIC RESOURCES
Two measures relating to social and emotional 
attributes were used to form an index of intrinsic resources 
for each partner. The first is a ten-item measure of self 
esteem, in which the respondent is asked to indicate on a 
four-point scale how strongly she agrees/disagrees with 
statements like "I feel that I have a number of good qual­
ities" or "All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a 
failure." The rationale for including self esteem as an 
interpersonal resource in marriage is two-fold. One, a 
person with high self esteem may possess leadership. Two, 
a person with high self esteem is less likely to be
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Table 4.2. Correlations of Five Extrinsic Resources and 
a Multidimensional Index Combining the Five Items, with 
an Index of Attributed Power, for Husbands and Wives
Extrinsic
Correlation with Husband- 





Personal Income .33 -.05
Work Status .25 .01
Occupation .18 -.02
Economic Contribution 




the sort of emotional drain on the partner which may 
hinder the satisfaction of the partner's needs (see defini­
tion of resources above).
The second measure of intrinsic resources is a 
three-item self rating of one's social, emotional and 
sexual contributions to the marriage. (These are parallel 
to the economic contribution item used in the ERI.) A 
sample item is "In term of our social life, my contribution 
as a husband is . . . (much more than it ought to be, more 
than it ought, just about right, less than it ought to be, 
much less than it ought to be)". These items appear to be 
a fairly direct assessment of the partners' views of the 
personal, social, and sexual resources they bring to the 
relationship.
Intrinsic Resources Index
A two-dimensional Intrinsic Resources Index (IRI) 
was constructed in a manner similar to that for the extrinsic 
index (ERI). First, each of the self-esteem and contribu­
tions items was standardized. Next, the sums of the resulting 
esteem scores and contributions scores were computed, and 
these two sums were themselves standardized in PZ score 
form. Thus, at this point, two standardized indexes—
Self Esteem (SE) and Marital Contributions (MC)— had been 
constructed. Next the scores on these two indexes were 
summed and the resulting score was standardized in PZ form.
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The resulting Intrinsic Resources Index, in PZ form, 
ranges from 0 to 100, has a mean of 50, and a standard 
deviation of 20.
Internal Consistency. The two intrinsic resources 
measures are interrelated for the husbands (r = .27), but 
not for the wives (r = .09). Thus, the rather curious 
finding for the women is that positive self esteem does 
not appear to be positively related to their ratings of 
contributions to the marriage. However, the moderate 
correlation found for the husbands seems to justify com­
bining the two into an overall index.
External Criterion Item Analysis. Table 4.3 gives 
the product-moment correlations between the two intrinsic 
resources measures and the overall index, and an index of 
attributed power. While for the men there is little rela­
tionship between intrinsic resources and attributed power, 
for the wives there is a moderate correlation in the expected 
direction between marital contributions, at least, and 
reported power. Thus, the higher the wives' ratings of 
their own intrinsic contributions to the marriage, the 
lower the level of power they attribute to their husbands. 
Self esteem does not seem related to power even for the 
wives, despite strong theoretical reasons for such a 
relationship.
While this analysis is in one way disappointing, in 
another it is not. When the external criterion analyses
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Table 4.3. Correlation of Two Intrinsic Resources 
Measures and a Multidimensional Index Combining Them, 








Self Esteem • O -.03




for both the extrinsic and intrinsic resources indexes are 
taken together, there is a pattern of different resources 
relating to attributed power for men and women which is 
compatible with previous research findings. Extrinsic 
resources appear more significant for the husbands, while 
intrinsic seem somewhat more important for the wives, in 
relation to attributed power. Since these relationships are 
explored here for measurement purposes only, further spec­
ification of the findings awaits the more substantive dis­
cussion to follow.
As in the analysis for extrinsic resources, the 
theoretical reasoning and the pattern of relationships seems 
to warrant using the two-dimensional intrinsic resource 
index.
A final note on the resources index construction. 
Originally my plan was to construct an overall or total 
resources index. However, since the extrinsic and intrinsic 
resources operate so differently for the wives and the 
husbands, it would be inappropriate to combine the two 
types into a single index. Such a combination would most 
likely obscure important findings rather than help uncover 
them.
RELATIVE RESOURCES
The thrust of the resource theory of marital power 
is that it is the relative resources of the partners which 
affects the distribution of power. While my primary purpose
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is not testing this theory, the relationships to be examined 
here are subsumed by the theory. Thus, indexes of relative 
resources were constructed to allow exploring the relation­
ships actually posited by resource theory.
The relative resources measures are formed on the 
basis of the proportion which the husband contributes to 
the total amount of a resource possessed by a couple. The 
formula then is the amount of the husband's resource, 
divided by the sum of the husband's and wife's resources. 
(Precedents for this procedure are Price-Bonham, 1976:631; 
Straus, 1978). The range for any item is from 0 to 100.
A score of zero means the husband contributes none of a 
resource, and the wife contributes all of it. A score of 100 
means all of that resource is contributed by the husband, 
and a score of 50 means each contributes the resource 
equally, or the resource is held in equal amounts by each 
spouse.
These measures are most clearly exemplified by the 
personal income item. The proportion of the couple's 
total income which the husband contributes is easily under­
stood. If the couple's total income is $20,000 and the 
husband's personal income is $15,000 then the relative 
income score is 75.
Conceptualizing the notion of relative resource 
measures is somewhat more difficult with the intrinsic 
resources. For example, the meaning of a relative resources
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score of 75 for self esteem is less readily understood than 
for income. It is hard to think of summing the self esteem 
scores of two individuals and then viewing the sum as the 
total esteem of the couple. However, if it is realized 
that the relative score simply is a way of conveniently 
summarizing who has a higher level of a particular attri­
bute, then the score makes some sense. Thus, a score of 50 
on the relative self esteem means each partner has about 
the same level of confidence; a score of 25 means the wife 
has much higher self esteem than the husband, and so forth.
There are two quirks of relative scores that need 
to be kept in mind. First of all, it is possible for couples 
who have vastly different absolute levels of resources to 
receive the same relative score. That is, a couple in which 
the wife earns $20,000 and the husband $30,000 (for a total 
of $50,000) would receive the same relative income score 
(namely 60), as a couple in which the wife earns $4,000 
and the husband $6,000 (for a total of $10,000). The other 
side of this, however, is that the same absolute difference 
between partners quite appropriately has very different 
implications for the relative score, depending on the base. 
Thus, a $10,000 difference gives a relative score of 60 
when the total is $50,000, but the relative score is 83 when 
the base is $12,000.
Secondly, in instances where each partner has zero 
of a resource, then the relative score is 50. This is
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certainly strange in terms of the absolute value of the 
resource, but makes sense in representing the equality of 
their positions relative to one another.
Indexes of Relative Resources
Two relative resources indexes were constructed—  
one for intrinsic and one for extrinsic resources. For 
each index, each of the component items was converted to 
relative form. Then each relative item was converted into 
PZ scores and the resulting items were summed. The resulting 
figure was itself transformed into PZ form. The resulting 
indexes have a range of 0 to 100, mean of 50, and standard 
deviation of 20.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 give information as to the internal 
consistency and external validity of the relative indexes.
The internal consistency results are similar to those 
for the absolute resource indexes.
However, for the analysis using the attributed power 
index as the external criterion, the relative resources 
indexes appear to be less adequate than the absolute ver­
sions. There is only one statistically significant rela­
tionship (between the wife's report of he power distribution 
and the relative intrinsic marital contributions score), and 
this is only a moderate correlation. Thus, contrary to 
expectations based on the resource theory of marital power, 
the absolute levels of the resources held by the partners 
seem more important than their relative resources. These
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Table 4.4. Correlation Matrix for Relative Personal 
















Relative Income (R-INC) .19 -
Relative Work Status 
(R-WKST) -.02 .57 -
Relative Occupation 
(R-OCC) .18 .13 .04 -
Relative Economic Contri 
bution to Marriage 
(R-ECON) .05 .38 .39 -.02
Relative Extrinsic Re­
sources Index (R-ERI) .49 .78 .74 .41 .64
R-SE R-MC
Intrinsic Resources
Relative Self Esteem (R-SE) -
Relative Marital Contributions 
(R-MC) .28 -
Relative Intrinsic Resources 
Index (R-IRI) .81 .77
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Table 4.5. Correlations of Relative Personal Resources 
Items and Indexes, with Husband-Oriented Attributed Power 





















relationships will be explored more fully in the sections 
to follow.
RESOURCES OF WIVES AND HUSBANDS
The interrelationships among the intrinsic and 
extrinsic resources of the partners demonstrate some inter­
esting differences in how resources relate to marriage for 
men and women.
Table 4.6 gives the product-moment correlations 
between the resources of the wives and the husbands. For 
the ERI (Extrinsic Resources Index), there is no correlation, 
but this lack of relationship obscures some strong relation­
ships for the individual items. For example, the partners' 
education and occupational level are highly correlated. 
However, there are very slight negative relationships for 
income and self-ratings of economic contribution, and a 
moderate negative correlation for work status. Thus, the 
positive and negative correlations for the partners' ex­
trinsic resource items cancel each other out and produce 
no correlation for the index as a whole.
There is a slight negative relationship for the IRI 
(Intrinsic Resources Index), such that the higher the wife's 
intrinsic resources,the lower the husband's. When the self 
esteem and contributions indexes themselves are looked at, 
though, we find moderate contradictory relationships. The 
partners' self esteem scores are positively related, but 
their marital contributions are negatively related. This
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Table 4.6. Intercorrelations of Personal Resources of 
Husbands and Wives
Extrinsic
EDUC - education .52
INC - income -.07
WKST - work status -.22
OCC - occupation .37
ECON - economic contribution to the
marriage -.08
ERI - Extrinsic Resources Index .05
Intrinsic
SE - self esteem .19
MC - marital contributions -.19
IRI - Intrinsic Resources Index -.10
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may be a function of the wording of the contributions 
items, which asked for a weighing of one person's input 
against the other's. If I see myself as doing more than I 
should have to, my husband will see himself as doing less 
and our responses will be negatively correlated (even though 
consistent).
The most interesting findings on the links between 
husbands' and wives' resources are given in Table 4.7. For 
the husbands, there is a moderately strong correlation 
between extrinsic and intrinsic resources. Following 
Scanzoni's (1970) lead of seeing the husband's "articula­
tion" with the economic system as the base point from which 
more intrinsic rewards are derived, we can posit a causal 
order in which extrinsic resources are temporally prior to 
intrinsic ones. Then, we can say that as the husband's 
"economic and prestige-conferring" resources (ERI) increase, 
his self esteem and rating of his interpersonal contribu­
tions to the marriage (IRI) also increase.
Among the wives, this connection is not nearly so 
strong. There is only a slight positive relationship 
between her extrinsic resources and her intrinsic resources, 
indicating that the wives' sense of self and perception of 
what they bring to marriage are not very closely tied to 
their performance in the economic sphere.
When the husband's extrinsic resources are corre­
lated with the wife's intrinsic resources there is only 
a small relationship. This is contrary to the implications
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Table 4.7. Intercorrelation Matrix for Intrinsic and 
Extrinsic Personal Resources of Husbands and Wives
Type of Husband Wife






Intrinsic .15 -.10 .13
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of Scanzoni's work, which suggests that the husband's 
extrinsic resources should increase the rewards experienced 
by the wife in marriage, and she in exchange will make a 
greater intrinsic contribution to the marriage (as well as 
have a higher sense of self esteem). In fact, Scanzoni's 
model (1970) actually implies that the husband's extrinsic 
resources are of greater importance in this regard than 
those of the wife.
Finally, there is the intriguing finding that the 
wife's extrinsic resources are negatively related to the 
husband's intrinsic resources. As the wife's economic 
input increases, the husband's sense of self and of input 
interpersonally to the marriage is lowered. The dynamic 
for this may be that wives of men who do not give much 
interpersonally to the marriage seek satisfaction outside 
of the marriage, through work. Or, it may be that husbands 
of wives who are extrinsically successful experience a loss 
of self respect as a result of their wives' success. Such 
a negative self definition might be induced by the wife's 
definition, or it might be self-inflicted.
These relationships were also re-examined separately 
for working class and middle class couples. There were only 
slight differences, except that for the working class wives 
(N = only 10) extrinsic and intrinsic resources were a little 
more highly correlated, and the husband's intrinsic resources 
showed some positive relationship to both types of resources 
for the wives.
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REPORTS FROM THE FRONT: ATTRIBUTED POWER AND 
POWER DISTRIBUTION NORMS
This section introduces the two self-report 
measures of the power distribution— power distribution 
norms and attributed power. Attributed power was defined 
in Chapter III as "the attribution to an individual of the 
ability to alter group outcomes— more specifically, reports 
as to the distribution of power in a group." In other words, 
attributed power consists of the reports made by individuals 
on their perceptions of the distribution of power. These 
reports may be self-reports by members of the group (i.e., 
the husband and wife, in this study), or observations by 
third parties (such as children). Such reports on the power 
distribution, which we are calling attributed power, are 
what is most frequently referred to simply as power.
Power distribution norms were defined in Chapter III 
as "expectations/beliefs about the way power should be dis­
tributed in a group. In a dyad, the right of A to alter 
B's behavior. Authority." This concept is parallel to 
attributed power, but on a normative plane. Attributed 
power refers to perceptions of the way power really is 
distributed, while power distribution norms refer to beliefs 
about how power should be distributed. Another way to think 
of this is that one is prescriptive or normative, and the 
other is descriptive.
Like attributed power, power distribution norms 
are reports made by individuals. However, the latter
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appear much less likely to be measured through the reports 
of third parties.
Measuring the Power Distribution Variables
For both attributed power and power distribution 
norms, indexes were based on the eight-item standard version 
of the Blood and Wolfe Decision Power Index. In the attri­
buted power (AP) mode, respondents indicated who usually has 
the final say in a series of family-related decisions. In 
the power distribution norm (PDN) version, respondents 
indicated who they think should have the final say on the 
same set of decisions.
The Decision Power Index (DPI) has been heavily used 
and heavily criticized as a representative of self-report 
measures of decision making. It has been much more often 
used as a descriptive measure (AP), and the objections are 
to its use for this purpose. A major criticism is that 
such measures are highly subject to social desirability 
responses--i.e., are confounded with authority (Safilios- 
Rothschild, 1970). This objection would seem most telling 
when the measure is taken as intended to assess the "real" 
power structure, rather than perceptions/attributions about 
the distribution of power. Further, in the context of this 
particular research, participants responded to the AP and 
PDN versions "back-to-back," and perhaps the explicit
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normative wording of the PDN items provided a contrast for 
them with the more descriptive (AP) items.^
The second kind of criticism of the DPI relates to 
the content of the items themsevles. One variation on 
this is to argue that the items themselves are not a 
representative sample of the kinds of decisions made in 
families, and thus a biased view of the power distribution 
is obtained. In particular, a disproportionate number of 
household-related decisions which are likely to be made by 
wives are included, and this gives a very unfortunate over­
estimation of the number of equalitarian and wife-dominated 
couples.
I believe that this objection may well be warranted. 
For descriptive purposes, the DPI items probably under­
estimate the husband's power in marriage particularly in 
terms of the extent to which husbands make broad decisions 
which affect the very conditions of the wife's existence. 
This kind of decision-making is not likely to be reciprocal 
on the part of the wife in determining the husband's life 
course (see for example Johnson, 1975) . This descriptive 
inaccuracy is important especially from a feminist perspec­
tive on male-female equality. However, when we turn to
■^It could be, on the other hand, that the back-to- 
back placement elicits a desire to show consistency between 
normative and descriptive items. This can ultimately be 
determined through further methodological research. How­
ever, the fact that the AP-PDN correlations reported later 
are only moderate argues against the view that responses 
were subject to a consistency need.
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the job of explaining variations in the relative distri­
bution of power, descriptive accuracy is less important.
A final criticism of the DPI items is that the 
decision areas included are not necessarily equally important 
to different respondents, and weighing items by importance, 
or using only items which are previously identified by 
participants as important, is necessary (Heer, 1963;
Safilios-Rothschild, 1970). However, at least one research 
directly on this issue suggests that there are no significant 
advantages of a weighted version of the DPI, although further 
research on the issue was recommended (Price-Bonham, 1976).
On the other side of the ledger, there are several 
advantages of using the DPI as the basis for the reports 
on the distribution of power in this research. Most impor­
tant, it has been extensively used, and this provides con­
tinuity with a large proportion of the existing literature. 
Second, there is considerable evidence of the construct 
validity of the index (Allen and Straus, 1979). Finally, 
the test-retest reliability— something like the durability 
of response— is quite high (Price-Bonham, 1976:631).
Index Construction
For each of the two indexes referring to the distri­
bution of power— AP and PDN— the component items were first 
standardized in PZ form. Then the sum of the PZ'd items 
was computed and itself transformed into PZ form. Thus,
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each index ranges from 0 to 100, has a mean of 50, and a 
standard deviation of 20.
Husband-Wife Consistency. Table 4.8 gives the 
correlations between husbands' and wives' reports for PDN 
and AP, for the sample as a whole, and for middle class 
and working class subsets. ^  The lack of consistency for 
all but one relationship is striking. Only for middle class 
couples reporting on attributed power is there even a 
moderate, positive relationship.
Prescriptions and Descriptions; Relationships
Figure 4.1 gives the correlation between power dis­
tribution norms and attributed power. The upper arrow in­
dicates the relationship between the husband's report of PDN 
and his report of AP, for the sample as a whole, and the 
middle and working class sub-samples. The lower arrow 
gives the relationship between the wife's report of PDN 
and her report of AP.
There are strong, positive correlations for all but 
the working class wives. Thus, for the sample as a whole, 
the stronger the prescription for a distribution of power
1 o
To obtain the middle and working class sub-samples 
used throughout the research, the total sample was dichoto­
mized based on the husband's occupational rating. Those with 
unskilled through skilled blue collar occupations were clas­
sified as working class. Those with clerical/sales through 
professional occupations as middle class (see Allen and Straus, 
1979). Two cautions: one, the husband's occupation alone was 
used so as to ensure inclusion of as many cases as possible, 
although admittedly this represents a sexual bias (Steinmetz 
and Straus, 1973). Two, this division of the sample results 
in only ten cases in the working class category.
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Table 4.8. Correlations between Husbands1 and Wives1 






Middle Class . 0 1 . 2 6
Working Class - . 0 6 - . 0 5






^  0 ^
Wife1s 
Norms
*The husband's correlations are between his norms and his 
report of attributed power. The wife's correlations are 
between her norms and her reports of attributed power.
In subsequent similar figures, the same holds— each 
partner's score on one variable is related to his/her 
own score on the dependent variable.
Figure 4.1. Correlations between Power Distribution Norms 
and Attributed Power, for Wives and Husbands
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favoring the husband, the greater the amount of power 
actually attributed to the husband. This is an especially 
strong relationship for working class husbands. However, the 
one reversal in the findings is for their wives. Working 
class wives show a small, negative correlation between PDN 
and AP, such that the greater their belief in the husband's 
authority, the less they actually attribute power to him.
RESOURCES AND THE POWER DISTRIBUTION
The resource theory of conjugal power relations 
predicts that the greater the relative resources possessed 
by a partner, the greater that person's "say" in the rela­
tionship. In this section, self-reports of the distribution 
of power, both normative and actual, will be linked to 
personal resources. The model presented in Chapter I 
suggests that personal resources have both a direct effect 
on attributed power and power distribution norms, and an 
indirect effect on attributed power, by way of power dis­
tribution norms.
Figure 4.2 gives the correlations between absolute 
relative extrinsic resources and power distribution norms, 
for the sample as a whole and for the middle and working 
class subsamples. The absolute level of extrinsic resources 
does not seem to affect norms about power, except slightly 
in the working class group. Even here, the relationship 
is the reverse of that expected for the wives: the higher


















Figure 4.2. Correlations between Extrinsic Resources and 
Power Distribution Norms
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When the relative resources are considered, the 
findings are much stronger and are consistent with resource 
theory. For the men especially, the greater their extrin­
sic resources relative to those of their wives, the more 
they adhere to male-dominant norms. There seems to be 
little class difference in this. For the middle class 
women, relative extrinsic resources seem unimportant. How­
ever, again we find an unexpected reversal for the working 
class women: the higher their husbands' relative resources, 
the less these women give the men authority in the relation­
ship.
In sum, relative extrinsic resources make more of 
a difference in power distribution norms than do absolute 
levels of these resources. Further, the relative extrinsic 
resources are mostly related to power distribution norms 
for men. The reversal of expected findings for working 
class women holds both in terms of the absolute level of 
their own resources, and in terms of relative resources.
It is hard to put much confidence in this finding 
given the sample size and its inconsistency with previous 
research (Brown, 1977). Still, one explanation could be 
that working class wives who are doing relatively well are 
violating their husbands' (and others') expectations, 
and so they hold especially strongly to a male dominant 
ideology in an effort to soften the impact of this violation. 
This could especially be the case in the early stages of
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the wife's success before she is firmly established. Support 
for this notion is available in a macro-level analysis of 
wife employment and education and decision-making pres­
criptions, in which it was found that there is a fourteen- 
year lag between an increase in these two independent var­
iables, and an effect of increasing shared decision-making 
prescriptions (Brown, 1977).
The intrinsic resources are much more important for 
the women than for the men (see Figure 4.3). The absolute 
index of intrinsic resources is not related to the husbands 
normative definitions about power, but there is a small 
negative relationship for the wives. This finding is 
stronger for the middle class women, but is reversed for 
working class wives.
Based on the relative intrinsic resources index, 
there is again no relationship for the men, except for a 
small one in the working class. For middle class wives, 
the greater the husband's relative intrinsic resources the 
higher the male dominant ideology. However, in the working 
class, the higher the relative intrinsic resources of the 
husbands, the less their wives subscribe to a male-oriented 
distribution of power. Thus, not only are the findings 
the opposite of those expected, but they are in conflict 



















Figure 4.3. Correlations between Intrinsic Resources and 
Power Distribution Norms
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Attributed Power and Resources
Figure 4.4 gives the correlations between extrinsic 
resources and attributed power. There is a moderate corre­
lation, regardless of class, between the absolute level of 
the husband's resources and his attribution of greater power 
to himself. For the middle class wives, there is a small, 
unexpected association between their own resources and 
husband-favorable attributions, while the working class 
women attribute less power to their husbands as their own 
resources increase.
Interestingly, the relative index of extrinsic 
resources is not related to husband's attributed power.
Thus, it seems to be the actual level of extrinsic resources 
in itself which affects attributed power for the men. Among 
working class wives, the greater their husbands' relative 
resources, the more they attribute power to the husbands, 
and this is consistent with the "absolute" findings. How­
ever, for middle class women, the higher the husbands 
resources relative to their own, the less they attribute 
power to the husband. This is also consistent with the 
absolute findings, but not with resource theory.
Figure 4.5 gives the correlations between intrinsic 
resources and attributed power. For the men, there is a 
surprisingly strong relationship in the working class only 
between the absolute IRI and AP. For the relative version 


















Figure 4.4. Correlations between Extrinsic Resources and 
Attributed Power
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working class men have relative to their wives, the less 
they attribute power to themselves.
For middle class women, the higher their IRI, the 
lower the attributed power score for the husband. This 
is reversed for working class women. Finally, the relative 
interpersonal skills of the spouses is not linked to wives' 
power attributions.
Overall, it seems that for the men extrinsic resources 
are more strongly associated with attributed power than with 
power distribution norms. This suggests that the ideology 
of male dominance is somewhat more resistant to changes 
in resource levels than is the (reported) actual distribu­
tion of power. Also, intrinsic resources tend to make less 
difference than extrinsic ones among the men. The relative 
indexes are a consistently more important variable than the 
absolute ones only in the relationship between extrinsic 
resources and power distribution norms.
The picture is more murky for the women, since there 
are more reversals in expected findings. Generally, the 
ERI is most strongly related to PDN in the working class, 
but in the "wrong" direction. Across classes, intrinsic 
resources seem more consistent in their importance.
THE END RESULTS: OUTCOMES
The variables and relationships discussed so far 
are all based on self-reports. These yield important 


















Figure 4.5. Correlations between Intrinsic Resources and 
Attributed Power
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I am moved to say: "Now I want to know what happens when
it comes right down to facing real disagreements and con­
flicts." Family researchers have expended a fair amount 
of energy on this issue, mostly in the form of the question, 
"Who won?"
Unilateral and Bilateral Outcomes
The Inventory of Marital Conflict (IMC) task asks 
participants to make a pair of judgments about each vignette. 
For this research, three outcomes measures were derived 
from these pairs of judgments. If both choices favor the 
husband's point of view, the husband is given a unilateral 
"win." If both decisions favor the wife, the wife is given 
a unilateral win. If one judgment favors one partner and 
the other choice favors the other, this is counted as a 
compromise or bilateral solution.
To give an example from an actual vignette (see 
Figure 4.6), one case involves a conflict over the car 
breaking down on a weekend trip, after the husband— on 
short notice— asks the wife to have the spark plugs checked. 
The crucial issues are whether she followed through on 
asking for the necessary repairs, or whether the garage 
did a poor job, and whether the husband's angry reaction was 
justified. The participants must (1) choose which spouse 
is primarily responsible for the conflict, and (2) decide 
whether "Linda should thoroughly carry out her responsibili­
ties once she has accepted them" or "Steve is being
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unreasonable in blaming his wife for the work not getting 
done." A husband-unilateral outcome would result if the 
couple decides that the wife is to blame and Linda should 
carry out her responsibilities. The other two choices in 
combination would be scored as a wife-unilateral outcome. 
However, if the couple either (1) blames the wife but 
thinks the husband should be more understanding, or (2) 
blames the husband but thinks the wife should be more res­
ponsible, then this is scored as a bilateral outcome.
To obtain the three measures, the number of each 
type of outcome is simply summed. There are twelve conflict- 
inducing cases, so the combined total of the three outcomes 
is 12. Each particular measure has a theoretical range of 
0 to 12, although the upper extreme is unlikely to occur.
For example, for a wife-unilateral score to be 12, there 
must be no husband-unilateral nor bilateral outcomes for 
the couple.
Marital Relations as a "Zero-Sum Game." The most 
startling findings for the outcomes measures are also the 
simplest. Table 4.9 gives basic descriptive information 
on the three variables. Most striking is the low number of 
bilateral outcomes— an average of 1.9 per couple. Twenty- 
seven percent of the couples come up with no compromise 
solutions at all, and only about one-fifth devised at 
least four bilateral decisions.
The low number of compromise outcomes produced by 
these couples is relevant to Sprey's (1972, 1975) claim
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Husband’s Version
"Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While 
Linda is driving Steve to work on Friday morning, Steve hears a "pinging" 
noise and realizes that the spark plugs should be changed along with 
other minor adjustments. Since they plan to leave Friday evening and
Steve has to work, he has to ask his wife to take the car to the garage.
Linda complains about the other preparations she says she has to make
for them and their two children but says she will have time to take
the car to the garage, and agrees to do so. Later on the trip, Steve 
hears the "pinging" noise and realizes the spark plugs have not been 
changed. It turns out that Linda took the car to the garage but did 
not bother to mention the spark plugs. Linda says that if Steve doesn't 
like the way she does things he can do them himself. Steve points 
out that he was unable to take the car to the garage and that when she 
agrees to do something she should do it."
a. Who is primarily responsible for the problem? (husband, 
wife)
b. Should Linda thoroughly carry out her responsibilities 
once she has accepted them? (yes, no)
Wife's Version
"Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While 
Linda is driving Steve to work on Friday morning, Steve decides that 
the spark plugs need changing and that other minor adjustments should 
be made. He tells his wife to get the work done in time for them to 
leave that evening. Linda also has all the other preparations to 
manage for them and their two children but she manages to get the car 
to the garage and asks for a tuneup. On the trip, Steve hears a 
"pinging" noise, discovers that the spark plugs are the same ones 
he had been using, and blames his wife for the spark plugs not being 
changed. Linda feels that if he is going to be so picky about how 
things are going to be done, he should assume some responsibility for 
doing them himself. Steve tells her he was too busy."
a. Who is primarily responsible for the problem? (husband, 
wife)
b. Is Steve being unreasonable in blaming his wife for the 
work not getting done? (yes, no)
Joint Form
a. Who is primarily responsible for the problem? (husband, 
wife)
b. Should Linda thoroughly carry out her responsibilities,
or
Is Steve being unreasonable in blaming his wife?
Figure 4.6. Sample Vignette, Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC)
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Mean 4.22 5.5 1.92
SD 1.807 1.959 1.793
Median 4.42 5.62 1.45
Mode 5.0 4.0 0
Range (N) 0(2) - 8(2) 0(1) - 10(2) 0(21) - 7(j
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that families are not analogous to zero-sum games. If Sprey 
is correct, then research based on simple "win scores" is 
seriously flawed, since such scores assume an "I win-you 
lose" situation.
Sprey's position, unfortunately, amounts to substitut­
ing one assumption for another, rather than treating the 
issue as an "empirical question." In other words, in place 
of the assumption that families are like zero-sum games,
Sprey makes the counter assumption that they are not— i.e., 
that they are like mixed-motive games in which both (all) 
group members can at least partially win or lose at the same 
time.
Sprey's assumption may be based on the fact that in 
families there is no structural reason for "I win-you lose" 
behavior, as there is in a formal zero-sum game. Yet, as 
I argued in Chapter III, group members may treat a situation 
as if it were structurally zero-sum, even though it is not.
My interpretation of the low number of bilateral solutions 
by the couples is that this is exactly what happened in 
this research.
Before concluding that the research couples were 
treating the task as a zero-sum game "voluntarily," we need 
to rule out the possibility that the task induced such 
behavior, at a rate higher than what we would expect in 
"real life." I think this can be done.
There are three aspects of the task which might 
induce unilateral solutions (treating the task as a zero-sum
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game). One, each partner comes to the joint discussion 
with a unilateral position and since this is already set 
it may be resistant to change. There is variation, however, 
in how firm these positions are, as there would be in every­
day life. The link with everyday life is further underscored 
when we remember that at home the partners often must resolve 
matters on which they have initial disagreements (or prior 
unilateral positions). In other words, conflicts of interest 
and disagreements on which group members must come together 
from initially divergent positions are a normal part of 
family life (Foss, 1979; Sprey, 1975), which are well 
modeled by this aspect of the task.
The second element of the task which might induce 
I win-you lose behavior is the instructions themselves. 
However, there seems to be nothing here that suggests to the 
couples that they should make unilaterally-consistent pairs 
of judgments.
The third possibility is that the couples are not 
operating on a zero-sum basis, but are just trying to be 
logically consistent, or rational, in their choices for 
each vignette. For example, to say that Linda is to blame 
for the conflict concerning the car breakdown, and then to 
say that Steve should still have been more understanding—  
just doesn't "make sense."
Or does it? In fact, many of the couples were able 
to make just such choices, and to do so in a way which
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seemed entirely logical to them. One approach is to decide 
that it was Linda1s responsibility to have the car checked 
properly, and she did give incomplete information to the 
mechanic, so she really is responsible for the problem—  
at least in the sense of providing the initial conflict 
issue. However, Steve’s resulting rage is far out of 
proportion to the offense, and therefore he should change 
his ways.
Another entirely rational bilateral approach occurred 
among couples who became aware that they simply had different 
perspectives or information on a vignette. Given no basis 
for choosing one person's information over the other's, they 
might rather arbitrarily choose to "blame Linda, but make 
Steven more understanding," or vice versa. This makes 
eminent good sense in the context of the task. Thus, there 
is nothing inherently irrational about making bilateral 
choices in the IMC task.
Having ruled out these three elements as possible 
artificial incentives for zero-sum behavior, it seems safe 
to conclude that the marital partners in this research, 
generally speaking, are trying to win outright, rather than 
to arrive at mutually satisfactory solutions in which each 
must give up something but also gains something. Further 
evidence on the analogy between families and zero-sum 
games is found in the power modes findings in later chapters.
Unilateral "Wins." Table 4.9 also gives the basic 
descriptive statistics for husband-unilateral and wife-
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unilateral outcomes. On the average, the number of wife- 
unilateral solutions is higher than the number of husband- 
unilateral outcomes. As with the attributed power index, 
we are not justified in concluding from this that the couples 
are wife-dominant or equalitarian. This is because it is 
hard to judge whether the items themselves (the vignettes) 
are exactly "fair." What is most important is determining 
what factors account for variation in the three outcomes 
measures.
Outcomes and the Distribution of Power
The model presented in Chapter I suggests that several 
important factors in explaining variations in outcomes 
should be attributed power, power distribution norms, and 
personal resources. We start by looking at the two power 
distribution variables. Table 4.10 gives the product-moment 
correlations for these relationships.
The husband's view of the normative distribution has 
only a small positive relationship to husband-unilateral 
outcomes and a corresponding small negative correlation 
with wife-unilateral outcomes. There is no relationship 
between bilateral outcomes and either the husband's or the 
wife's prescriptions. Also, as expected, the more the 
wife believes decisions should be made by the husband, the 
fewer wife-unilateral outcomes.
Husband's attributed power is more strongly related 
to husband-unilateral decisions (as well as negatively to
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Table 4.10. Correlations between Power Distribution 
Variables and Outcomes, for Husbands and Wives
Outcomes
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wife-unilateral ones) while for the wives attributed power 
is a weaker factor than prescriptive power. Again, bilateral 
outcomes do not relate to husband's attributed power.
However, for the wives, the more husband-oriented their 
attributions, the higher the number of bilateral solutions.
Outcomes and Personal Resources
Table 4.11 gives the product-moment correlations for 
personal resources and outcomes. What is most interesting 
here is the relatively greater importance of the intrinsic 
rather than the extrinsic resources. None of the correla­
tions between extrinsic resources and outcomes are large 
enough to be given much weight.
The greater the husband's intrinsic resources, the 
lower the number of wife-unilateral outcomes. The corres­
ponding increase in the other outcomes is for bilateral 
more than husband-unilateral choices. Among the wives 
there is the unexpected finding that the higher their intrin­
sic resources, the lower the number of wife-unilateral out­
comes, and— correspondingly— the higher the number of husband- 
unilateral ones. Finally, as the husband's intrinsic 
resources relative to the wife's increase, there is a very 
small drop in the husband-unilateral outcomes.
T O  ,
-LJWhen each of the five extrinsic resources were exam­
ined separately, the results were no different, except that hus­
band's income was related negatively to the number of husband- 
unilateral outcomes and positively to the number of bilateral 
outcomes. Also, the work status of the wife showed a small 
negative relationship with bilateral outcomes, but her occupa­
tional level a small negative relationship to wife-unilateral 
outcomes.
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Table 4.11. Correlations between Personal Resources and 





Husband-unilateral -.09 .02 -.12
Wife-unilateral -.06
oo• -.06








Overall, it appears that as the husband contributes 
more interpersonally to the relationship, the likelihood 
of compromise solutions— and perhaps of a more negotiation- 
oriented, give-and-take process— increases. However, wives 
with high levels of interpersonal resources do not "win" 
more or compromise more, but actually "lose" more often.
Perhaps these are women who see their proper contribution 
to the relationship as interpersonal, and who define this 
rather traditionally as at least partly an ability to be 
cooperative and supportive to men in decision-making processes. 
This would be something like the wife as complement model 
of marriage described by Scanzoni (1972:37-39), or even the 
model of women in the family prescribed by popular books 
such as The Total Woman (Morgan, 1973).
CONCLUSION
All of the concepts analyzed in this chapter can 
actually be viewed as "distributional" variables. Each 
reflects how a power-related attribute is distributed in a 
group. Figure 4.7 illustrates several notions about how 
these distributional elements relate to one another through 
an hypothetical power event. First, each variable can be 
seen as a single "slice-of-life," or one frame in an on-going 
moving picture. Second, each overlaps with the others, but 
also partially does not overlap. Thus, the picture of the 
power distribution given in each frame is somewhat different, 
but also somewhat the same. Third, and related to the last
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point, while each frame can be partially explained by the 
previous one(s), it is reasonable to expect each to be 
partially explained by additional, disparate elements.
The additional explanatory factors which are important 
are not always the same for each group member. In the 
present case, what each marital partner brings to the moving 
picture may differentially affect the images.
The earliest frame in the process, personal resources, 
was divided into extrinsic and intrinsic attributes of the 
marital partners. The extrinsic resources seem to have a 
greater impact on later variables for the men than for 
the women, while the intrinsic assets are especially important 
for the women.
Of the two explicitly distributional variables, power 
distribution norms— the ideological component— seems less 
subject to changes in personal resources than attributed 
power— the descriptive component. In other words, the 
normative frame seems relatively more independent of personal 
resources, and thus gives a picture of the power distri­
bution which is less congruent with the one given by 
resources. Concomitantly, the attributed power distribution 
overlaps somewhat more with the distribution of resources.
One special finding with the "achieved power" 
variables is that the couples in this research do seem to 
be treating the task as a zero-sum game, contrary to the 
analogy of the family with a mixed motive game (Sprey, 1972).
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Figure 4.7. Changes in the Distribution of Power through 
a Power "Event"
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As a result, there are few bilateral or compromise outcomes 
for the couples. For the most part one person or the other 
unilaterally wins. The question of the distribution of 
those wins is a matter of achieved power, or power outcomes. 
Here, the intrinsic resources of the partners are a more 
powerful explanatory factor than extrinsic ones. Further, 
attributed power seems to affect outcomes more for men, 
while power distribution norms affect them more for women.
Still, there is a big gap in the moving picture 
between the resources and normative and descriptive percep­
tions of the power distribution, and outcomes in a conflict 
situation. A large part of that gap is the interaction 
process through which married partners produce group out­
comes .
CHAPTER V
THE CONCEPT OF POWER MODES
This Chapter and the next, are devoted to the 
central concept in the research: power modes or types of
power assertion used by marital partners. The format of 
the presentation is similar to that used in Chapter III 
in examining other important dimensions of power. In this 
Chapter, power modes are first defined. Then, relationships 
with other dimensions of power, existing measures relevant 
to the concept, and considerations important to the 
development of a system of coding power modes in marital 
interaction, are examined. Chapter VI presents the Marital 
Power Assertion Coding System (MPACS) developed specifically 
for this research, and includes basic descriptive analysis 
of the system, and analysis of inter-code relations.
DEFINING POWER MODES 
Power modes is defined as "the specific type of 
act carried out as a power assertion" (Straus, 1976:1).
A synonym for power modes which is used frequently is "types 
of power assertion." Straus has defined power assertions 
as "attempts which A makes to control the behavior of the 
other. Synonyms are 'influence attempts' and 'control
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attempts'" (1976:1). Within the framework of the present 
terminology, power assertions are "attempts to alter group 
outcomes (or the other's behavior, in a dyad)."
The term "power modes" itself is essentially new to 
the study of husband-wife power relations, although there 
is some precedent for the concept. Sprey has repeatedly called 
for the study of process, strategy, bargaining, and more 
specifically "powering" in the field of family power (1972:
236). Burr had suggested that it is "important to dis­
tinguish between the distribution of power and the different 
methods that are used in controlling. For example, attempts 
to control can be made verbally or nonverbally, overtly 
or covertly, and with physical threats or without them" 
(1973:189). Another source for this concept and a direct 
influence on the research [proposed] here, is the distinc­
tion made by Foss and Straus (1975) between measures of 
the distribution of power and measures of "powering tech­
niques. "
Relationship to Other Variables
Power modes are the central focus of the research, 
and a major concern and contribution is the development of 
a system of coding marital interaction in the laboratory 
in terms of power modes. However, relationships between 
power modes, the other power variables, and personal 
resources, will also be explored. Figure 1 in Chapter I, 
roughly indicates the relationships to be examined. Since
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the research is exploratory and designed to generate hypo­
theses, it is inappropriate to present specific prepositions 
to be tested. Even if this were desirable, it would prove 
very difficult. First, while some leads as to expected 
relationships can be found in the literature, they are not 
systematic and do not suggest consistent sets of expecta­
tions. For example, Safilios-Rothschild suggests that the 
spouse with the greater personal resources and/or greater 
attributed power will not need to use direct, overt power 
modes (1970:80). However, in a laboratory setting which 
confronts spouses with new issues not previously settled, 
that may not be the case. Further, even in a non-laboratory 
setting, the spouse with greater resources or attributed 
power has little to lose by using overt power modes, and 
therefore may not be less likely to use them.
An additional difficulty in unearthing specific pro­
positions at the outset of the study is that the few systematic 
discussions of marital power modes in relation to other 
variables tend to include a different or broader range of 
power modes than are available in the present study. For 
example, the degree of husband-wife violence (which may be 
conceptualized as an extreme type of power assertion) as 
measured through the Conflict Tactics Scales, is negatively 
related to the resources possessed by the spouse, and this 
relationship is further specified when power distribution 
norms, attributed power, and social class are considered
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(Allen and Straus, 1979). While such findings provide 
leads for the present study, and will be considered in 
interpreting findings, they do not provide clear guides for 
advancing specific hypotheses concerning the "finer" power 
modes observable in a laboratory setting.
DEVELOPING A MEASURE OF POWER MODES 
While there have been a number of systems developed 
for coding marital interaction, none has been specifically 
designed to focus on types of power assertions made by 
intimates. One possibility for the present study would 
have been to use an existing system and concentrate analysis 
on categories which seem relevant to power modes. One such 
system is that designed by Olson and Ryder for use with the 
Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC) task used in the present 
research. The authors note that this is a "purely descrip­
tive, non-theoretically based coding system," and suggest that 
"an investigator always has the option of selecting codes 
from the IFC system which seem most appropriate for use in 
a given research project" (1973:1). However, two character­
istics of this particular coding system make it inappro­
priate for our purpose. First, a large number of the cate­
gories are designed to distinguish between interaction over 
the IMC task itself and other, more personalized interaction—  
a distinction which is not of particular interest here.
Second, the system appears to be procedural and format- 
oriented, rather than content-oriented. This characteristic
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means that it would be very difficult to extract categories 
which clearly reflect types of power assertions. Thus, 
compared to existing coding systems, it seemed preferable 
to develop a new coding system which would explicitly 
reflect our interest in power modes.
A rare typology of power modes, based on responses 
to an open-ended question in a survey research, which might 
have been adapted for use in coding laboratory interaction, 
was developed by Safilios-Rothschild (1969) . However, 
adaptation of this typology did not seem advantageous for 
two reasons. First, like Straus' Conflict Tactics Scales 
mentioned above, this typology covers a broader range of 
techniques than is likely to occur in a laboratory 
setting. Second, like the Olson and Ryder IMC coding system, 
the Safilios-Rothschild typology does not seem to have the 
kind of theoretical base necessary for our purposes. For 
example, a major division of the typology is between verbal 
and non-verbal techniques, a distinction which is clearly 
not relevant in the present context. Thus, this typology, 
like the IMC coding system, was bypassed in favor of 
developing a new system tailormade for coding marital power 
assertions in the laboratory.
Identifying the Range of Behavior to Be Considered
The first step in developing a system for coding 
marital interaction in terms of power modes is to specify 
the range of behavior to be included. At one extreme,
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anything that anyone does can be viewed as a power assertion 
Hawley has argued that "every social act is a power equation 
and every social system is an organization of power" (1963: 
423). In the sense that every social act may be positively 
or negatively reinforcing of another's behavior, or as Turk 
(1975:85) puts it, "all the actions of every individual in 
the choice situation have some impact on the outcome," 
then indeed any behavior could be seen as a power assertion.
While this is intuitively reasonable, it does not 
seem to be viable for research purposes. In this view, 
power assertions are apparently equivalent to causal in­
fluences. Thus, any behavior which has a causal influence 
on the other is a power assertion.1 In a very strict sense, 
we would have to find out whether a behavior did in fact 
have a causal influence (or was "effective" or "successful") 
before we could classify it as a power assertion. And, we 
should probably have to do this for each couple individually 
for what is reinforcing within the context of one relation­
ship may not be in another. Not only would such a task 
approach the dimensions of a "life's work," but it also 
shifts attention away from attempts to alter or maintain the 
other's behavior, which may or may not be effective, to 
successful power assertions ("achieved power") which is an 
entirely different dimension.
1If so, why not also include non-human causal in­
fluences as power assertions?
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In a sense, the definition of power assertions as 
attempts to alter group outcomes necessarily implies some 
assessment or attribution of intent. We are interested in 
whether the actor is trying to alter the other's behavior.
If a husband were on his way out the door and he brushed 
against the on-off button on the TV set and turned it off, 
we would probably count this as an accident. But if the 
husband were arguing with his wife over what program to 
watch and finally just changed the channel to his program, 
we would attribute intentionality to his action and count 
it as a power assertion. Similarly, when an actor is offering 
persuasive arguments for his/her position (or against the 
other's position), we assume that the actor is making a power 
assertion, or is attempting to change or influence the behavior 
of the other. There is no doubt that it is very difficult 
at times to assess intent. Certainly this involves making 
attributions which may sometimes be mistaken. Since there 
is no external, unambiguous criterion available for assessing 
intent, the final test of the success of the coding system 
is interrater reliability.
Ultimately the appropriate range of behavior for a 
power modes coding system, can only be more precisely defined 
when the more specific types of power assertion are delineated. 
Few existing measures of husband-wife power in any way 
classify modes of powering used by spouses (Foss and 
Straus, 1975). However, many observation systems which have
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been used to study the distribution of marital power use the 
occurrence of power assertions as an indirect way of 
measuring the distribution of power (i.e., the actual control 
of the other's behavior). Two basic approaches have been 
taken— one is "content-free" and the other is "content- 
based. "
Content-Free Approaches. Content-free approaches dis­
regard the content of the behavior, and focus on its existence 
or form. For example, Strodtbeck (1951, 1954) and Farina 
(1960) have used as measures of power who talks the most, 
and who most often initiates discussion. Leighton et al.
(19 71) have used the number of interruptions and the number 
of simultaneous speeches. Farina (1960) also used the number 
of interruptions. Mishler and Waxier (1968) use two types 
of behavior: "attention control strategies" (who speaks to
whom, statement length, etc.) and "person control strategies" 
(interruptions and questions). Cromwell and Olson (1975) 
have criticized many of these measures as being essentially 
a-theoretical and conceptually unsophisticated. Further 
problems in terms of the present project are the very limited 
range of behavior which they include and the fact that they 
do not suggest any typology of power modes.
Content-Based Approaches. Several approaches are 
content-based in that the determination of whether an act 
represents power is based on its content. Two fairly narrow 
approaches are Caputo's (1963) measure using the number of 
instrumental (task-oriented) acts which are directive, and
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the Riskin and Faunce (1970) measure of the number of "behave 
yourself requests" and "requests for commitment." Both of 
these have the disadvantage of including only the most 
directive and obvious strategies, and excluding more subtle 
tactics like attempts at persuasion. Henkel's (1963) 
somewhat broader measure is the total number of instrumental 
(rather than expressive) acts, based on Bales' Interaction 
Process Analysis coding system (1950). In this system, 
instrumental acts include giving and requesting suggestions 
or directions, opinions, and information. While this measure 
has the advantage of offering a neat typology, it appears to 
lack content validity in that it includes behaviors which 
seem at best remotely related to power assertions (as in 
asking for information) and excludes actions which seem 
clearly relevant (such as rejection, antagonism, and defending 
or asserting self, which are classified as expressive be­
haviors) . Counting all instrumental acts as power-relevant 
and all expressive acts as non-power-related is inappropriate.
One additional approach classifies power acts as 
"any direction, instruction, suggestion, or request intended 
to control or modify the behavior of another member of the 
family" (Straus and Tallman, 1971:392). Cromwell et al.
(1975) adopt the same criterion, and specify that any 
behavior which is not coded as a power act is coded 
"sociable act" and these include "nondirective, non-goal- 
oriented, supportive, and climate setting types of state 
ments (1975:156).
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Using this criterion, Cromwell et al. (1975) found 
that in a discussion task 15 percent of a family's total 
activity was power activity, and in a more physical, game 
task (SIMFAM), 31 percent was power activity. While this 
measure of power acts is broader than many others, both the 
behaviors which are not included as power acts, and the 
relatively low percentage of activity classified as power 
assertions, suggest that this measure also focuses on the 
most obvious power assertions and excludes more subtle ones. 
On the other hand, this measure is most consistent with the 
conception of power assertions as attempts to modify group 
outcomes.
While the approaches discussed thus far offer some 
criteria for classifying acts as power assertions, they do 
not suggest typologies of power assertions or distinctions 
among power modes. Perhaps some of the best leads for 
developing a power modes typology come from the parent- 
child literature. As Foss and Straus (1975) point out, in 
parent-child measures of power the emphasis is not on the 
distribution of power, but on power modes— specifically, the 
types of power assertions which parents make in attempting 
to "get their children to do something."
HOFFMAN'S QUALIFIED AND UNQUALIFIED POWER ASSERTIONS
In looking at parental power modes, Hoffman (1963) 
makes an important distinction between qualified and 
unqualified power assertion techniques. Unqualified power
117
assertions include direct commands, threats, and depriva­
tions as well as physical force, and no explanations or 
justifications are offered by the parent. Qualified power 
assertions are influence techniques which are qualified by 
explanation and various types of persuasive appeals. This 
distinction is an important one in the coding system for 
husband-wife power assertions developed for this research.
In a later analysis, Hoffman (1970) offers a somewhat 
different model. Here he classifies parental influence 
techniques into power assertive and non-power assertive 
techniques. Power assertive techniques include "physical 
punishment, deprivation of material objects or privileges, 
the direct application of force, or the threat of any of 
these . . . The parent seeks to control the child by capital­
izing on his physical power or control over material 
resources" (1970:285). This category appears to be equiva­
lent to unqualified power assertions in the first model. 
Non-power assertive techniques are divided into "love- 
withdrawal" and "induction." Love-withdrawal means that 
"the parent simply gives direct but non-physical expression 
to his anger or disapproval of the child . . . Examples 
are ignoring the child, turning one's back to him, refusing 
to speak or listen to him, explicitly stating a dislike 
for the child, and isolating or threatening to leave him" 
(1970:285). Induction techniques are those in which the 
parent "gives explanations or reasons for requiring the
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child to change his behavior" (1970:286). Thus, induction 
in this model is equivalent to "qualified power assertion" 
in the first. While Hoffman seems to ultimately view per­
suasive appeals as non-power assertive techniques, we prefer 
the view that they represent qualified power assertions. 
Power assertions were defined above as any attempt to alter 
group outcomes, and persuasive appeals, or induction tech­
niques, clearly fit this definition, even though they are 
aimed at obtaining the change "voluntarily."
power assertions is used as a broad framework for the power 
modes coding system developed for this research. The next 
Chapter provides a detailed presentation of the coding 
system itself, as well as the basic findings from initial 
use of the coding system in the present project.
The distinction between qualified and unqualified
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CHAPTER VI
THE MARITAL POWER ASSERTION CODING SYSTEM (MPACS)
In this chapter, the power modes coding system and 
basic descriptive findings derived from it are presented. 
First, there is a summary of the final system with the 
discussion focusing on the broad categories within which 
the specific codes fit. Then, the process of developing 
the system and the fairly technical aspects of the system 
itself and the coding procedures are described. Finally, 
descriptive findings are given, including code frequencies, 
inter-code correlations, and relationships between the 
power assertions of wives and husbands.
OVERVIEW OF THE CODING SYSTEM 
Two of the three major divisions of the coding 
system— unqualified and qualified power assertions— are 
based on Hoffman's (1963) analysis, as described in the 
last chapter. The third division— bilateral power asser­
tions— is based on an assumption that an important part of 
power processes in marriages, as in other groups, is not 
only unilateral, win-oriented behavior, but also bargaining, 
negotiation, and trading of positions. Figure 6.1 lists 
the specific MPACS codes in the context of the major
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divisions of the system. The full MPACS package is pre­
sented in Appendix B.
Unqualified Power Assertions
In the last chapter, power modes were defined as 
"the specific type of act carried out as a power assertion," 
or "attempts to alter group outcomes." Unqualified power 
assertions are unilateral attempts to alter group outcomes, 
in which no effort is made to provide other group members 
with a rationale for one's position. These assertions may be 
blunt, directive, and relatively coercive in the sense that 
no effort is made to obtain compliance "voluntarily." In 
addition, these communications are relatively unadorned.
They tend to be short, choppy phrases like "that was stupid;" 
"No, he didn't;" "Yes, he did;" "Don't do that."
Included in this broad category are seven specific 
behaviors. Rejecting/attacking involves direct negative 
statements which are personally critical. These are usually 
given in angry or ridiculing tones. I count them as the 
most extreme of power modes represented in this system, as 
they are instances of verbal aggression, or verbal expressions 
which are intended to injure the other (Foss, 1979).
The command code is the only one in the system 
defined solely in terms of formal grammatical structure.
Any statement which is a formal command or directive is 
included. Do anyway attempts are especially important in 
paralleling other variables in the research, since they
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I. Unqualified Power Assertions (UPA)
01 Reject/attack other
02 Command
03 "Do anyway" attempt
04 Surrender under protest
05 Reiteration
06 Unqualified disagreement/refusal
07 Unqualified partisan assertion




B. Qualified Partisan Assertions




31 Situation definition (vignettes)
32 Personal definition
33 Other's position definition
34 Progress definition
III. Bilateral Power Assertions (BPA)
40 Explicit position trade
41 Other compromise/bilateral solution
42 Role division solution
Other
49 Other power assertion/related behavior (SPECIFY)
50 Self-depreciation/deference 
98 Non-power assertions
Figure 6.1. Summary of Marital Power Assertion Coding 
System Categories
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are unilateral attempts to impose one's position despite 
opposition. In the IMC context, this is usually a situation 
where one partner goes ahead and writes in his own response 
against the objections of the other. It can almost be seen 
as the prototype of all unqualified power assertions— and 
not surprisingly is often responded to with verbal aggres­
sion.
Surrender under protest is a rather unusual code 
developed in the process of listening to tapes. This is a 
one-sided capitulation in which the message is actually not 
"I give in," but almost the opposite. This is a power 
assertion in that it is a final attempt to either "guilt- 
trip" or threaten the other for "browbeating" behavior. In 
fact, surrender under protest seems to occur when the actor 
thinks the other is being coercive, and it represents a 
giving notice or threat of withdrawal or attack if the 
coerciveness continues. There is usually either hostility 
or exaggerated indifference in the voice-tone.
The last three codes in this category are parallel 
to one another. Reiteration is flat repetition of one's 
position. Unqualified disagreement/refusal includes flat 
disagreements such as "No, I won't," or "It didn't say that." 
Unqualified partisan assertions are flat statements of posi­
tion like "I had the wife on mine." All are unelaborated 
statements in which the actor is making no attempt to persuade 
or qualify or obtain voluntary compliance or agreement.
Qualified Power Assertions
Like the unqualified power assertions, qualified 
power assertions are also unilateral in the sense that the 
communication is one-sided. The actor is operating with a 
view toward the other person— not herself— changing. How­
ever, here the actor is attempting to provide some induce­
ment or incentive for the other to alter behavior. There 
are three subtypes of QPA which represent different degrees 
of subtlety in the inducements for changes offered by the 
actor. All are still attempts to obtain "voluntary" 
compliance rather than to coerce the other.
Consequence Identification. The most direct kind of 
QPA is consequence identification, in which the actor ex- 
plititly promises rewards or threatens punishments in ex­
change (or as inducements) for behavioral/positional 
change. These are very clear statements of the form "If you 
do . . ., then I will . . . ." Promises are offers of 
rewards for desired behavior, and threats are statements of 
the retaliation or punishment which will result from un­
desired behavior. The reward or punishment may be either 
material or expressive.
These behaviors are the most explicit out-croppings 
of underlying relational structures based on exchange.
Since the exchange base of intimate relationships is thought 
to be less readily acknowledged than that of other social 
relationships, we can expect consequence identifications 
to be relatively infrequent.
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In this research, there were no instances of 
promises, and only five instances of threats being made 
in the entire sample. I would expect the frequency of both 
to be quite a bit lower in a laboratory than in a natural 
setting, if only because the cues for the full range of 
exchange items available at home are not available in the 
laboratory. One is likely to only think of offering or 
threatening emotional and positional items. I would also 
expect threats to far outnumber promises in the home setting 
if only because explicit exchanges may not be considered 
very legitimate in families, and by the time one is making 
them one is probably in a state of anger. The area in which 
promises are most likely to occur is in the division of 
household duties, and one would expect this to be more 
common among couples who are questioning traditional family 
roles.
Qualified Partisan Assertion. The second type of QPA 
is parallel to one of the UPA codes— unqualified partisan 
assertion. Qualified partisan assertions are elaborated 
statements of one's own position, where there is an attempt 
to persuade or convince the other. They are persuasive 
arguments based on the use of such things as logic, analogies, 
hypothetical appeals, and appeals for empathic understanding. 
The actor is not just stating a position, but also providing 
a rationale for it. The partner is being offered some 
"good reason" for compliance.
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Definitional Assertion. These are the most subtle 
QPA's, and perhaps the most difficult to justify as power 
assertive behaviors. Here the actor is presenting his 
definition of some aspect of the situation, and thus laying 
the groundwork for behavior change by the other. If one 
actor can get the other to accept his view of the "facts of 
the case," he is closer to obtaining a position change. 
Further, if the partner does change her position, she has 
been given an opportunity to rationalize the change as a 
function of a new understanding of "the facts," rather than 
"giving in" or losing the argument.
The justification of definitional assertions as 
power assertions rests on two points. One, what is "informa­
tion" at all in a given interaction sequence is questionable. 
The speaker may be elaborating, distorting, attributing 
motives or meaning, making generalizations, or drawing con­
clusions. As the IMC task itself models, two persons' 
perceptions of the "facts" may be quite different. Thus, 
whose version is adopted for group use is an important 
determinant of group outcomes.
Second, the control of information has been recognized 
as an important personal resource--part of the bases of power 
domain (French and Raven, 1959; Raven, Centers, and 
Rodrigues, 1977; Smith, 1970). Indeed, the access to 
"information" which seems relevant to the resource domain 
and the actual control of information relevant to the power
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outcomes domain, seem to have a natural parallel in attempts 
to control information in the power processes domain.
There are five types of definitional assertion 
identified in MPACS. Task/procedure definitions refer to the 
nature of the task itself and how it can be done. Situation 
definitions are attempts to supply the facts of the case (in 
this research, mainly what went on in the vignettes).
Personal definitions are characterizations of self, spouse, 
their relationship, friends, relatives, etc. Other's posi­
tion definition is an attempt to define or feedback to the 
other her own position. Ostensibly this is just a helpful 
checking out procedure, but it can also be used to "lead" 
the other or make his position look absurd, simplistic, etc. 
Finally, progress definition is a summary statement as to the 
couple's progress on the task, or a laying out of alternative 
positions and approaches. Generally, it provides a broader 
perspective on the discussion itself.
Bilateral Power Assertions
These are explicit suggestions or offers for both 
partners to partially change their positions simultaneously. 
The expectation is that partial concessions will be recipro­
cated in kind. Thus, both actors win something and lose 
something, but neither totally experiences either "the 
thrill of victory or the agony of defeat." The behavior 
involves making contracts, bargaining, negotiating, trading.
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The most direct BPA is an explicit position trade.
In the context of the IMC task, this means offering to give 
in on one of the choices so you can have your way on the 
other: "I'll agree on blaming Steve, if you'll say the wife
on the second part.1 Another explicit trade, which can 
also occur on other than IMC tasks, is to exchange one
item for another, as in "I'll give you this one, if I can
have the next."
Other compromise/bilateral solution includes any 
explicit compromise offer, other than direct trade-offs of 
position. One possibility is to broadly suggest compromising. 
Another is to "agree to disagree" and just pick choices out 
of expediency. Another is to suggest an arbitrary/external 
decision rule such as flipping a coin.
Role division solution is actually a special case 
of the preceding code, in which the decision rule being 
invoked is a pre-existing division of labor. The actor is 
genuinely saying that there is a general rule which can be 
used to develop a solution, and that is whose area of res­
ponsibility the issue falls in. One is saying "when the 
item is in my area, my views will take precedence, in your
area you will have more say."
Miscellaneous Codes
The other power assertive behavior category was 
included at the outset, but became less and less used as 
MPACS was revised and necessary codes added. There are only 
a few incidents counted here.
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Self-depreciation/deference is not a power assertion 
behavior, but is included as a parallel to "Reject/attack 
other." It seemed theoretically interesting also in that 
submissive, victim-like behavior has been seen as inviting 
attack (Gelles, 1972:155-6).
All other statements not covered by MPACS categories 
were tallied as non-power assertions. Many of these were 
statements of agreement, support, or conceding to the 
other.
PROCEDURES
The preceding discussion dealt with the final version 
of MPACS used in the research. This section indicates how 
the coding system was developed, and describes the actual 
procedures used in coding.
A Trial and Error Process
It seems that the only way to develop a new coding 
system is to try it out. The only thing for it is to set 
up some categories, attempt to code some materials with 
them, see how they work, and then go back to the drawing 
board. The process is repeated until one is satisfied that 
it works reasonably well— that the codes reflect one's 
theoretical concerns, they are as clear as possible, and 
there is a minimum of overlap. Refining the codes and 
making their descriptions more precise may go on through the 
coding itself— and in fact could go on indefinitely.
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In devising the MPACS package, the above process was 
followed. Starting with the broad divisions partly based on 
Hoffman's qualified/unqualified power assertion distinction, 
a number of more specific codes were filled in. Many of these 
were actually adapted from existing systems, such as the 
Inventory of Marital Conflicts System (Olson and Ryder,
1973) . These were tried on transcripts for two or three 
couples, then reworked, some discarded, some added. The 
same transcripts were recoded, and additional transcripts 
covered, until another problem was reached. Then the system 
was restructured again. By the time ten transcripts could 
be coded with it, the system was ready for use.
Coding Procedures
Each couples' IMC discussion had been taped, and 
the coding was done on the transcript while listening to 
the tape. Two of the tapes were of such poor quality that 
they could not be coded, so the sample size for the power 
modes data is 76— 62 noncounseling and 14 counseling 
couples.
Two-thirds of the transcripts were coded by the 
investigator, and one-third by an MA student in sociology.
For the first few efforts by the assistant coder, the 
transcripts were double-coded. Then, we went over the 
codings together as a training exercise, and as time went on 
to ensure that our uses of the categories were consistent.
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While resources were not available to double-code 
all cases and run full reliability assessments, some steps 
were taken to minimize intercoder discrepancies and drift 
over time. First, each coder reviewed the MPACS summary 
before each session to be sure that infrequently used cate­
gories would be kept in mind. Second, about every fifth 
transcript, a portion of the discussion was double-coded.
Then the two coders went over the section together, resolving 
differences, reviewing categories, and discussing problems 
with particular items. In this way, a common understanding 
of MPACS was maintained.
BASIC MPACS FINDINGS 
The concluding part of this chapter provides basic 
descriptive findings, some of which are mainly of method­
ological interest and some more substantive. First, the 
intercorrelations of the codes are discussed, in order to 
gain an understanding of the internal workings of the system. 
Then the code frequencies are given. Finally, the degree 
and nature of husband-wife similarities and differences are 
considered.
Internal Relationships
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 give the product-moment correla­
tion matrixes for MPACS categories, for husbands and wives 
respectively.1 In assessing how the system works internally,
1A full, code-by-code version of these tables is 
in Appendix D.
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we are primarily concerned with questions of validity.
One thing to look for is that codes which are clustered 
together in the system for conceptual reasons— such as the 
"definitional assertions"— do in fact correlate with one 
another, and generally more highly than with other cate­
gories. Generally speaking, the system seems adequate in 
this respect. For example, rejecting/attacking is most 
highly correlated with three codes from its own group (UPA's)—  
command, reiteration, and unqualified disagreement. This 
holds for both men and women.
Another consideration for the validity of the system 
is whether particular codes are highly related to other 
theoretically linked categories (construct validity), and 
unrelated to categories which are theoretically unconnected 
(discriminant validity). To use reject/attack other as an 
example again, this code was expected to show very little 
relationships to the BPA codes. The degree of ego involve­
ment and emotion, and aggression, accompanying attack behavior 
seems incompatible with the sense of perspective and ration­
ality which go with bilateral power assertions. For both 
men and women, there are no relationships between these 
variables.
Clearly the MPACS package does not meet these 
internal criteria for validity without exception. Also, 
the system seems to work somewhat differently for men and 
women. However, in general the codes seem to cluster both 
conceptually and empirically, and there are no glaring anomalies.
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Table 6.1. Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Husbands




assertions (QPART) .36 -
Definitional asser­
tions (DA) .46 .56 -
Bilateral power 
assertions (BPA) .05 -.03 .06 -
Self-depreciation 
(SD) .01 -.06 -.04 -.01
Non-power asser­
tions (NPA) .46 .13 .38 .18 .05
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Table 6.2. Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Wives




assertions (QPART) .43 -
Definitional asser­
tions (DA) .40 .55 -
Bilateral power 
assertions (BPA) .27 .20 .04 -
Self-depreciation
(SD) .22 -.02 .07 .01 -
Non-power asser­
tions (NPA) .29 .00 .30 .06 .09
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MPACS Scores of Husbands and Wives
Table 6.3 gives the mean scores of the husbands and 
wives on each of the power modes categories, as well as the 
product-moment correlations between the partners' scores.
The third column in the table indicates whether the husbands 
had a higher or lower mean score than the wives.
Looking at the mean scores, we uncover perhaps the 
most significant finding in the table— that there is little 
difference between the men and women in how frequently, on 
the average, they exhibit each behavior.
Previous Research. One of the problems with research 
on sex differences in communication is that there tends to 
be an overly defensive approach to women's communication 
patterns. The focus is often one which ignores the strengths 
of female communication, and instead seeks to rather apolo­
getically explain why women aren't more like men (Thorne 
and Henley, 19 75).
Another difficulty with sex differences research, 
however, is that it overemphasizes the differences, and thus 
gives a vastly inaccurate underestimate of the extent to 
which human communication is the same, whether emitted by 
women or men. In line with this, when we seek differences 
between men and women, we tend to overlook the extent to 
which findings of sex difference are highly mixed and incon­
sistent (Thorne, 1978).
Nevertheless, when studies do show sex differences 
in language, they suggest that women use a weaker, more
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Table 6.3. Mean Power Modes Scores of Husbands and Wives, 




Power Mode Husbands Wives * and Wife




















Other's position definitioi 
Progress definition
Bilateral Power Assertions 
Explicit position trade 
Other bilateral solution 
Role division solution
Other
Other power-related behavior 
Self-depreciation 
Non-power assertion
1.88 2.08 - .48
2.38 1.88 + .22
.30 .12 + .12
.76 .64 + .17
11.63 10.74 + .90
4.88 4.38 + .67






16.42 18.29 - .59
5.49 4.96 + .56
17.71 17.58 + .77
7.16 7.88 - .72
. 1.72 1.78 - .16
1.91 1.91 0 .16





.58 .86 - .65
19.17 19.00 + .72
*The symbols in the third column indicate the direction of 
difference between wives' and husbands' scores. A "+" 
means the husbands' score is higher, a "-" means the hus­
bands' is lower, and a "0" means there is no difference.
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hesitant style. In reviewing research employing a number 
of content and form variables, Walum concludes that women's 
speech suggests "someone who lacks confidence, is uncertain 
of her own feelings, seeks approval from others, cannot make 
up her mind, and lacks an opinion of her own" (1977:29).
In contrast, men are constrained to indicate "seriousness 
of purpose, hard hittingness, and decisiveness, whether they 
feel that way or not," and it is difficult for them to 
express any feeling except anger (1977:30).
In another analysis of male/female speech, the con­
clusion is that:
1. Women's speech tends to be more person- 
centered and concerned with interpersonal 
matters. It is apt to deal with the speaker's 
own and other's feelings. It is more polite, 
more indirect, and uses the method of impli­
cation. It employs qualifiers and other 
softening devices to avoid imposing belief, 
agreement, or obedience on others through 
overly strong statements, questions or 
commands.
2. Men's speech tends to be more centered 
around external things and is more apt to 
involve straight factual communication. It 
is more literal, direct, and to the point.
It employs stronger statements and forms 
that tend to press compliance, agreement, 
or belief on the listener (Eakins and 
Eakins, 1978:49).
Given these previous research findings, we would expect 
men to use the more direct UPA's and the threat category 
more than women. Women are expected to use qualified 
partisan assertions, personal and other's positions defini­
tion, and self-depreciation more often.
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Difference and Similarity. While the differences 
actually indicated in Table 6.3 are small, they are almost 
all in the expected direction. Women do use qualified 
assertions, personal definition (but not other's position 
definition), and self-depreciation more than men. Men use 
all the UPA's more frequently, except for reject/attack. 
Women have a slight edge here. In addition, men more often 
define the task, and are slightly more likely to engage in 
bilateral power assertions.
The consistency with which these findings of sex 
difference meet expectations clearly warrants attention. 
However, it is still important to recognize the small size 
of the differences, and thus the degree of similarity in 
the women1s and men's patterns.
One possibility that cannot be overlooked is that 
the laboratory task induces an artificially high degree of 
similarity in behavior. One, in a two-person task it is 
difficult for one person to engage in much less sheer 
behavior than the other. In this research, the mean total 
number of coded behaviors for the men was 131.07, and 129.77 
for the women, showing little difference. Thus, there seems 
to be a conversation-based limit to how discrepant the 
behaviors can be. This does not explain, though, why there 
is such similarity category by category. A second, more 
plausible consideration, is that the formal nature of the 
task and the even treatment of the partners in the instruc­
tions and by the session administrator, gave many of the
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women clear permission to operate on an equal footing with 
their spouses. That is a permission that many women would 
not have in their more informal private encounters with 
men and without which they would not be as active and 
direct. I would suggest, then, that if there is a laboratory/ 
natural setting discrepancy here, it is in the direction of 
the women being more like men in their behavior than they 
would be in everyday life.
Relationships Between Husbands' and Wives' Scores. 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 give the product-moment correlations 
between husbands' and wives' scores. Here we can see how 
closely the behavior of one partner resembles that of the 
other. The relationships are very strong except for bilateral 
power assertions. The largest coefficient is for unqualified 
power assertions. For reiteration, expecially, the number 
of reiterative statements made by one spouse is closely 
related to the number made by the other. The experience of 
actually listening to tapes and coding transcripts really 
brings this finding to life. Very frequently the partners 
become enmeshed in a rhythmic sequence of interaction, con­
sisting of a series of alternating repetitions. The phrasing 
was something like "Yes, he did," "No, he didn't," repeated 
for two to four cycles, and then snapped out of by one of 
the partners.
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Table 6.4. Intercorrelations of Power Modes of Husbands 
and Wives
Power Modes Power Modes of Wives
of Husbands UPA QPART CA BPA SD NPA
Unqualified power 
assertions (UPA) .90 .44 .50 .21 .18 .41
Qualified partisan 
assertions (OPART) .38 .59 .53 .22 -.12 .17
Definitional
assertions (DA) .43 .40 .73 .01 .04 .50
Bilateral power 
assertions (BPA) .11 .01 .00 .07 .01 .06
Self-depreciation
(SD) -.00 -.11 .00 -.02 .65 .10
Non-power
assertions (NPA) .43 .19 .35 .27 .19 .72
140
Basic Frequencies and the Laboratory-Field Continuum
The final issue to be addressed in this chapter 
concerns the ways in which the MPACS system as applied to 
a laboratory task may or may not reflect behavior in natural 
settings. There are a number of power modes which we would 
expect to be more frequent and more important at home.
First, there is aggressive behavior which is repre­
sented in MPACS only through the reject/attack code. This 
code covers only verbal aggression, and in the laboratory 
only the milder forms of it. Thus, physical aggression—  
the ultimate power mode particularly of men (Goode, 1971)—  
is left out.
I would expect "do anyway" attempts to be more 
important— have a big impact— at home, even if they are not 
more frequent. "Surrender in protest," is only one special 
kind of withdrawal. A laboratory task does not allow the 
two partners to withdraw or offer the same variety of with­
drawal forms as can be used in the home. As a strategy in 
confrontation processes, then, withdrawal is probably very 
important for married couples in everyday life (Foss,
1979) .
Finally, the use of threats and promises should be 
much higher in everyday life, at least among some social 
groups. Particularly in couples who have negotiated over 
the household division of labor (and are there any who have 
not, at least on a few items?), we can expect fairly
frequent exchanges of promises and threats. Probably 
younger, more modern, and more career-oriented couples 
operate less in terms of normative beliefs in a traditional 
division of labor, and thus negotiate the order more exten­
sively and use such power modes more often.
In this chapter, the descriptive outlines of the 
MPACS system have been addressed both conceptually and 
empirically. Particular attention has been given to dis­
crepancies and similarities between husbands and wives and 
between the laboratory and the home setting. The following 
chapter places power modes into the power processes model, 
by relating it to the other power-related variables.
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CHAPTER VII
POWER MODES: LINKS WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF POWER
This Chapter provides the initial examination of 
links between other, more familiar, power variables and the 
newly developed power modes concept. Figure 1 in the first 
Chapter is a guide to the relationships to be explored.
Developing the MPACS system for codifying types of 
power assertions is a first step toward the ultimate goal of 
devising a more dynamic model of power processes in marriage. 
The objective of this Chapter is to provide some initial 
inquiry into relationships between aspects of the power struc­
ture and power processes.
Although no specific hypotheses concerning these rela­
tionships have been formulated, a general issue can be 
suggested as a loose guide to these analyses. In her 
important article assessing the state of family power studies 
as of 1970, Safilios-Rothschild suggested in passing some 
competing ideas about power structure variables and types of 
power assertions. On the one hand, a spouse who lacks 
authority may not make power assertions which are direct, but 
will use indirect, "manipulative" approaches in attempting 
to alter group outcomes. On the other hand, the spouse with 
greater authority may need to make only mild power assertions
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unless directly challenged (1970:80).
We may broaden the issue to include additional 
aspects of the power structure, besides power distribution 
norms (authority). Thus, the general issue becomes whether 
those with a stronger position structurally (as in personal 
resources, attributed power, and norms) use a strong, direc­
tive, or a weak', persuasive or indirect style. Concomitantly, 
we may ask whether those with a weak structural position resort 
to manipulation and indirect approaches, or whether they 
openly challenge the other.
POWER MODES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
Table 7.1 gives the product-moment correlations 
between each partner1s power modes and his/her report of the 
distribution of power (attributed power). The correlations 
are for the sample as a whole, and for the middle and 
working class subsamples.
Looking at the total sample, there are no really 
strong relationships. However, there is the finding that 
almost all the relationships that do exist are negative.
That is, the more a husband attributes power to himself, 
the less likely he is to behave in any of the ways included 
in the table. Similarly, the more a wife attributes power 
to her husband, the less likely she is to use four of the 
types of behavior included. When the MPACS codes are 
examined one by one, there are only slight differences, and 
only among the wives.
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Table 7.1. Correlations between Attributed Power and Power 











Power Mode MC WC Total MC WC Total
Unqualified power 
assertion (UPA) -.11 -.40 -.13 -.02 .34 -.01
Qualified partisan 
assertion (QPART) -.12 .08 -.16 -.06 -.49 -.13
Definitional asser­
tion (DA) -.12 .00 -.12 -.25 .01 -.21
Bilateral power 
assertion (BPA) -.07 .34 -.12 . 14 nc .10
Self-depreciation
(SD) -.32 .57 -.19 -.17 -.28 -.19
Non-power asser­
tion (NPA) -.15 -.66 -.09 .13 -.36 .06
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The clearest way to interpret these consistently 
negative relationships is that as the distribution of power 
increasingly favors the husband, the sheer amount of behavior 
emitted by the couple decreases. Somehow, it must be that 
couples with a husband-oriented power distribution get 
through the task more quickly.
One way to explain this is that when entering a task 
with an already husband-favoring power balance, wives do not 
push as hard for their own positions. As the wives display 
less counter-husband behavior, the husbands have to expend 
less energy maintaining their own positions. Thus, both 
partners actually engage in less behavior. In a natural 
setting in more extreme instances of this, many wives 
might actually not even put forward their disagreements in 
the first place. Once the husband's preference is known, 
in a husband-oriented relationship, the group outcome is 
known. Even in the conflict-inducing IMC task, in a few 
cases a wife asked her husband what he put on his answer 
sheet, and once having heard his response, proceeded to 
agree with him without ever having disclosed her own 
initially divergent position.
To show that the quicker completion of the task 
among couples with a husband-oriented power distribution 
is due to the wives pushing less hard for their own 
positions, we would have to show that the husbands actually 
win more arguments. This seems to be the case. As reported 
in Chapter IV, as husband-attributed power goes up, the
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number of husband-unilateral outcomes increases. This is 
suggestive, then, of an interactional link between reported 
power and outcomes.
Middle and Working Class Couples
The broad finding of negative relationships between 
attributed power and the power modes categories holds for 
the middle class couples taken separately. The husband's 
lower use of self-depreciation is especially strong. Further, 
the two positive correlations— for wives' use of bilateral 
power assertions and non-power assertions— are intensified 
a little. Interestingly, a higher frequency of behavior 
by the wives in these two categories is consistent with the 
above discussion of why couples with a husband-dominant 
power distribution generally emit fewer behaviors throughout 
the task.
For the working class couples, there are some 
interesting reversals, not necessarily in the expected 
direction. (The very small sample size warrants a strong 
caution as the working class couples are discussed.) Working 
class men who attribute greater power to themselves use 
fewer unqualified power assertions and more bilateral 
power assertions. Further, they make fewer non-power 
assertions but more self-depreciating statements. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that despite seeing them­
selves on paper as more powerful, these men do not use a 
particularly assertive style in face-to-face encounters with 
their wives.
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Working class wives who attribute greater power to 
their husbands tend to use more unqualified power assertions 
and fewer qualified power assertions. Further, these women 
make fewer self-depreciating statements and non-power 
assertions. For these wives, then, a belief that the power 
distribution favors their husbands seems to be no barrier 
to challenging, assertive behavior.
Are the working class husbands inflating their self- 
reports on attributed power for social desirability reasons, 
and then unable to "come through" in the reality of face- 
to-face encounters? Apparently not, since the mean AP 
score for middle class husbands (52.56) is actually higher 
than that for working class husbands (40.00). Moreover, 
working class wives actually attribute much greater power 
(X - 53.70) to their husbands than their husbands do them­
selves . This means the working class husbands may be under­
reporting their own power (AP).
Why are the working class wives more assertive and 
the husbands less assertive than their AP scores, and 
previous theoretical and empirical work, would suggest?
One possibility is that the IMC task elicits atypical 
behavior from these couples. Backed by a session administra­
tor who seems to be treating the couple in an egalitarian 
fashion, the wives may be more assertive than normally. And 
given situational expectations for egalitarian behavior, the 
husbands may be more tentative than usual.
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Power Distribution Norms and Power Modes
Faced with some puzzling findings in relation to 
attributed power, we turn now to an examination of power 
distribution norms and their relationship to power modes.
The product-moment correlations between norms and power 
modes, for husbands and wives and by class, are given in 
Table 7.2. Here again there are only small relationships, 
but they are generally more in the expected direction than 
for attributed power.
For the men, as husband-dominant norms increase, 
non-power assertions decrease and self-depreciation decreases 
slightly. The more the wives hold norms favoring husband 
dominance, the more non-power assertions and the fewer 
unqualified and qualified power assertions they make. They 
also make fewer self-depreciating statements.
The Influence of Social Class. Among middle class 
husbands, the findings for the sample as a whole are inten­
sified. As husband-dominant norms increase, non-power 
assertions, self-depreciation, and bilateral power assertions 
decrease, while qualified partisan assertions increase 
slightly. These husbands seem to be maintaining their 
position through persuasive argument.
Working class husbands with strong husband-dominant 
norms use fewer non-power assertions and unqualified power 
assertions. They make more self-depreciating statements, 
and slightly more definitional assertions. These are 
similar to, though not as strong as, the findings for AP.
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Table 7.2. Correlations between Power Distribution Norms 











Power Mode MC WC Total MC WC Total
Unqualified power 
assertion (UPA) -.10 -.17 -.07 -.16 -.76 -.20
Qualified partisan 
assertion (QPART) .12 -.06 .10 -.23 .02 -.22
Definitional asser­
tion (DA) .03 .14 .07 -.01 .14 .00
Bilateral power 
assertion (BPA) -.19 .05 -.08 . 01 nc .03
Self-depreciation 
(SD) -.19 .28 -.13 -.24 -.02 -.19
Non-power asser­
tion (NAP) -.25 -.38 -.22 .27 -.26 .23
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Thus, working class men who hold husband-dominant norms, 
and those who attribute more actual power to themselves, 
seem to use a less assertive, more tentative interaction 
style.
Middle class wives tend to repeat the whole sample 
findings— more non-power assertions, and fewer unqualified 
and qualified power assertions and self-depreciations, as 
husband-dominant norms are stronger.
For the working class wives, there is a particularly 
strong negative relationship between husband-oriented norms 
and unqualified power assertions. These women are less 
inclined, then, to directly challenge their husbands' 
views.
Relating the Two Power Distribution Variables
Table 7.3 presents the mean attributed power and 
power distribution norms scores for the husbands and wives, 
by social class. In the middle class, for both men and 
women, the mean AP and PDN scores are about the same. For 
working class couples, there are some discrepancies which 
may be relevant to the unexpected styles which they adopted 
in the IMC task.
The working class men hold as strongly to husband- 
dominant norms as the middle class men, yet they attribute 
much less actual power to themselves. Holding these norms 
but seeing oneself as not actually having the corresponding 
"power" may produce a more hesitant style.
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Table 7.3. Mean Attributed Power and Power Distribution













Husband's report 52.56 40.00 50.03
Wife's report 49.17 53.70 50.03
Power Distribution 
Norms
Husband's report 49.75 50.40 49.84
Wife's report 51.13 44.60 50.16
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In contrast, the working class wives seem to think 
their husbands have more power than they should, and therefore 
may be openly challenging. However, when they do think 
their husbands should have more say, they use the relatively 
direct unqualified power assertions less often.
PERSONAL RESOURCES AND POWER MODES 
Extrinsic Personal Resources
Table 7.4 gives the product-moment correlations 
between extrinsic personal resources and power modes, for 
husbands and wives and by class. For the husbands, there is 
a slight negative relationship between extrinsic resources 
and unqualified power assertions, and a slight positive 
relationship with non-power assertions. The same holds for 
the women: as their own extrinsic resources increase, they
are slightly less likely to use unqualified power assertions 
and more likely to use non-power assertions. In addition, 
wives with greater extrinsic resources are slightly more 
likely to use bilateral power assertions.
These findings are basically replicated or intensified 
in the middle class subsample (with the exception of the 
relationship with husbands' use of non-power assertions).
Thus, as extrinsic resources increase, the most direct 
power modes are used less often and more non-power asser­
tions are made.
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Table 7.4. Correlationsi between Extrinsic Personal Re-
sources and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by
Class
Correlation be­ Correlation be-
tween Husband's tween Wife1s
ERI, Husband1s ERI, Wife's
Power Modes Power Modes
Power Mode MC WC Total MC WC Total
Unqualified power 
assertion (UPA) .27 -.22 -.16 -.11 -.50 -.13
Qualified partisan 
assertion (QPART) .05 .38 -.06 .03 -.06 .10
Definitional asser­
tion (DA) .08 .22 .07 .11 -.16 .08
Bilateral power 
assertion (BPA) .07 .23 -.04 .20 nc .18
Self-depreciation 
(SD) .08 .09 .02 -.06 -.27 -.04
Non-power asser­
tion (NPA) .01 -.13 .11 .17 .27 .18
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Among working class men, as extrinsic resources 
increase, there is the same decrease in unqualified power 
assertions. However, non-power assertions also decrease 
slightly. The slack is then taken up by definite increases 
in qualified partisan assertions, definitional assertions, 
and bilateral assertions.
Working class wives with high extrinsic resources 
show an intensification of the general pattern of fewer 
unqualified power assertions and more non-power assertions.
In addition, they are less likely to make self-depreciating 
statements.
As a whole, the findings on extrinsic resources and 
power modes support the idea that those with greater re­
sources are less direct and tend to make milder power asser­
tions. Those with lesser resources are not more indirect or 
manipulative, as might be expected, but more direct. This 
suggests that those with more extrinsic resources may need 
to make only mild power assertions unless directly challenged, 
and those with fewer extrinsic resources may need to directly 
challenge in order to be heard.
Intrinsic Personal Resources
The relationships between power modes and intrinsic 
resources are somewhat different from those for extrinsic 
resources. Table 7.5 gives the product-moment correlations 
between intrinsic personal resources and power modes, for 
husbands and wives and by class.
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Table 7.5. Correlations between Intrinsic 












Power Mode MC WC Total MC WC Total
Unqualified power 
assertion (UPA) -.02 i • 0 1 • o VO .16 -.66 .08
Qualified partisan 
assertion (QPART) .09 -.01 .01 .45 -.48 .35
Definitional asser­
tion (DA) -.12 -.30 -.14 .28 -.12 .18
Bilateral power 
assertion (BPA) -.01 i • 0 1 • o u> .02 nc .04
Self-depreciation
(SD) .02 1 o » o to .17 .14 .19
Non-power asser­
tion (NPA) -.21 -.74 -.17 .03 -.47 .02
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Among the men, as intrinsic resources increase, the 
number of definitional assertions and non-power assertions 
decrease somewhat. For the women, increased intrinsic 
resources are strongly related to qualified partisan asser­
tions and moderately related to definitional assertions 
and self-depreciation. Thus, the women rely more on persua­
sive argument and are rather self-effacing as their inter­
personal resources increase. For the middle class subsample, 
these findings are somewhat stronger.
Working class men with high intrinsic resources 
are much less likely to make unqualified power assertions 
and non-power assertions, and somewhat less likely to use 
definitional assertions. Working class women whose intrinsic 
resources are high use far fewer unqualified power assertions, 
qualified partisan assertions, and non-power assertions.
An interesting observation is that for working class 
men and women almost all the relationships are negative.
Thus, as intrinsic resources increase, these couples are 
less active in general. In contrast, middle class women 
seem to increase all kinds of activity as their intrinsic 
resources increase.
In contrast to the ERI relationships, as IRI increases 
the use of non-power assertions decreases. A similarity, 
however, is that as either kind of resource increases un­
qualified power assertions decrease, although more sharply 
for IRI than for ERI. It seems that those with greater
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personal resources of either kind use a more persuasive 
than directive style.
Relative Personal Resources
Table 7.6 gives the product-moment correlations 
between relative extrinsic and intrinsic resources and the 
power modes of husbands and wives, by class.
For the husbands' use of power modes, the relative 
strength of their extrinsic resources compared to their 
wives seems to make little difference. There is only one 
slight positive association with self-depreciation. Middle 
class men with high relative ERI use fewer non-power asser­
tions and slightly fewer bilateral power assertions. Most 
interesting, for the working class men relative ERI are 
positively related to all the power modes. Thus, working 
class men with high R-ERI seem to increase their activity 
level as a whole in the task.
For relative intrinsic resources among the husbands 
there is a slight negative association with all the power 
modes. Here, then, relatively greater intrinsic resources 
bring a somewhat lower general activity level. Among middle 
class men in particular, there are fewer definitional 
assertions and non-power assertions as R-IRI increases. 
Working class men with high R-IRI are less likely to use 
bilateral power assertions and self-depreciation. Such men 
may be less threatened by a verbal task if they have good 
interpersonal skills.
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Table 7.6. Correlations between Relative Personal Resources 
and Power Modes of Husbands and Wives, for Extrinsic and 





Power Mode MC WC Total MC WC Total
Husbands
Unqualified power 
assertion (UPA) -.09 .53 -.05 -.08 .09 -.13
Qualified partisan 
assertion (QPART) .08 .21 -.03 -.11 .16 -.13
Definitional asser­
tion (DA) .06 .35 .09 -.21 .08 -.17
Bilateral power 
assertion -.13 .30 -.08 -.07 -.51 -.12
Self-depreciation
(SD) .10 .37 .13 .01 -.42 -.02
Non-power
assertion (NPA) -.22 .48 -.02 -.21 .01 -.16
Wives
Unqualified power. 
assertion (UPA) -.00 .64 .05 -.08 .65 -.06
Qualified partisan 
assertion (QPART) -.10 .33 -.16 -.34 -.02 -.34
Definitional asser­
tion (DA) -.19 .29 -.11 -.28 -.41 -.25
Bilateral power 
assertion (BPA) -.08 nc .02 -.10 nc -.09
Self-depreciation
(SD) -.10 .31 .04 -.15 .04 -.15
Non-power
assertion (NPA) -.10 -.18 -.05 -.15 -.05 -.15
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As their husbands' relative extrinsic resources 
increase, women tend to use slightly fewer qualified partisan 
assertions and definitional assertions. Among middle class 
wives, the husbands' greater R-ERI actually brings lower 
frequencies for all the behaviors. Working class wives use 
more of each of the power modes, except non-power assertions. 
They are especially likely to use more unqualified power 
assertions.
For relative intrinsic resources, as husbands' R-IRI 
goes up, the women use fewer of all the power modes, but 
especially fewer qualified partisan assertions and defini­
tional assertions. The findings are almost exactly the 
same among middle class women only. Working class women are 
especially likely to use fewer definitional assertions, and 
much more likely to use unqualified power assertions as 
husbands' R-IRI increases.
In some instances, the findings for relative resources 
give us important information not obtained when the "absolute" 
resources indexes are used. For the middle class men, both 
absolute and relative resources seem to have about the same 
impact on power modes. For working class men, relative 
resources are really different from absolute in their 
associations with power modes. For example, when the R-ERI 
is used there are increases in all behaviors, but with the 
absolute ERI unqualified power assertions are lower rather 
than higher. For intrinsic resources, the unqualified and 
non-power assertions are much lower when the absolute level
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of resources is examined. But these relationships disappear 
and negative relationships between bilateral power assertions 
and self-depreciation develop as we use the R-IRI.
For the women, results with the absolute and relative 
versions of the ERI are fairly similar. The same is true 
for intrinsic resources, with the exception that among working 
class wives their own absolute intrinsic resources are 
negatively related to qualified and non-power assertions.
When the R-IRI is used, these relationships disappear and 
we find that as husbands' relative resources increase, these 
women use fewer definitional assertions.
The finding with the absolute indexes that lower 
resources do not necessarily produce an indirect, covert 
style is generally upheld when relative resources are con­
sidered. Particularly for working class wives, as their 
husbands' relative extrinsic and intrinsic resources 
increase, the most direct power modes— unqualified power 
assertions— are more likely to be used. Further, this is 
consistent with the findings based on self-reports of the 
power distribution.
THE CASE OF VERBAL AGGRESSION
One of the unqualified power assertions— "reject/ 
attack other"— is perhaps the most extreme behavior of the 
couples in the IMC task. It is an instance of verbal 
aggression, and examining even this relatively mild kind 
of aggressive behavior in families can help shed light on
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more general issues surrounding violence in intimate groups. 
Further, there is a rapidly growing literature relating 
other dimensions of power to family aggression in natural 
settings, and this provides good continuity with the present 
study. Finally, verbal aggression is a good focus for 
examining the general issue of whether more direct or more 
indirect power modes are used as levels of the other power 
variables increase. For these reasons, I will pause here for 
a special look at verbal aggression.
Allen and Straus have developed and tested what they 
term the "Ultimate Resource" theory of violence (1979). 
Violence is seen as a resource, and is used only when a 
person "lacks other resources to serve as a basis of power" 
(1979). Given the small sample size especially for the 
working class subsample in this research, it is not possible 
to fully replicate the multivariate analyses necessary to 
test this theory. However, the analyses which can reasonably 
be carried out offer some strong parallels to the findings 
by Allen and Straus.
Table 7.7 gives the product-moment correlations 
between scores on the various power variables and verbal 
aggression (VA) of husbands and wives, by class.
For husband's attributed power and verbal aggres­
sion, there is a small negative correlation which becomes 
moderate in size in the middle class. Allen and Straus 
found no relationships here, and indicate that that is con­
sistent with "Ultimate Resource Theory" in that greater
1 6 2
Table 7.7. Correlations between Scores on Power Variables 





Variable MC WC Total MC WC Total
Attributed power 
(AP) -.28 -.14 -.17 -.07 -.38 -.05
Power Distribution 
Norm (PDN) -.15 -.09 -.13 -.16 -.46 -.17
Extrinsic Re­
sources (ERI) -.36 -.50 -.16 -.17 -.34 -.20
Intrinsic Re­
sources (IRI) .12 -.45 .12 .14 -.86 -.00
Relative Extrinsic 
Resources (R-REI) -.05 .38 .06 .07 .48 .11
Relative Intrinsic 
Resources (R-IRI) .12 .05 .13 -.01 .25 .05
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"power" per se is not related to VA unless there is also a 
concurrent lack of other resources. Thus, as long as these 
relationships are not positive, the theory is not questioned. 
That the association found is actually negative for middle 
class men may be a result of their having more than enough 
other resources to validate their position. The theory is 
again supported for the women— there is generally no 
relationship, except that working class women who attribute 
greater power to their husbands tend to use less VA.
A measure of power distribution norms is not avail­
able in the Allen and Straus study, but in this research 
there are slight negative correlations between PDN and 
husband's VA. There is also a slight negative relationship 
between wives' husband-dominant norms and wives' VA, which 
becomes moderately large among working class women.
Thus, working class women, especially, who believe in their 
husbands' right to decide things, use less VA.
Resources and Verbal Aggression
Consistent with the Allen and Straus study, for 
both men and women the greater one's extrinsic resources, 
the lower one's use of VA. These are generally strong 
negative relationships, especially in the working class.
Allen and Straus included intrinsic resources in their 
research but did not examine them separately from extrinsic 
resources. In the present study, the strong negative 
association between resources and VA is replicated for the
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IRI only in the working class— and there is an extremely 
strong negative relationship for working class women.
However, there is a very slight positive relation­
ship between the IRI and VA for both men and women in the 
middle class. The link may be too small to warrant specu­
lation, but one idea is interesting to consider. Straus 
has argued that catharsis models legitimize aggression as 
something that needs a full expression (1974). Middle class 
couples may adopt expressive violence more than instrumental 
(Allen and Straus, 1979). I would argue that this may be 
because of greater exposure to catharsis-oriented writings 
in the popular and semi-professional literature. Those who 
attend to "professional advice" on family relations may 
also have greater intrinsic personal resources. Thus, the 
(small) link between the IRI and VA for middle class couples 
may be by way of exposure to a certain kind of advice on 
marriage.
The findings for relative resources and VA are 
particularly interesting. Allen and Straus found that 
" . . . the extent to which a husband's resources exceed 
those of his wife has little or no relation to violence by 
either spouse" (1979). The present findings for the ERI 
bear this out only for the middle class. For the working 
class, as husband's extrinsic resources outweigh those of 
his wife, both husband and wife use more VA. (The findings 
on R-IRI are very small in magnitude.) Thus, the absolute
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level of resources in the working class seems to have the 
most important dampening effect on VA.
In general, these findings are consistent with the 
Ultimate Resource Theory developed by Allen and Straus.
They do not, however, replicate the fuller test offered in 
the earlier research.
In terms of the general issue for this chapter, the 
findings on verbal aggression support the idea that those 
with a better position "structurally" need not use direct—  
even aggressive— means of affecting group outcomes.
POWER MODES AND OUTCOMES 
The final link to be examined is that between power 
modes and outcomes. Do the kinds of power assertions made 
by marital partners make a difference in the nature of the 
outcomes? Tables 7.8 and 7.9 give the product-moment 
correlations between power modes and three kinds of outcomes, 
by class. The first table is for husbands' use of power 
modes, and the second for the wives' power modes.
The pattern of findings seems less clear than for the 
other power variables. For the sample as a whole, as the 
husbands use more unqualified power assertions and qualified 
partisan assertions, the number of wife-unilateral outcomes 
decreases and the number of bilateral outcomes increases.
This is replicated in the middle class subsample. In the 
working class, the more UPA's and QPART's by the husbands, 
the fewer husband-unilateral and the more wife-unilateral
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Table 7.8. Correlations between Husbands' Power Modes and 
Three Types of Outcomes, by Class
Power Modes of Husbands













































































Table 7.9. Correlations between Wives' Power Modes and 
Three Types of Outcomes, by Class
Power Modes of Wives
Outcome UPA QPART DA BPA SD NPA
Husband-unilateral
Middle Class -.01 .10 .12 -.16 -.05 .09
Working Class -.37 -.60 -.40 nc .37 -.53
Total -.07 .04 . 01 -.16 -.06 -.01
Wife-unilateral
Middle Class -.27 -.19 -.13 -.07 -.06 -.12
Working Class .24 .62 .33 nc -.38 .47
Total -.21 -.10 -.04 -.09 -.11 .10
Bilateral
Middle Class .25 .15 .03 .32 .06 -.04
Working Class .38 .00 .20 nc .00 .18
Total .26 .12 .04 .34 .11 .03
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and bilateral outcomes. Definitional assertions by husbands 
do not affect outcomes much, except in the working class 
where they are negatively related to husband-unilateral and 
wife-unilateral outcomes.
Interestingly, bilateral power assertions by hus­
bands are not related to bilateral outcomes. Further, in the 
working class, the more BPA's by the husbands, the more 
husband-unilateral and the fewer wife-unilateral outcomes.
Self-depreciation on the part of husbands is also 
not an important determinant of outcomes. However, one 
curious finding is that as working class husbands make more 
SD statements, the number of husband-unilateral outcomes 
increases and bilateral outcomes decrease.
Finally, non-power assertions of husbands show a 
slight negative relationship to husband-unilateral outcomes 
and a slight positive relationship to wife-unilateral and 
bilateral outcomes.
Overall, there is not a relationship between the 
husbands' power modes activity and their obtaining increased 
unilateral "wins." Rather, for the middle class there seems 
to be a lessening of wife "wins" and an increase in bilateral 
outcomes. The findings for the working class suggest that 
increased powering activity by the men actually results in 
fewer husband wins. However, when these men offer bilateral 
solutions (BPA) or use self-depreciation, they win more.
One can speculate that BPA's and SD's are somehow taken as
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a show of good faith (or perhaps as real discouragement) 
which prompts working class wives to respond with submission.
Wives' Power Modes
For the middle class wives, and the wives as a 
whole, there is a pattern which is the mirror image to that 
for the men. Wives' use of UPA's and QPART's actually 
produces fewer wife outcomes and more bilateral outcomes.
The one contrast with the findings for men's power modes, 
is that wives' use of bilateral power assertions is 
positively related to the number of bilateral outcomes.
The pattern for the working class women also mirrors 
that of working class men. This is actually the only group 
in the research whose increased use of various power modes 
actually produces more wins for themselves. Self-deprecia­
tion results in fewer wife wins and more husband wins.
Putting the working class wives and husbands together, it seems 
that a "strong" approach by the wives pays off for them, but 
a "weak" approach by the men results in more wins for them.
Verbal Aggression and Outcomes
Looking specifically at verbally aggressive behavior 
(see Table 7.10) we find that middle class husbands' verbal 
aggression is negatively related to wife wins and positively 
related to bilateral outcomes. When working class men use 
verbal aggression, there are fewer bilateral outcomes.
Actually, the wives' use of verbal aggression seems 
to have a bigger impact on outcomes. When middle class
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Table 7.10. Correlations between Verbal Aggression of 







Middle Class -.01 -.12
Working Class -.02 -.50
Total -.04 -.17
Wife-unilateral
Middle Class -.19 -.08
Working Class .14 .53
Total -.16 ,01
Bilateral
Middle Class .19 .20
Working Class -.30 -.05
Total .19 .19
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wives are verbally aggressive, there are slightly fewer 
husband wins and more bilateral outcomes. Working class 
wives using verbal aggression obtain much greater wins, at 
the expense of their husbands.
Overall, for the men and the middle class women, 
aggression may produce more bilateral solutions, but little 
in the way of purely personal gain. However, for working 
class women verbal aggression seems to be a fairly effective 
tactic in obtaining unilateral wins.
CONCLUSION
The general issue posed at the beginning of the 
chapter was whether those with a stronger position struc­
turally and normatively use a relatively strong, direct style 
or are more indirect in their approach. In general, it was 
found that those with fewer resources and not favored by 
norms or power attributions use the more direct power 
modes.
When verbal aggression is examined separately, 
similar findings result. Those with a better position 
structurally do not need to use the most direct— verbally 
aggressive— power modes.
The final issue addressed in how the use of different 
power modes affects the outcomes of a confrontation. The 
findings here seem compatible with those for the power 
distribution and power modes findings. For husbands and 
middle class wives— those in a more favorable position,
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structurally— the most direct power modes are used less 
and do not really seem very effective anyway. The working 
class wives, who may be seen as the most structurally dis­
advantaged group, are the most direct and their directness 





This research was designed to explore the types of 
power assertions used by married couples. This question of 
how husbands and wives go about "powering" has largely been 
neglected by family researchers. Instead, attention has 
been focused almost exclusively on explaining variations in 
the distribution of power in marriages. I have argued that 
the incorporation of power modes into a model of power can 
lead to a much more complete understanding of marital power 
relations, and ultimately to a more dynamic, process- 
oriented approach to confrontation and change in families.
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
The combined observation and self-report study was 
carried out with a sample of seventy-eight married couples, 
some of whom were in marital counseling. Each member of a 
couple completed a questionnaire and then the couple 
participated in the Inventory of Marital Conflict (IMC) 
task (Olson and Ryder, 1970). This is a highly-involving 
conflict resolution task which offers a great deal of 
realism in inducing disagreement between the marital
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partners. A comprehensive system of coding the power modes 
used by the couples was developed for this research.
Limitations and Strengths
In reviewing the research it is appropriate to con­
sider some of its strengths and limitations. Particularly 
in the area of sample selection and characteristics, some 
cautions are necessary.
First, several of the couples were referred to the 
project by local marriage counselors. The rest were sel­
ected through a random sampling procedure which produced a 
response rate of less than half— a low response, but one 
which is by no means atypical of laboratory researches 
which demand much time of the subjects. Therefore, the 
group of couples included in this research is not repre­
sentative of any definable population and generalizations 
are largely unjustified.
Second, while the actual social characteristics of 
the couples, such as age, education, children, etc., are 
fairly broad in range, overall the sample is heavily middle 
class and professional. The couples in counseling are 
generally younger and of lower social class standing than 
the others, so they help make the sample more broad than it 
would be otherwise. Some of the most interesting findings 
involve middle and working class comparisons, yet because 
of the small number of working class couples, these findings 
must be viewed as mainly providing a basis for further 
hypothesis-development and research.
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The focus of the research on interaction in the 
laboratory over a researcher-defined task is both a limita­
tion and a strength. The degree of control over "extraneous" 
variables is clearly an advantage. Yet, obviously the 
present task and laboratory setting preclude investigating 
some important aspects of marital power processes in natural 
settings. These will be discussed more below.
There are two major strengths of the research design 
itself. One is the inclusion of both marital partners.
The other is the multi-method approach, which includes 
self-reports on several aspects of power, direct observa­
tion of behavior, and a rather unique assessment of the 
task outcomes. This still uncommon combination of methods 
and viewpoints in a single research allows a "triangulation" 
both by method and by person to yield special insight into 
marital power relations.
Finally, two additional contributions of the project 
should be mentioned. One is the clarification of major 
power concepts presented in Chapter III. The other is the 
contribution to measurement in the field of the Marital 
Power Assertion Coding System.
SOME SELECTED FINDINGS 
Most of the findings for the research have been 
reviewed in each chapter. Rather than resummarize them 
here, I would like to highlight some of the findings in 
terms of important issues which have cropped up throughout
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the research and which have implications for different 
bodies of theory and research.
Husbands and Wives
In an important analysis of modern marriage, Bernard 
(1973) has discussed the ways in which husbands' and wives' 
experiences of marriage are essentially different. In 
many instances, the findings for this research underscore 
Bernard's analysis. On two important self-report measures—  
attributed power and power distribution norms— there is not 
a great deal of congruence between the husbands' and wives' 
reports or beliefs. When personal resources are related to 
attributed power, different kinds of resources are 
important for the two partners. Further, the effect of 
resources on task outcomes seems to be different for men 
and women. For example, when husbands have high intrinsic 
resources there are more bilateral solutions for a couple. 
However, when wives' intrinsic resources are high, the 
wives simply tend to outright lose more decisions.
Turning to the types of power assertions used by 
marital partners, while there are strong correlations 
between the behavior of the wives and husbands, there are 
also some differences. When there are differences, they are 
generally in the direction of the women using a "weaker" 
less confident style. Finally, there are differences between 
men and women in how the power distribution variables relate 
to outcomes. For example, working class men who use very
177
direct power modes do not seem to gain much in outcomes, 
but working class women who are direct win more.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the 
question of how power processes in marriage differ and are 
the same for men and women needs to be addressed much more 
systematically. That there are significant differences is 
clear.
Personal Resources
The relative resource theory of power has dominated 
investigations of family power. While testing this theory 
was not a goal of this research, many relevant relation­
ships have, in fact, been considered.
Probably the most significant contribution of the 
research in this area is the overall finding that the 
type of resource makes a difference in the relationship to 
other power variables. Only a few previous researchers 
(such as Allen and Straus, 1979; Safilios-Rothschild, 1976; 
Smith, 1970) have systematically considered both extrinsic, 
or economic and status resources, and intrinsic or inter­
personal resources.
There are differences in how the two types of 
resources operate. In this research, extrinsic resources 
influenced the attributed power scores of the husbands, but 
not the wives. Intrinsic resources had a greater influence 
on wives' reports.
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In addition, extrinsic resources were a relatively 
unimportant factor in the task outcomes. The level of 
intrinsic resources was more significant, for both men 
and women.
These findings suggest that different kinds of 
resources relate to power differently for men and women.
Also, different resources affect power differently at 
different points in the process and depending on the 
dimension of power being considered.
Marriage and Zero-Sum Games
The finding that the couples in this research 
devised very few bilateral solutions to the task has already 
been discussed in relation to marriage as a zero-sum or non- 
zero-sum game. I have argued that it is inappropriate to 
replace the assumption that marriage is a zero-sum game with 
the counter assumption that it is not. Both the small number 
of bilateral outcomes and the types of power modes used by 
the partners suggest that much of the time they were 
operating at least as if the situation were a zero-sum 
game. At this point, I would like to raise a broader 
issue relating to conditions under which intimate relation­
ships are likely to operate as zero-sum games.
It is only possible for all group members to share 
in "winning" (a non-zero-sum outcome) when there is, in fact, 
"enough to go around." Conversely, a group situation is 
objectively a zero-sum structure when there is, in fact, 
not enough to go around. We then need to ask, what is it
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that is sought after in marriages, and is there enough 
to go around?
We may divide valued ends in families into instru­
mental and expressive, or extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. 
Steiner (1976:131-137, 352-361) makes a convincing case 
that in intimate family relationships, there is actually no 
structural reason for there not to be expressive rewards 
for everyone. There is no objective scarcity of expres­
sions of liking and caring. Yet many, if not most, families 
operate as if there were such a scarcity, and it is only 
with great difficulty that some families are able to break 
out of this scarcity-based "stroke economy."
When we turn to instrumental rewards, there is a 
much clearer objective basis for structured zero-sum behavior 
In a society in which economic goods are distributed un­
equally and on a principle of scarcity, there obviously 
are many families in which there really is not enough 
economically to go around, and many more who lack basic 
economic security. Having to operate within a framework of 
economic scarcity may in turn produce objective and subjec­
tive conditions which make it hard to freely exchange 
expressive rewards (evidence for this may be found in 
Scanzoni1s (1970) work on economic position and intrinsic 
aspects of married life). Even if the objective economic 
scarcity does not produce objective expressive scarcity, 
it may produce a generalized style which is based on the 
belief that there are not enough of such rewards to go around
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Thus, the findings of this study related to Sprey's 
(1972) comments on families as non-zero-sum games, are 
indirectly suggestive of some broader issues about economies 
and families. The objective and subjective determinants 
of zero-sum behavior cannot be adequately assessed without 
reference to the larger economy in which they are embedded.
POWER MODES AND GOVERNANCE IN FAMILIES 
One of the frustrating aspects of carrying out this 
research has been the gnawing sense that only one level of 
power processes is being tapped. I would like to close by 
discussing the level at which the power modes system operates, 
and its significance within the broader context of marital 
power relations.
Broderick (1975) has offered a fascinating analysis 
of what he terms "governance of families." He argues that 
"all families face the problem of making decisions about 
the allocation of shared resources," and that the "process 
of resolving conflicting interests (essentially the process 
of governance) involves the issue of power in several 
important ways" (1975:117).
Governance in families is then divided into three 
levels. (1) "Zero-sum power confrontations" involve 
"unilateral imposition" or attempts to gain one's ends 
without "serious consideration of the opposing view" 
(1975:118). These are rather similar to the unqualified
181
power assertions, consequence identification, and perhaps 
some of the qualified power assertions in the MPACS system. 
(2) Governance through rules involves developing and 
referring to rules which group members see as fair. There 
are different types of rules, such as those which directly 
allocate resources (as in setting personal allowances), 
those which define who gets to decide contested issues in 
certain areas (authority rules), or rules about how nego­
tiations may fairly be carried out (1975;120-121). MPACS 
includes some of this sort of governance, insofar as couples 
refer to such rules in making qualified power assertions, 
and also in some of the bilateral power assertions. Gen­
erally, however, among the couples in this research any 
reference to supposedly previously established rules 
seemed to meet with a contest over the rule itself— back 
to the zero-sum power confrontation level. (3) Governance 
through "principled interaction" rests on the internalization 
of a moral precept for guiding conflict resolution, shared 
by all family members. Such a precept might be placing 
group needs before individual needs (1975:121-122). MPACS 
does not really cover this sort of governance. Little 
principled interaction appeared among the research couples, 
in any event. It may be that in a group with only two 
members, it is hard to conceive of conflicts as group issues 
rather than as personal confrontations. However, in large 
families the difference between doing something "for the
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good of the group" and simply giving into another individual, 
may be more readily felt by group members.
Broderick's distinctions between governance levels 
address some important issues in studying family power.
For example, clearly not all instances of needing to 
allocate scarce resources are openly negotiated in families, 
the way the IMC vignettes must each be confronted by the 
research couples. For many issues a person is assigned to 
make decisions (authority rule), or a rule is set in advance 
to cover such situations, or both.
Second, Broderick's typology raises some important 
connections between family governance and the study of 
deviant behavior. One important question is under what 
conditions rules are shared or imposed by a group member, 
and if they are shared, how these shared rules emerge out 
of the day-to-day interaction in the group. Further, we may 
ask who breaks the family's rules, who enforces them, and 
under what conditions they will be broken and enforced. 
Finally, how and under what conditions are family rules 
and shared moral precepts questioned and renegotiated?
Figure 8 is suggestive of how Broderick's levels 
of governance in families may be integrated with other 
aspects of power. I have added two additional governance 
options— withdrawal/avoidance and covert resistance/ 
sabotage. I think both are important options not covered 
by the other levels. These two might be placed with power
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modes, in that they are unilateral actions. Yet, the cir­
cumstances under which they are used and their implications 
for the group are probably so different as to warrant 
separate status. For example, sabotage might be used by 
the weaker partner in an extremely unequal relationship, 
where the other essentially governs capriciously (i.e., 
without consistent reference to even self-imposed rules), 
and where an open approach at the power modes level would 
meet with a severe, even life-threatening response.
Each of the variables relating to the distribution 
of power can be related to the governance options, perhaps 
in different ways. Thus, different kinds of resources 
may have a different impact on the several levels of 
governance. The inclusion of governance norms indicates 
the possibility that whatever option is chosen, there is 
always the possibility that the option itself will be 
contested.
The power modes themselves may well be the most 
important of the governance options. Broderick (1975) 
suggests that the proportion of conflicting interests 
settled by each form of governance will vary by family.
I would add that they will also vary over the course of 
the family life cycle. For instance, early in a marriage 
the number of conflicts settled through reference to estab­
lished rules or moral precepts will be lower than later in 
the group history. In another case, as the first child in 
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Figure 8. Power Distribution and Governance Options
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will probably occur from rule-bound to power modes-based 
governance, as the application of existing rules is rejected 
by the child. Power modes have a special importance both 
because of their frequent use in resolving substantive 
issues, and because of the likelihood that they will come 
into play whenever the legitimacy of any of the other 
governance options is questioned.
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Education. (Q10 in original questionnaire)
How much education have you completed?
1 - Less than seven years of school
2 - Junior high school (grades 7-9)
3 - Partial high school (10th or 11th grade, but
not graduation from high school)
4 - High school graduation
5 - Partial college training (completion of at
least one year, but not full college course)
6 - Standard college or university program (completed
a college or university course leading to a 
recognized college degree)
7 - Graduate professional training
Personal Income. (Q18 in original questionnaire)
Which of the following categories indicates your 
personal income in the past year?









9 - $25,000 and over
Work Status. (Q20B10 in original questionnaire) 
Work status
1 - full time 6 -
2 - part time
3 - student 7 -
4 - housewife 8 -






Occupation. (Q20C10 in original questionnaire) 
Open-ended responses coded on a 7-point scale using 
Hollingshead1s occupational classification, and 
ranging from unskilled workers to "higher executives 
and major professionals."
Economic Contribution to Marriage. (Qll.l in original 
questionnaire)
In terms of our economic life, my contribution as a 
(wife/husband) is:
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much more than it ought to be 
more than it ought to be 
just about right 
less than it ought to be 
much less than it ought to be
Intrinsic Personal Resources
Marital Contributions. (Qll.2 to 11.4 in original 
questionniare)
In terms of our social life, my contribution as a 
(wife/husband) is:
much more than it ought to be 
more than it ought to be 
just about right 
less than it ought to be 
much less than it ought to be
In terms of our emotional life, my contribution as a 
(wife/husband) is:
much more than it ought to be 
more than it ought to be 
just about right 
less than it ought to be 
much less than it ought to be
In terms of our sexual life, my contribution as a 
(wife/husband) is:
much more than it ought to be 
more than it ought to be 
just about right 
less than it ought to be 
much less than it ought to be
Self Esteem. (Q8.1 to 8.10 in original questionnaire) 
For each of the following statements, circle one of 
the 4 possible responses.
I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an 



























































A. What car to buy.............  1 2 3 4 5
B. Whether or not to buy
some life insurance.......  1 2 3 4 5
C. What house or apartment to
take.......................  1 2 3 4 5
D. What job you should take... 1 2  3 4 5
E. Whether or not your wife 
should go to work or quit
work.......................  1 2 3 4 5
F. What job your wife should 
take (If your wife doesn't 
have a paid job now, ans­
wer in terms of who should, 
and then who would decide 
this if she took such a
job).......................  1 2 3 4 5
G. How much money your 
family can afford to spend
per week on food........... 1 2 3 4 5
H. What doctor to have when
someone is sick............ 1 2 3 4 5
I. Where to go on a vacation.. 1 2  3 4 5
*Circle a number using these categories:
1 - the wife only
2 - the wife more
3 - husband and wife exactly the same
4 - the husband more






1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
APPENDIX B
INVENTORY OF MARITAL CONFLICT (IMC) 
FORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS
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INTRODUCTION TO IMC PROCEDURE
Tonight, you will be involved in a procedure centering 
around your joint discussion of some real cases where couples 
are having various types of marital conflicts. These case 
descriptions have been incorporated into what we call the 
"Inventory of Marital Conflict" or the IMC.
After collecting information from about 2,000 couples 
like yourselves, we have found certain things that have fre­
quently caused disagreements or conflicts. We have provided 
brief case descriptions of couples having some of these con­
flicts. Your task is to read each of these case descriptions 
and decide which spouse is primarily responsible for the 
conflict.
It is very important to us that you take this task 
seriously because your recommendations will be combined with 
others so that couples with these problems might be helped.
In some cases you may have experienced the conflict yourselves. 
In others you may know friends who have had similar problems.
In all the cases, these are serious problems for some couples.
As j.:.:. any conflict situation, there are two points of 
view presented in these case descriptions. In some of the 
cases, one of you will learn about the conflict from the point 
of view of the husband. The other person will learn the wife's 
point of view regarding the same situation. In each case, 
however, both of you will be given the same essential facts.
It is very important that for every case you decide 
who is at fault in the conflict even though this might be 
difficult at times. You should not indicate that both are 
to blame or leave any question blank.
I am now going to take you to separate rooms so that 
you can read and evaluate these cases. After you have finished 
filling out the Inventory of Marital Conflict, bring these 
materials out to me. Later we will bring you and your spouse 
to a room where you can jointly discuss these case descriptions.
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I N V E N T O R Y  O F  M A R IT A L  C O N F L I C T S  (IMC) 
C A S E  D E S C R I P T I O N S
1. Bob and Frank are good friends. Janis, Bob’s wife, likes Frank but 
jj becoming increasingly annoyed with his unannounced and 
excessively long visits to their apartment, especially a t mealtimes. 
She has suggested to  Bob that he ask Frank to  please phone before 
visiting, but her husband feels this would be insulting to his friend. 
Janis suggests that she might ask Frank to please phone before 
visiting, but this only makes her husband angry. After accusing his 
wife of interfering with his friendship, he refuses to  discuss the 
matter further.
2. Cora doesn’t  really enjoy sexual relations. When she was first 
married she would avoid love making by telling her husband i t  was 
painfiiL More recently she has pretended to be tired when her 
husband has approached her. Now she has resorted to  retiring 
earlier than her husband. Cora believes sex is an unpleasant subject 
that one does no t discuss unless absolutely necessary, and she 
becomes furious when Jack insists they should talk about this 
problem.
7. Betty and Phil have been having marital difficulties for the past 
year. One of the problems has been Betty’s extravagance. Now 
Betty insists on  immediately seeking costly professional counseling. 
Phil points ou t that there simply is no money to pay for such an 
expensive venture until they can cut down their expenses some 
place else. Betty will n o t hear of waiting until money is available, 
and many arguments arise in the weeks to  come.
8. Jim routinely arrives home from work a t 5:00 PM and enjoys his 
dinner soon after his arrival. Susan has been a full-time housewife 
since the birth o f their first child one year ago bu t still leaves her 
domestic chores undone. Jim has asked Susan if  she would have the 
house clean and dinner prepared when he returns home. Upon 
arriving home, Jim again finds the ironing board with a pile of 
clothes in the living room, a dining table that has not been set, and 
his wife sitting on the sofa reading a magazine. Upon viewing the 
situation Jim appears discouraged, whereupon Susan accuses him 
o f always finding fault with her and angrily storms into the 
kitchen.
3. When Don finally gets home from work he takes o ff his jacket, tie 
and shoes, and makes himself comfortable with a  can of beer. After 
dinner Don has a little more energy, so he goes back and puts away 
the various articles o f clothing he has taken off. One day Francine 
tells Don he is sloppy and lazy and demands th a t he not leave 
clothes lying around, even for a short period o f time. Two days 
later, Don forgets to  do as his wife had demanded, and she angrily 
repeats her complaint. An argument develops.
4. Nina has been looking for a pair o f shoes to wear w ith her favorite 
dress. Upon finding a pair o f shoes on  sale, Nina just cannot resist 
and purchases them. Later that evening she shows her new purchase 
to Peter. He remembers that she already has many pairs of shoes 
and asks about the necessity o f such a purchase a t this time. Nina 
beoomes outraged and accuses him o f being cheap and incon­
siderate.
5, Mark and Elaine have both been working since their marriage in 
order to live at a level which they feel to  be comfortable. 
Occasionally, Elaine becomes depressed because she wants to have 
a child but knows that on Mark’s salary alone this would be 
extremely difficult. Elaine’s emotions get the best o f her and she 
accuses Mark of not being aggressive enough, Implying that he is an 
inadequate provider. Mark was advised not to  go to  college because 
of scholastic difficulties and has done as well as could reasonably 
be expected, but his wife continually compares him unfavorably to 
his college-educated friends. Mark’s self-esteem is injured and an 
argument begins.
6. A conflict has arisen between Jack and Colleen following a party 
with friends. During the party, Jack talked to  another woman, 
resulting in his wife becoming very angry. Following the party, 
Colleen angrily accuses Jack o f intentionally ignoring her for the 
entire evening and becomes argumentative.
9. I t’s Friday evening and the Carter family have a  dinner engage­
ment, which had been made the previous week. Frank comes home 
a half hour early so he can be sure to be ready on time. He 
showers, shaves and is dressed and ready to  leave on time. But 
when it is time to  go, Mary is still in the bathroom combing her 
hair and putting on makeup. Since Mary almost always makes them 
late this way, Frank becomes upset. Mary retorts that she isn’t very 
concerned about being late since they always get where they are 
going sooner or later.
10. Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While Linda is 
driving Steve to work on Friday morning, Steve hears a "pinging” 
noise and realizes that the spark plugs should be changed along 
with other minor adjustments. Since they plan to leave Friday 
evening and Steve has to  work, he has to  ask his wife to take the 
car to the garage. Linda complains about the other preparations she 
says she has to  make for them  and their two children bu t says she 
will have time to take the car to the garage, and agrees to  do so. 
Later on the trip, Steve hears the “ pinging”  noise and realizes the 
spark plugs have not been changed. I t  turns out that Linda took 
the car to the garage bu t did no t bother to  mention the spark 
plugs. Linda says that if  Steve doesn’t  like the way she does things 
he can do them himself. Steve points out that he was unable to 
take the car to  the garage and that when she agrees to  do 
something she should do it.
11. When Charlotte and Richard were living with Charlotte’s family, a 
lo t o f ill will developed between Richard and his in-laws. Charlotte 
told her parents just about everything that happened, and when 
Richard told her to  stop, his mother-in-law said she was hurt and 
told Charlotte to keep Richard in his place. Richard and Charlotte 
now have their own home, but the situation continues. Richard 
will rarely visit his in-laws, bu t whenever he is not around Charlotte 
is on the phone with her mother, passing on information and 
receiving advice. When Richard tells Charlotte again that she should 
stop telling things to  her mother, Charlotte becomes enraged.
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p . Each night Larry promises Judy that he will throw the garbage out 16. Tom is very concerned about his wife’s smoking habits. Betty is a
I: "  after they finish dinner. Invariably, Larry forgets and leaves the very heavy smoker and has a severe cough. Although Tom used to
kitchen without doing what he has promised. Judy has felt that the be a heavy smoker himself, he has now quit completely, so he is
:« best thing to do is to  throw the garbage away by herself and has convinced that Betty could at least cut down. He has told her in
been doing this later in the evening. When he notices this, Larry detail about the health hazards involved in smoking and he has
becomes angry with Judy, stating that this is his job. As Larry asked her to stop or a t least cut down, if not for lierself then
’ continues to follow his old habits, Judy begins to do the chore because o f  her love for him. Betty’s usual reaction has been to get
herself, only to be angrily criticized by her husband. sarcastic. She says she is trying but doesn’t  change. As a result
there has been a  series of arguments.
13. At parties that Bob and Nancy attend, Nancy spends most o f her 
time with the men present and obviously enjoys being with them. 
Bob is very concerned and has tried to tell Nancy that her behavior 
is interpreted as flirtatious and could lead to  a  romantic involve­
ment with another man. Nancy denies this, bu t Bob knows from 
his own experience that this type o f thing does frequently happen 
and feels that she is being inconsiderate o f his feelings by no t giving 
up this behavior.
14. When Jerry comes home from work in the evening he is tired and 
likes to relax over a  pleasant meaL After dinner he prefers to be 
alone with his wife. However, Betty does no t understand Jerry’s 
unwillingness to go ou t after a  hard day’s work, and she is after 
him to go out partying in the evenings. She tells Jerry he is a lazy 
do-nothing.
H IS. Dick and Diane have been married for three years. Dick likes his 
f;' job and is anxious to  get ahead. For the past year he has been 
voluntarily spending a  great deal o f  extra time a t his work. Diane 
: has repeatedly accused Dick o f caring more about his job than he
cares for her. Dick explains that his career is important to .both of 
them and that it is necessary for him to  work additional hours if  he 
expects to get promoted. Diane refuses to  listen to Dick’s 
explanations and unreasonably demands th a t he substantially cut 















17. Chuck is a  football fan who likes to  watch the pro games on 
Sunday afternoons. His wife Betty is upset at this, so she plans a 
series o f activities for them together on Sundays and tells him he 
will have to give up the football games. Chuck feels that this is an 
unreasonable demand. He points ou t that he works all week and 
should be entitled to  a couple o f  hours o f relaxation watching TV 
on Sunday. He reminds her that she watches many hours o f soap 
operas during the week when he is a t work. Chuck also reminds 
Betty that the other wives they know do not get so upset just 
because their husbands watch football. Betty, however, continues 
to be annoyed and insists that he stop watcliing games.
18. John has been ou t o f  college for three years and is able to provide a 
modest bu t adequate income for himself and his wife, Jean. They 
have been planning a vacation, which Jean has been enthusiastically 
anticipating. John has always been a  stereo enthusiast and 
presently feels that he wants to improve his stereo by buying new 
speakers. I f  John proceeds with his plan, the vacation they have 
planned would be impossible. John states that he is the bread­
winner in the family and deserves a luxury. He insists that as the 
man in the family, he should make the decision.
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INSTRUCTIONS: P lease  read each case  description and answer questions _a,_b,_c and_d for each case .
Check the appropriate box in each column and do not leave any questions unanswered. ■
(0) (b) (c) (d)
Item
No.
Who i s  primarily 
responsib le lor 
the problem?
Have you had a 
sim ilar problem?
Have you known 
other co u p les  
who have sim ilar  
problem s?
Check One Check One Check One
HUSBAND WIFE Y ES NO YES NO
1 Should Bob ask Frank to phone before Yes visiting? No
2 Is Cora being reasonable in refusing to d iscuss their sexual problems?
I j Y e s  
1 No
3 Should Don be able to relax th is way before dinner?
“ ■Yes
“ No
4 Is it  reasonable for Peter to question the - necessity  of N ina's purchase?
□  Yes
□  No
5 Is E laine justified in accusing Mark of being 1 j Yes an inadequate provider? (“H  No
6 Should Jack be permitted to talk  to another j"~f Yes woman at a party without Collen becoming upset? [ ! No
7 Is Phil justified in worrying about starting r~ l Yes counseling without being able to afford it? No
. 8
Should Susan be reading a magazine when her |~ 1  Yes
household duties are not completed and dinner
is  not prepared? ( J No
9 Should Mary make a greater effort to be ready on time?
r i Y c s
“ No
10 Should Linda thoroughly carry out her respon­sib ilities  once she has accepted them?
□  Yes 
“ N o
11 Is Richard justified in becomming upset with Charlotte discussing matters with her mother?
! Yes 
I No
12 Is Larry neglecting his responsibilities by not carrying out the garbage?
□  Yes 
“ i N o
13
Should Nancy realize that her behavior can be Yes 
interpreted by other men as flirtatious and could 
unintentionally lead to further involvements? No
14
t .
After working hard all day should Jerry be allowed [ 1 Yes 
to spend a quiet evening at home with his wife? No
15
Should Dick continue to devote the time that he Yes
knows is  necessary to obtain advancement in
his career? No
16 Should Tom feel he has the right to concern [_ ! Yes himself with his wife’s health? No
17 Should Chuck be able to watch football on 
Sunday afternoon?
□  Yes 
No
18 Is it John’s prerogative to decide how the family 
money will be spent?
□  Yes
““ No
PLEASE M AK E S U R E  Y O U  H A V E  A N S W E R E D  A L U  T H E  Q U E S T I O N S  A N D  H A V E  C H E C K E D  O N E  A N SW ER  IN E A C H  C O L U M N .  
When you have completed th is answer sheet, return th is and the case  descriptions to the research assis tan t in the 
lobby before completing the other material.
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INVENTORY O F  MARITAL C O N F L IC T S  (IMC) 
C A S E  D E S C R I P T I O N S
1, Bob and Frank are good friends. Janis, Bob’s wife, likes Frank but 
is becoming increasingly annoyed with his unannounced and 
excessively long visits to their apartment, usually at mealtimes. She 
has suggested to Bob that he ask Frank to please phone before 
visiting, but her husband feels this would be insulting to his friend. 
Janis suggests that she might ask Frank to please phone before 
visiting, but this only makes her husband angry. After accusing his 
wife of interfering with his friendship, he refuses to discuss the 
matter further.
2. Cora doesn’t really enjoy sexual relations. When she was first 
married she would avoid love making by telling her husband it was 
painful. More recently she has pretended to  be tired when her 
husband has approached her. Now she has resorted to  retiring 
earlier than her husband. Cora believes sex is an unpleasant subject 
that one does not discuss unless absolutely necessary, and she 
becomes furious when Jack insists they should talk about this 
problem.
3. When Don finally arrives home from work he immediately sits 
down and makes himself comfortable with a can o f beer and 
scatters his jacket, tie and shoes on the furniture and/or floor, 
where they stay until some time after dinner. After putting up with 
this sloppiness for a while, Francine asks Don to stop tossing his 
clothes around the apartment, even if he does eventually pick them 
up. Two days later, Don repeats his usual performance as if 
Francine had said nothing. When she mentions it again, an 
argument develops.
4. Nina has been shopping around carefully for some time to find a 
pair of shoes she can afford that will go with her favorite dress. She 
finally finds a satisfactory pair of shoes and is happy to discover 
that they are on sale. She purchases the shoes and takes them home 
to show her husband, Peter. He does not care whether or not the 
shoes are satisfactory. He doubts that they are necessary at all and 
fails to understand their importance to  her or how much trouble 
she has gone to in order to save money.
5. Mark and Elaine have both been working since their marriage in 
order to live at a level which they feel to be comfortable. 
Occasionally, Elaine becomes depressed because she wants to have 
a child but knows that on Mark’s salary alone this would be 
extremely difficult. Elaine’s emotions get the best o f her, and she 
accuses Mark of not being aggressive enough, implying that he is an 
inadequate provider. Mark was advised not to  go to college because 
of scholastic difficulties and has done as well as could reasonably 
be expected, but his wife continually compares him unfavorably to 
his college-educated friends. Mark’s self esteem is injured and an 
argument begins.
6. A conflict has arisen between Jack and Colleen following a party 
with friends. During the party, Jack becomes involved with another 
woman and ignores his wife. Colleen feels hurt and attempts to 
discuss her feelings o f being neglected but feels like she is not 
understood.
7. Betty and Phil have been having marital difficulties for the past 
year. Betty is no longer reassured by having her husband minimize 
her unhappiness and wants to seek professional counseling. Phil, on 
the other hand, insists on holding off indefinitely before spending 
money on counseling. He says she is far too extravagant. In the 
weeks to  come, many arguments arise because o f their differing 
opinions.
8. Jim routinely arrives home from work a t 5:00 PM and enjoys his 
dinner soon after his arrival. Susan has been a full-time housewife 
since the birth of their first child one year ago but still leaves her 
domestic chores undone. Jim has asked Susan if  she would have the 
house clean and dinner prepared when he returns home. Upon 
arriving home, Jim again finds the ironing board with a pile o f 
clothes in the living room, a dining table that has not been set, and 
his wife sitting on the sofa reading a magazine. Upon viewing the 
situation Jim appears discouraged, whereupon Susan accuses him 
o f  always finding fault with her and angrily storms into the 
kitchen.
9. I t’s Friday evening, and the Carter family has a dinner engagement, 
which had been made the previous week. Frank surprises his wife 
by getting home from work a half hour early and uses the 
bathroom continuously until it is almost time to leave. Since it 
takes Mary more than the few minutes Frank has left her to wash, 
comb her hair, and put on her makeup, it becomes obvious that 
they will be late for their appointment. Frank raises his voice and 
accuses her o f always making them late. Mary tries to calm Frank 
down by saying that being a little late is not all that serious, but 
Frank just becomes more enraged and an argument develops.
10. Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While Linda is 
driving Steve to work on Friday morning, Steve decides that the 
spark plugs need changing and that other minor adjustments should 
be made. He tells his wife to get the work done in time for them to 
leave that evening. Linda also has all the other preparations to 
manage for them and their two children but she manages to get the 
car to the garage and asks for a tuneup. On the trip, Steve hears a 
“ pinging” noise, discovers that the spark plugs are the same ones he 
had been using, and blames his wife for the spark plugs not being 
changed. Linda feels that if he is going to be so picky about how 
things are going to be done, he should assume some responsibility 
for doing them himself. Steve tells her he was too busy.
11. When Charlotte and Richard were living with Charlotte’s family, a 
lo t o f ill will developed between Richard and his in-laws. Richard 
told Ids wife to stop talking so much with members of her family. 
When Charlotte’s mother found out how Richard felt, she was hurt 
and said she thought Richard was ou t of place to make such a 
demand. Richard and Charlotte now have their own home but the 
situation continues. Richard will rarely visit his inlaws, so 
Charlotte’s only regular contact with them is by phone. Charlotte 
usually speaks only to her mother and only phones her mother 
when her husband is not around, but Richard is still not satisfied. 
Richard insists that Charlotte stop speaking with her mother.
MH-20-B (W)
2-6?
Please Continue on Reverse Side
203
12 Each night Laity promises Judy  that lie will throw  the garbage out 
after they finish dinner. Invariably, Larry forgets and leaves the 
kitchen without doing w hat he has prom ised. Ju d y  has fe lt th a t the 
best tiling to do is to throw  the garbage away by  herself and has 
been doing this later in the evening. When he notices this, Larry 
becomes angry with Judy, stating tha t this is his job . As Larry 
continues to follow his old habits, Judy begins to do the chore 
herself, only to be angrily criticized by  her husband.
13. At parties Nancy prefers the company of men to the other women 
and spends much of the evening with them because she finds them 
intellectually stimulating and shares many of their interest. Nancy 
finds at parties that the women’s conversations are limited to 
housekeeping, cliildren, etc. Nancy is upset by Bob’s accusations 
that her behavior may lead to involvement in an | affair or, at the 
very least, misinterpretation of her behavior by other people, 
which would cause gossip. She is deeply hurt by his lack o f trust 
since she is a devoted wife and would not consider an involvement 
with another man.
14. Jerry regularly comes home froin work, eats, and sits down in front 
of the television screen for the entire evening. Betty is cooped up 
in the house all day and feels that she will go crazy if she can’t  get 
out and have some sort o f contact with other human beings. Jerry 
refuses to go out and so there is a disagreement between Betty and 
Jerry.
15. Dick and Diar.e have been married for three years. Dick likes his 
job and is anxious to get ahead. For the past year he has been 
voluntarily spending a great deal of time at his work. Diane feels
. that their marital relationship is deteriorating due to the lack of 
time tiiey are able to spend together. She attem pts to explain to 
Dick that financial success will be meaningless if their marriage is 
destroyed in the process. Dick cooly tells his wife that her response 
is so immature that it is pointless to discuss the subject further.
16. Tom claims to be worried about Betty’s health because she s m o k e s  
so much and has a cough. He gives her endless detailed lectures 
about health hazards and is always demanding that she stop or nut 
down. Betty realizes Uiat she smokes too much and is trying to cut 
down, but Tom’s continued badgering is no help. Tom apparently 
feels that, because he stopped smoking w ithout any difficulty, 
everybody else should quit too and should have no ttoublc doing 
so. He seems unable to understand that it is difficult for her to 
change her smoking habits and he says that if  she really loved him 
she would quit. Betty has tried to  control herself and not gel angry 
at Tom’s continuous comments, but Tom goes right on lecturing to 
her ar.d eventually there are a series o f arguments.
17. Chuck is an ardent sport fan who spends every Sunday afternoon 
glued to the television screen watching football. His wife Betty is 
getting tired o f being left by herself every Sunday, so she asks him 
to give up this part o f his football watching and plans some Sunday 
activities for them together. Chuck not only refuses to give up any 
football, hut lie launches in to  a  whole series o r aigumcnts to 
defend hirnself. He tells Betty that no one clse’s wife is as 
unreasonable as she is. He accuses her o f spending her time 
watching soap operas while he is at work. He also tells her that 
since he work's hard he should be able to  watch football games if  lie 
wishes. Betty is upset by his attitude but continues to want him to 
spend Sunday with her.
IS. John has been out o f  college for three years and is able, to provide a 
modest but adequate income for himself and his wife, Jean. They 
have been planning a vacation, which Jean lias been enthusiastically 
anticipating. John  has always been a stereo enthusiast arid 
presently feels that he wants to  improve liis steieo by buying new 
speakers. If John proceeds with his plan, the vacation they have 
planned would be impossible. John states that he is the bread­
winner.. dso-rww.V'lu-xirry: Ho insists-that as the




COU RTSHIP AND MARRIAGE STUDY
N A M E
INVENTORY O F  M A RITA L C O N F L IC T S  (IMC) D A T E C O U P L E  N O
ANSWER S H E E T S E X : [ j  Male 1 i Female
INSTRUCTIONS: P lease  read each case  description and answer questions a b ,  £ a n d  cl for each case.
Check the appropriate box in each column and do not leave any questions unanswered.
Item
No.
(°) (b) (c) (<•)
Who is primarily 
responsible for 
the problem?
Have you had a 
similar problem?
Have you known 
other couples 
who have similar 
problems?
Check One Check One Check One
HUSBAND WIFE YES NO YES NO
1 Should Bob ask Frank to phone before visiting?
C  Ye: 
3  No
2 Is Cora being reasonable in refusing to d iscuss L_3 Yes their sexual problems? f j  No
3
Should Don be more considerate of Francine by [ j Yes 
not scattering his clothes around? [ j  No
4 Should Pecer try to understand Nina’s well- 1 ! Ye planned purchase of these particular shoes? L_J
5 Is Elaine justified in accusing Mark of being ( □  Ye.- an inadequate provider? No
6 Should Jack be more attentive to his wife at [ , '  Yev parties? L J  No
7
Is Betty ju stified in  feeling that their mar- Q j  Ye:- 
riage is  more important than any financial 
considerations? | -No
8
Should Susan be reading a magazine when her [PJ Ycv
household duties are not completed and dinner
is not prepared? | 1 No
9 Should John have a greater understanding of why she is  late?
Yey
□  No
10 Is Steve being unteasonable in blaming his wife for the work not getting done?
“ 1 Ye. 
j N o
11 Should Charlotte be able to speak freely 1 Yc.-. with her mother? j*1 No
12 Is Larry neglecting h is responsibilities by 
not carrying out the garbage?
i Ye: 
□  n o
13 Should Bob trust his wife and not be upset that she is  enjoying the company of other men?
□  Ye*
□  No
14 Should Jerry understand and respond to Betty’s 
boredom by going out in the evening?
i Yes
□  No
15 Should Dick spend more time with h is wife? ' Yes 
i No
16 . Should Tom leave Betty alone and quit pressuring her?
f ~ i  Yes 
“ iN o
17 Should Chuck spend more time on Sundays with 1 ! Yes 
his wife? No
18 Is it John’s prerogative to decide how the Yes 
family money will be spent? l ”  No
PLEASE m a k e  s u r e  y o u  h a v e  a n s w e r e d  a l l  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  a n d  h a v e  c h e c k e d  o n e  a n s w e r  i n  e a c h  c o l u m n .
Wien you have completed th is answer sheet, return this and the case descriptions to the research a ss is tan t in the 
. *°bby before completing the other material.__________________________________________  ______
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE IMC DISCUSSION SESSION
Now we would like you to fully discuss the conflict 
each couple is having and decide who is primarily responsible 
for the problem. As was previously mentioned, in some cases 
the descriptions you each read represented different points 
of view. For example, if you and your spouse were involved 
in a disagreement and subsequently you each were to relay 
to me what happened during the conflict, it is highly probable 
that each of you would present different points of view 
regarding your marital conflict. However, please do not be 
distracted by such differences, for in every case each point 
of view contains all the essential facts, and our primary 
concern is how you resolve the conflict each couple is having.
In discussing these cases it is important that you use 
only the information provided. Also, it is important that you 
resolve each disagreement before going on to the next case.
Once again, I want to stress the importance of this 
task for helping couples who are having conflicts. It is 
vital to our research that your answers be thoroughly discussed.
We will have a tape recorder on so that no one will have 
to be present in the room while you are discussing these items.
You will have about 30 minutes to discuss these cases.
I will come in and remind you 5 minutes before your time is up.
If you finish before that time, please bring the materials to me.
These are your individual response sheets (GIVE TO 
EACH SPOUSE) to help you recall your answers to each item. 
However, while discussing these cases, do not show your spouse 
your answer sheet. You will not have the case descriptions to 
refer to, so do the best you can remembering the details of 
the cases.
This is the sheet (JOINT DISCUSSION FORM) for recording 
your joint answers. The brief sentence for each item should 
help you recall the cases. As you can see, on Part A you 
must decide which spouse is primarily responsible for the 
problem and on Part B you must choose one of the two alternatives.
On both Part A and Part B do not leave any question blank 
and check only one answer for each.
C O U R T S H I P  A N D  M A R R I A G E  S T U D Y  




D A T E C O U P L E  N O .
DISCUSSIO N:
INSTRUCTIONS: I t  i s  v ery  im portan t th a t 
i s  p rim arily  re s p o n s ib le  
PART B. Do not leave
for EACH case you decide which spouse, either the husband or wife,
for the problem. You should make ONE response for both PART A and
any questions unanswered. Complete each case before going on to the next item.
Case
P A R T  A P A R T  B




Which of the following would be o better way to - 
to resolve the conflict?
Check Only OneHusband Wife
J, Conflict over frequent v isits  
by husband's friend and w ife 's 
annoyance.
1 ! Should Bob ask Frank to phone before visiting? 
O R
1 S Should Jan is stop interfering in her husband’s 
friendship?
2. Conflict regarding satisfaction  
during sexual relations.
1__1 Is Cora being reasonable in refusing to d iscuss
the problem of sex?
O R
1 1 Is Jack justified in suggesting they d iscuss 
the problem of sex?
3. Conflict concerning husband's 
distributing his shirt, tie , jacket 
and shoes around the apartment 
when he gets home from work .
1 j Should Don be able to relax th is way before dinner? 
O R
1 1 Should Don be more considerate of Francine by not 
scattering his clothes around?
4. Conflict about wife’s purchase of 
a pair of shoes to wear with new 
dress.
1 1 Is  it reasonable for Peter to question the necessity  
of Nina’s purchase?
O R
1 i Should Peter try to understand Nina’s weJl-planncd 
purchase of these particular shoes?
5. Conflict between Mark and Elaine 
stemming from their desire to have 
a child but recognizing the 
financial burden.
1 1 Is  Elaine justified in accusing Mark of being an 
inadequate provider?
O R
1 1 Should Elaine be more understanding concerning 
Mark’s ability and achievements?
6. Conflict caused by wife feeling 
ignored by husband while at a 
party.
□ .S h o u ld  Jack be permitted to talk  to another woman at 
a party without Colleen bec.oming upset?
O R
I | Should Jack  be more attentive to h is  wife at parties?
7. Conflict over when to seek profes­
sional help for the mar i t al . . . .  
difficulties between Betty and 
Phil.
1 ! Is Phil justified in worrying about starting counseling ■ 
without being able to afford it?
O R
1 1 Is Betty justified in feeling that their marriage is  
more important than any financial considerations?
8. Conflict concerning wife’s
inability to have house clean and 
dinner ready upon husband’s 
arrival.
1 1 Should Susan be reading a magazine when her household 
duties are not completed and dinner is  not prepared?
O R
□  Should Susan try to be a better housekeeper?
9. Conflict over wife’s la teness 
for dinner engagement.
1 i Should Mary make a greater effort to be ready on time? 
O R
□  Should John have a greater understanding of why she is  
late?
10. Conflict over car breokdown 
while taking a short weekend 
trip.
1 1 Should Linda thoroughly carry out her responsibilities
once she has accepted them?
O R
1 1 Is Steve being unreasonable in blaming his wife for 
the work not getting done?
2-49 P le o s e  C ontinue On R everse  Side
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% JOINT DISCUSSION - (C o n t in u e d )
C ase
PART A PART B
Who is  primarily 
resp o n sib le  for 
the problem?
Check One
Which o f th e  follow ing w ould be a better way to  
re so lv e  the con flict?
Check Only OneHusband Wife
11. Conflict over w ife ’ s
conversations with' her mother.
— ....* - •
1 I Is  Richard justified in becoming upset with Charlotte 
d iscussing matters with her mother?
OR
I | Should Charlotte be able to speak freely with her 
mother?
12. Conflict about th e  resp o n sib ility  
for tlvowing the garbage aw ay.
r  1 Is Larry neglecting h is responsibility  by not 
carrying out the garbage?
OR
1 1 Is  Judy expecting too much by asking her husband 
to  carry out the garbage?
13. Conflict over w ife ’ s  con versa tion s  
with men at parties.
1 1 Should Nancy realize  that her behavior can be 
interpreted by other men as flirtatious and could 
unintentionally lead to further involvements 
OR
1 1 Should Bob trust h is wife and not be upset that she 
is  enjoying the company of other men?
14. Conflict regarding even in g  
entertainment.
1 1 After working hard a ll day should Jerry be allowed 
to spend a quiet evening at home wich his wife?
OR
1 1 Should Jerry understand and respond to Betty’s 
boredom by going out in the evening?
15. Conflict over husband spending  
time at the o ff ice .
1 1 Should Dick continue ro devote the time that he 
knows is necessary to obtain advancement in h is 
career?
OR
1 1 Should Dick spend more time with h is  wife?
16. Conflict over w ife ’ s  sm oking.' - 
O
1 1 Should Tom feel he has the right to concern him self 
with h is wife’s health?
OR
1 1 Should Tom leave Betty alone and quit pressuring 
her?
17. Conflict over TV football gam es. 
» -
1 1 Should Chuck be able to watch football on 
Sunday afternoons?
OR ___
1 1 Should Chuck spend more time on Sundays with h is  
wife?
18. Conflict of vacation  v s .  stereo  
speakers.
1 1 Is it John’s  prerogative to  decide how the family 
money will be spent?
OR
1 I Should financial expenditures be a joint decision?
P L E A S E  T A K E  A M IN U T E  T O  R E C H E C K  Y O U R  A N S W E R S  ON  E A C H  Q U E S T I O N .  
Y O U  S H O U L D  H A V E  O N E  C H E C K  F O R  P A R T  A A N D  O N E  C H E C K  F O R  P A R T  B. 
A F T E R  R E C H E C K I N C  Y O U R  R E S P O N S E S .  R E T U R N  T H I S  F O R M  T O  A  R E S E A R C H  




MARITAL POWER ASSERTION CODING 
SYSTEM (MPACS)
INTRODUCTION
MPACS is a scheme for coding power modes or types of 
power assertion used by marital partners. Power assertions 
are attempts to alter group outcomes. In the marital dyad, 
they can be viewed as attempts to alter the other's behavior. 
Power modes are specific types of power assertion, and are 
operationalized here as the specific MPACS categories. The 
combination of all the MPACS categories can be taken as an 
operationalization of power assertions.
Features
1. The system was developed for interaction elicited by 
the Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC) task (Olson &
Ryder, 1970) . However, it could be adapted for use with other 
verbal interaction tasks.
2. MPACS is not intended to provide exhaustive coverage of 
all verbal behavior in an interaction session. Statements 
not coded as power assertions are simply tallied in a sep­
arate category ("98" - non-power assertion).
3. The formal structure of a statement (e.g., question/ 
command/statement) is generally disregarded except where 
specified. For example, many attempts to give "information" 
or express a partisan opinion are couched in the form of a 
leading question which urges an agreement response from
the other. These are coded as if they were in statement 
form.
4. Statements including expressions of agreement are not 
automatically defined as non-power modes simply on that basis. 
Whether and how the statement is elaborated are the deciding 
factors.
5. Unit of Coding:
(a) A statement is any "coherent" utterance bounded 
at the beginning and end by another person's "coherent" 
utterance.
(b) Statements considered incoherent, and therefore 
ignored by the coder, are:
(1) incomplete ideas which cannot be clas­
sified. (Example: "Well, it's . . .") Usually fragments
of three words or less, but note that "coherent" statements
210
of three words or less are coded, unless they fit (2) 
below (Example: "No, I disagree;" "That's not right;"
"Put down husband").
(2) Perfunctory social acknowledgments, usually 
interspersed through the other's statement. These merely 
show that one is following the other (Example: "yeah;" "ok;" 
"right;" "uhuh;" "mmm"). Note that these comments are not 
always perfunctory— if they indicate active agreement or 
response to a question, they are coded "98" (non-power 
assertion).
(3) Statements which cannot be heard after 
repeated efforts.
(c) A statement may contain more than one idea.
If more than one idea is expressed, more than one code may 
be used for a statement. For example, a statement might 
include two sentences. If each expresses a different idea, 
each would be coded differently. But if both sentences 
express the same thing, they are coded once together. Double 
coding of the same statement is allowed only if two distinct 
ideas are contained in it.
If part of a statement can be coded in MPACS, do 
not use "98" (non-power assertion) for another part of the 
same statement. "98" is used only if the whole statement
does not contain MPACS codes.
6. Priorities among codes are specified where necessary and 
likely points of confusion among related codes are clarified 
as much as possible. However, it will often still be neces­
sary to consider the overall context of a statement, the
couple's general "style," and/or your own assessment of the
statement's general impact, in deciding which code to use.
Try to get a sense of the statement as a whole, or the 
distinct ideas embedded in it if it contains more than one 
idea, and code on that basis.
Special Notes
1. All statements not covered even partially by the MPACS 
codes are coded "98"— non-power assertion.
2. Statements coded "49"— other power assertion/related 
behavior— should be listed, described, and location specified 
on back of summary code sheet.
3. Interaction with the session administrator is ignored. 
This is usually before, after, and at 20-minute reminder. 
Couple's post-completion checking and interaction is also 
ignored.
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4. For the present study discussions of only the twelve 
conflict-inducing vignettes are coded (3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10,
11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17) .
Overview of Main MPACS Categories
Unqualified power assertions (UPA) are unilateral 
attempts to alter group outcomes (or the other's behavior, 
in a dyad), in which no effort is made to provide the partner 
with a rationale for changing. These assertions may be blunt, 
directive, relatively coercive in the sense that no effort 
is made to obtain compliance "voluntarily." Further, the 
actor may sometimes give off a sense of not attending to or 
acknowledging the other.
Qualified power assertions (QPA) are also unilateral 
in the sense that the presentation is one-sided or the 
actor is operating with a view toward the other person, not 
herself changing. However, here the actor is attempting to 
provide some inducement or incentive for the other to alter 
behavior, and thus may be seen as trying to obtain "voluntary" 
compliance rather than to coerce the other. The sub-types 
of QPA represent different degrees of subtlety in the induce­
ments for change offered by the actor.
In the most direct of these sub-types consequence 
identification, the actor explicitly promises rewards or 
threatens punishments in exchange (or as inducements) for 
behavioral/positional change. In qualified partisan assertion, 
the actor presents rationales and persuasive arguments in an 
effort to convince the other of the merits of his position.
The partner is offered some "good reason" for compliance. The 
most subtle type of QPA is definitional assertion. The 
actor is presenting his definition of some aspect of the 
situation, and thus laying the groundwork for behavior change 
by the other. If one can get the other•to accept one's own 
view of "the facts of the case," one is closer to obtaining a 
position change. Further, if the partner does change her 
position she has been giVen an opportunity to rationalize the 
change as a function of a new understanding of "the facts," 
rather than as "giving in" or losing the argument.
Bilateral power assertions are suggestions or offers 
of change on the part of both partners simultaneously. The 
expectation is that partial concessions will be reciprocated 
in kind. Thus, both actors "win" something and "lose" some­
thing, but neither experiences total victory/defeat. The 
"sense" of the behavior is to be making contracts, bargaining, 
negotiating, trading.
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SUMMARY OF MPACS CATEGORIES
I. Unqualified Power Assertions (UPA)
01 - Reject/attack other
02 - Command
03 - "Do anyway" attempt
04 - Surrender under protest
05 - Reiteration
06 - Unqualified disagreement/refusal
07 - Unqualified partisan assertion




B. Qualified Partisan Assertions
20 - Qualified partisan assertions and persuasion 
attempts
C. Definitional Assertions
30 - Task/procedure definition
31 - Situation definition (vignettes)
32 - Personal definition
33 - Other's position definition
34 - Progress definition
III. Bilateral Power Assertions (BPA)
40 - Explicit position trade
41 - Other compromise/bilateral solution
42 - Role division solution
Other
49 - Other power assertion/related behavior (SPECIFY)
50 - Self-depreciation/deference 
98 - Non-power assertion
Related Codes; Keep Separate
A. 05, 06, 07, 20, 31
B. 30, 33, 34, 41
C. 34(2), 20
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DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF MPACS CATEGORIES
01 Reject/attack other
Direct, negative statements about the other which are 
personally critical, not just disagreeing.
Example: "That's really stupid."
"You're just being stubborn."
NOTE: "Neutral"/"factual" characterizations of
other are coded 32. Example: "You don't take 
out the garbage."
Also, other statements where voice-tone indicates 
obvious sarcasm, disbelief, skepticism, impatience with 
other, frustration with other, anger, ridicule, verbal 
aggression. Range from mild to extreme is included.
Example: "Are you kidding?" (sarcasm)
"And I suppose you also think he enjoys it 
(ridicule)
NOTE: 01 is a priority code. Regardless of what
else a statement represents, if it fits the 
above, it is coded 01. Example: "Don't
threaten me!" (angry)— code 01, not 02 
(command).
02 Command
Any statement which is a formal command.
Examples: "Put down this one."
"Turn the page."
"Just don't argue on this one."
"Don't do that."
"Listen to me."
"Tell me what you think."
NOTE: This is a priority code, after 01 (reject/attack)
03 "Do anyway" attempt
Explicit attempt to ignore opposition and mark down own 
position. Unilateral imposition, disregard of other's 
view. Usually occurs after some discussion, often at an 
impasse. Must be explicit.
21.4
Example: "Well, I'm gonna put her down, anyway."
(06) (02)
W: "You can't do that. Erase it. We
didn't agree yet."
A prior "do anyway" attempt by H 
is inferred from W response, and 
coded.
but: "Put down the wife anyway."--code 02.
04 Surrender under protest
One-sided "giving in" or capitulation in which the message 
is actually not "I give in," but just the opposite. The 
actor makes it quite clear that he has not been persuaded 
by the other (in fact, his own position may have hardened), 
but is yielding to the other's persistence only. This is 
a power assertion in that it represents a final attempt 
to prick the other's conscience, or even threaten her, 
for "browbeating" the actor. It is something like a 
"rhetorical question" in that it is not what it appears 
to be at face value. This is a judgment call, and voice- 
tone (often hostile) and context can help distinguish it 
from related situations noted below.
Examples: "Do whatever you want. I don't care."
(voice-tone may be hostile, exaggerated 
indifference, pouting, etc.)
"I'm really unhappy with this, but I'll go 
along."
"Well, if it's that important, ok, but I 
don't like it."
"I'll go along with you, but just to get 
it over with."
NOTE: If the actor is bowing to the other's special
expertise or right to decide in a particular domain, 
then code it 42 (role division solution), unless 
the voice-tone indicates that 04 is more appro­
priate.
Example: "You know more about this sort of thing,
so you decide."— code 42.
NOTE: If the actor has genuinely been persuaded and is ack­
nowledging that, or is saying "no matter what the 
issue, you're better at this so I'll bow to your 
judgment," then it is a real surrender and should 
generally be coded 98 (non-power assertion). Or, 




Flat repetition of one's position with no elaboration.
Any elaboration requires another code (basically the same 
phrasing repeated, though not necessarily word for word). 
May be seen as an attempt to "muscle" one's position 
across, similar to nagging— if you say it often enough, 
you may wear the other down. Should not be used if the 
actor seems to have just run out of arguments and is re­
turning to an earlier one or trying to present an earlier 
argument in a different way. Rather, should include 
blunt repetition which gives force, stress, or emphasis 
to one's position, or has a wearing effect on the other.
Examples: "I still say it's the husband."
"Again, the wife should understand."
"It's just her fault, pure and simple."
NOTE: Takes priority over 06 (disagreement/refusal).
Example: "That's just not right." repeated— code
05, rather than 06.
NOTE: At the beginning of a new vignette, the first
statement by one of the spouses may be a direct 
reading from the answer sheet. If that is all 
that's included in the statement, code it 98 (non­
power assertion). But if the reading is followed 
by disclosure of a position, the statement is 
coded 07 (unqualified partisan assertion) or 20 
(qualified partisan assertion). But, if later in 
the discussion the actor rereads from the answer 
sheet to emphasize her own position, this may be 
coded 05.
Example: "It says 'conflict caused by wife feeling
ignored' . . . "  — code 05.
06 Unqualified disagreement/refusal
Disagreement/refusal with no elaboration. Flat contra­
diction. If elaborated at all, another code is used.
Examples: "No, I don't agree."
"I disagree. It's the wife."
"It didn't say that."
"I won't put that down."
NOTE: If 01 is indicated, code 01.
NOTE: 05 (reiteration) takes priority.
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07 Unqualified partisan assertion
Non-elaborated one-sided statements of own position.
This includes more general partisan assertions than just 
those specifically about the vignette events and people. 
Includes initial disclosure of position, even though 
speaker may be merely "informing" the other of her 
position and voice-tone may not reflect a strong personal 
commitment.
Non-elaborated normative (should/ought) statements about 
the vignette characters are included here. If elaborated, 
code 20. Characterizations of the vignette characters, 
even those interpretable as opinions, are coded 31.
Examples: "I put down the wife."
"I think the husband is responsible."
"Oh, the wife, of course, don't you think?"
(leading question)
"She should have asked him first."
but: "He was being obnoxious."— code 31.
This code is not confined to position disclosures on the 
specific IMC items. It also includes opinion disclosures 
on related, and not-so-related issues in the conversation.
Example: "I really think couples should work to­
gether on dividing up those sorts of 
chores."
NOTE: Convention for when an actor's first disclosure is
an agreement statement is to code it 07 (or 20 if 
elaborated).
Example: W: "I put the husband."— code 07.
H: "I did too."— also code 07.
10 Promise
Explicit or clearly implicit "if-then" statement in 
which A promises material/expressive rewards in return 
for desired behavior by B. Rare.
Example: "If you'll just calm down, I'll be much
more ready to consider your position."
11 Threat
Same as 10, except A threatens material/expressive retalia­
tion/punishment for undesired behavior by B. Rare.
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Example: "If you keep on this way, I'll be really
angry."
NOTE: Clear trade-offs in position are not included as
10 or 11. Code those 40. Example: "I'll agree
to the wife on this one, if you'll say the husband 
there."— code 40.
20 Qualified partisan assertions and persuasion attempts
Elaborated one-sided statements of one's own position 
or attempts to persuade or convince the other. Provides 
arguments/rationales for position based on use of logic, 
analogy, hypothetical/conditional examples, appeals to 
empathic understanding. It is assumed that even if the 
partisan position is not explicitly stated, the persuasive 
attempt is a qualification of the implicit position. (For 
example, read "If he had . . . then she would have . . . "  
as having "therefore, I conclude that . . . "  attached.)
Statements including "information" or characterizations of 
the people/events/behavior in the vignettes are included 
only if the "info" is explicitly a rationale for one's 
position. That is, the "information" is part of an 
explititly partisan statement, as in "I think the husband 
is responsible because he didn't explain what had to be 
done."
Elaborated normative statements (should/ought) about the 
vignette couples are included here.
Examples: "I tried to understand how he felt, though,
and decided she really had to . . ." 
(empathy)
"If she had been willing to listen, he 
wouldn't have been so upset" (hypothe­
tical/conditional example)
"I just have to say the wife, because she 
was the one being extravagant" (explicit 
information, rationale)
"Wouldn't it have been just the same, though, 
even if he hadn't done that?" (hypothetical/ 
conditional example; leading question)
"I think he should have . . . because . . . "  
(elaborated normative statement)
NOTE: If the rationale for a position is based on personal
information, double code the statement 20 and 32 
(personal definition). See 32 for rationale.
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30 Task/procedure definition
Supplies task/procedure "information" or suggests proce­
dure. May be in opinion/suggestion form, but there is 
little affect and no sense of personal commitment to a 
position.
This code includes two fairly distinct contents: (1)
information, questions and suggestions about the task/ 
procedure/equipment imposed by the investigator, and (2) 
information, questions and suggestions on how the couple 
might proceed within the externally imposed constraints 
(like making a list of alternatives). (1) refers to how
we have to (must) do it, and (2) to how we can do it.
Both refer to "how to do it."
Examples: "I think we have to choose one."
"We have to finish this one first."
"Let's skip it and come back to it."
"It's very hard to check one or the other,
because of the way they have it here." 
(defines task itself as difficult)
NOTE: Suggestions that some decision-rule (like flipping
a coin) be used, or bilateral solution suggestions, 
would be coded as a bilateral power assertion (one 
of the 40 codes— usually 41 or 42).
NOTE: This code would be appropriate with any laboratory
task. Further, even in a natural setting with no 
formal task, task definitions would occur. For 
example, one partner might suggest making a list 
of alternative solutions, or postponing discussion 
of an issue, or define precedence of issues, as in 
"We need to decide on how much money we have before 
we decide where to go."
31 Situation definition (vignettes)
Gives "information" from vignettes, or clearly relevant 
to vignettes. Speaker is trying to supply the "facts 
of the case." The speaker may be elaborating, distorting, 
attributing motives or meaning, making generalizations, 
or drawing conclusions about the people/events/behaviors 
in the vignettes, but presenting this as "information." 
Affect is generally neutral.
Normative statements (should or ought) about the vignette 
couples would be coded 07 or 20, and hypothetical/condi­
tional speculation about what might have happened would be 
coded 20.
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Note that situation definitions, as well as other defini­
tional assertions, may begin with "I think . . "I
feel . . . etc.
Examples: "This is the one where the wife . . . "
"And the husband said . . ."
"It said she tried to help him."
"He was asking for it."
"She was really nagging him and being 
obnoxious."
"Wasn't she just worried about his health?" 
(leading question)
but: "No, it didn't say that."— code 06 
(disagreement)
32 Personal definition
Gives personal "information" about self, spouse, couple, 
relatives, or friends. Includes descriptions/attributions 
of "real life" behavior and emotions, summary characteri­
zations of personality, relationships, etc. Also includes 
observations on own or spouse's behavior in the laboratory 
task, including whether that behavior is "in character" 
or not (see example 1)
Examples: "That just doesn't seem like you."
"Of course, I do that all the time."
"We never argue over such silly details." 
"You're always watching football."
"I don't mind when you do that."
"Your parents do exactly the same thing.
Remember . . . "
"Well, you know we've talked about how 
the Smith's over-reacted."
If personal information is explicitly part of a partisan 
argument, as in clear "arguing by analogy," and is clearly 
tied to one's position, then it is double coded 20 and 32.
Example: "It's just like your father."— code 32
but: "I had to say that the wife was responsible
since I saw it as just like the situation 
with John and Mary that we've talked 
about."— code 32 and 20.
NOTE: Negative-toned attacks/evaluations of other are
coded 01.
Example: "You're just being stubborn."— code 01
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NOTE: Use 33 (other's position definition) for attri­
butions/summaries of other's task-related posi­
tions .
NOTE: The notion of "mind-reading" in the clinical
literature (as in Bach and Wyden's Intimate Enemy) 
is covered in codes 01, 32, and 33. (Example:
"I know what you're thinking . . .").
If negative, attack, code 01.
If about position, code 33.
If about the other person, but not 01, code 32. 
NOTE: "We read them differently."— code 32
but:
"They gave us different stories."— code 30.
33 Other's position definition
Show understanding of, repeat, summarize, or define other's 
view or position. Does not necessarily imply agreement 
with other. Includes "attribution" of a position to other,
or "leading" definitions of other's view (see examples
4-6) .
Examples: "I see what you mean now . . . "
"Are you saying that . . .?"
"As I understand you, the husband . . . "
"I'm sure you would say she accepted the 
responsibility."
"Naturally you agree it's a question of 
long-range effects."
"I know deep down you feel the same way 
on this."
NOTE: The code refers to definition or summary of other's
position, while 32 (personal definition) would 
include definition of other's personality, des­
cription of behavior, etc.
NOTE: Must be more than perfunctory social acknowledgments
("yeah;" "uh huh;" "ok") which are ignored in the 
system.
34 Progressive definition
(1) Provides summary perspective/characterizes couple's 
progress on task, or (2) weighs alternative views equally,
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or (3) indicates need for new approach or tactic, or 
(4) actually suggests a different approach in general 
terms. Usually occurs after considerable discussion— at 
an impasse— and provides some broader perspective on the 
couple's progress.
Examples: (1) "We really seem to disagree on this one."
(2) "Well, on one hand he should be respon­
sible because . . ., but on the
other hand, she . . . "
(3) ""This is going nowhere." "We'll have
to try something different."
(4) "Somebody just has to give in."
To distinguish (3) and (4) from 30, they are general 
assessments of need or general suggestions, while 30 is 
a specific suggestion. Also, 34 is a perspective-taking 
move, while 30 is not.
40 Explicit position trade
Explicit offers or suggestions of trade-offs or bilateral 
compromises. Usually after considerable discussion.
Examples: "I'll agree here, if you'll say the wife
on this part."
"How about putting your choice on this one 
and mine on the other."
"If you'll give me this one, we can go back 
and change #7."
41 Other compromise/bilateral solution
Explicit bilateral solutions or attempts at compromise, 
other than direct trade-offs of position, such as:
(1) global compromise offer
Example: "Why don't we compromise here."
(2) suggest arbitrary/external decision rule
Examples: "Let's flip a coin."
"We should take turns."
(3) agree to disagree
Examples: "Well, since we know that both are
all right, let's put . . . "
"Even though we disagree, why don't we 
just put . . ., to settle the matter."
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42 Role division solution
This is actually a special case of 41 (other compromise/ 
bilateral solution), in which the outside decision rule 
being used is one of individual expertise or a division of 
labor. The actor is genuinely saying that there is a 
general rule which can be used to develop a solution, and 
that is whose area the issue falls in.
Examples: "You know more about this one, so you
decide it."
"Well, when it comes to working on cars, 
that's my area, so why don't we go with 
my answer."
49 Other power assertion/related behavior (SPECIFY)
Other unilateral/bilateral; qualified/unqualified behavior 
which seems important to the study of power assertions but 
is not covered by the specific MPACS categories.
Must be listed and location specified on special form.
50 Self depreciation/deference
Statements of negative evaluation of self, lack of con­
fidence in own judgment/ability, or self-depreciating 
deference to other. Fairly broad.
Examples: "I guess I didn't read it carefully."
"Oh, I misunderstood."
"I'm terrible at this."
"Now I don't know at all . . . "
If another code seems applicable, give the other code 
priority. Use this only for relatively clear behaviors.
98 Non-power assertions
Statements not covered by the MPACS categories.
APPENDIX D
DETAILED CORRELATION MATRIXES FOR POWER MODES 
HUSBANDS AND WIVES
Table 0.1. Detailed Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Husbands
0501 02 04 06 07 3103 20 30 32 33 34 40 41 49 50 98Power Mode
Unqualified Power Assertions (UPA)
01 Reject/attack other
02 Command
03 "Do anyway" attempt
04 Surrender under protest
05 Reiteration
06 Unqualified disagreement/refusal
07 Unqualified partisan assertion
Qualified Power Assertions (QPA) 
Consequence identification:
10 Promise-. .





















20 Qualified partisan assertions .26 .06 .24 .15 .32 .22 .26 —
Definition assertion:
30 Task-procedure definition .06 .41 .07 .07 .19 .11 .28 .19 —
31 Situation definition .39 .15 .46 .16 .51 .33 .23 .50 .26 —
32 Personal definition .15 .03 .18 .23 .02 -.01 .18 .36 .13 .32 —
33 Other's position definition .34 .16 .18 .04 .17 .23 -.01 .23 .08 .17 .05 —
34 Progress definition -.08 -.06 -.14 .23 .05 -.06 .03 .18 .22 .13 -.06 .04
Bilateral Power Assertions (BPA)
.0940 Explicit position trade
41 Other compromise/bilateral solution -.04
















.10 .03 .12 —
49 Other power-related behavior -.06 .01 -.06 .03 -.09 -.06 -.02 -.22 -.14 -.12 -.09 -.10 -.03 -.06 .01 —
50 Self-depreciation .18 .10 -.08 • 09 .05 .06 -.16 -.06 -.05 -.06 .03 .10 -.09 -.01 -.04 .39 —
09 Non-power assertion .32 .20 .07 -.08 .34 .35 .43 .13 .32 .32 .12 .06 .21 .09 .11 -.01 .05 —
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Table D.2. Detailed Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Wives
Power Mode 01 02 03 04 05 . 06 07 20 30 31 32 33 34 40 41 49 50 98
Unqualified Power Assertions (UPA) 
01 Reject/attack other
02 Connand .57 —
03 "Do anyway" attempt -.04 -.08 —
04 Surrender under protest .39 .40 .06 —
05 Reiteration .50 .60 .13 .47
06 Unqualified disagreement/refusal .55 .52 .29 .39
07 Unqualified partisan assertion .02 .03 .18 .04
Qualified Power Assertions (QPA) 
Consequence identification:
10 Promise,
11 Threat * *no significant incidence)
Q ual i f ied  p a r t i s a n  a s s e r t i o n :
20 Qualified partisan assertions .27 . 3S .06 .37 .43 .22 .16 —
Definition assertion:
30 Task-procedure definition .13 .24 -.10 .08 .19 .11 -.02 .30 —
31 Situation definition .27 .45 .02 .29 .47 .29 .08 .41 .36 —
32 Personal definition .19 .13 .08 .30 .06 .08 .12 .45 .30 .29 —
33 Other's position definition .11 .10 .07 .08 .14 .03 .22 .20 .26 .11 .10
34 Progress definition .32 .32 -.07 .20 .26 .16 -.11 .24 .30 .24 .27 .28
Bilateral Power Assertions (BPA)
40 Explicit position trade 
41'Other compromise/bilateral solution 





























49 Other power-related behavior •.07 .00 .78 -.07 .16 .33 -.02 -.06 -.08 .09 -.09 -.09 -.04 -.02 -.04 —
50 Self-depreciation .40 .16 -.04 .20 .23 • .21 -.08 -.02 .11 .07 -.07 .00 .25 , .05 . -.02 .01 —
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